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《全球传媒学刊》编辑部

主编的话

本期《全球传媒学刊》的封面主题是“中国与国际伦理前沿的对话”，特邀主编是陈昌凤教授。

随着传播技术的发展和国际社会的深刻变革，媒介伦理问题已经成为全球性的热门话题。在中国，新闻传播界也面临着伦理方面的各种考验。2014 年 4 月，清华大学新闻与传播学院及其新闻研究中心、中国新闻史学会外国新闻传播史研究委员会联合主办了“第四届全球媒介伦理圆桌会议”，来自中国内地、香港和台湾地区从事媒介伦理教学研究的知名教授与国际顶尖的媒介伦理专家，就新形势下的媒介传播问题进行了研讨和对话。本期专栏中的几篇论文，便来自这次以新闻专业伦理为主题的国际学术会议。

在这次会议上发表论文的 5 位国际学者，都是媒介伦理专业的顶级专家。他们同意将英文论文首先发表在《全球传媒学刊》上。我们也从中国参会学者专家的论文中挑选了三篇。

被尊为“媒介伦理之父”的美国伊利诺大学克里斯琴斯教授（Clifford G. Christians）的论文《全球观中的真实性与专业性伦理》从哲学的层面重新审视了新闻的真实性问题。他认为，在全球化与技术垄断传播的时代，“真实”的概念和新闻的本质都需要重新定义。后现代社会的“真实”界定，实际上饱含着价值判断问题。他倡导“阿莱西娅”（Aletheia）式的真实——即人类生活在思想和文化的系统中，现实及对现实的人类意识处于建构性的环境。这意味着，新闻必须强调“解释的充分性”，从而反映所报道情境的真正特征。

新闻真实性的问题在新媒介环境中更加突出，也成为中国新闻管理部门关注的重点。2010 年，中宣部等 5 部门联合下发《关于深入开展“杜绝虚假报道 增强社会责任 加强新闻职业道德建设“专项教育活动的通知》。2011 年，新闻出版总署印发了《关于严防虚假新闻报道的若干规定》。随之，2012 年，中国记协和中国政法大学在中国大陆组织了一次新闻行业自律情况问卷调查。记协张洪超博士介绍了调查的结果。多数被调查者反对接受各种利益输送的行为；在“主动淡化不利于重要广告客户的新闻”方面，明确反对的人将近七成，占 69%，而只有 10%的人表示赞同。

在国际范围内，新闻的专业性集中体现于全球化和本土化之间的冲突。来自加拿大的美国俄勒冈大学沃德（Stephen J. A. Ward）教授提出了“开放的媒介伦理观”，主张正确看待爱国主义在新闻报道中的影响力。纽约州立大学传播系的印度裔拉奥（Shakuntala Rao）教授也探讨了公共理性的包容性和非本土主义原则在印度等发展中国家媒体中的运行情况，主张“去语境化”，倡导不局限于特定的地区、族群、国家或宗教的理性。而南非罗德大学的赫尔曼•沃瑟曼教授（Herman Wasserman）则以南非为例，认为形成于西方发达国家的专业伦理不能在不加修正的情况下移至他处。

中国学者大多认为，西方的新闻专业性及其媒介伦理不能照搬到中国。中国人民大学的陈立丹教授特别从文化和体制两方面分析了中国新闻自律举步维艰的根源。浙江大学吴飞教授阐述了大数据时代个人的“被遗忘权”，以期解决数字化带来的个人隐私不保的问题。

曾长期担任美国《大众媒介伦理学刊》（Journal of Mass Media Ethics）主编的威尔金斯（Lee Wilkins）教授认为，媒介的专业性勇气体现于日常职责中，即应该以高道德水准持续完成最为常规的例行事务。勇气不只意味着“大胆”的行动，而是一种有关公正的思考方式，它需要面对一系列不同的问题，依据符合伦理的原则进行系统而连续的日常决策。

在常设的《全球传播论坛》中，捷孚凯（GfK）市场研究公司公共事务与企业传播高级副总裁赵小岩博士及其同事、GfK 全球研究与咨询主管马克•基达（Mark Keida）博士报告

了他们的“国家品牌指数调查”的最新成果。他们认为，创新并构建有竞争力的地方认同，是在全球声誉竞争中增强软实力的必由之路。

自从 2005 年创办、2009 年改版以来，《全球传媒学刊》已经发行多年，共出版了 18 期电子版和 10 期书刊版。近期，《全球传媒学刊》获得新闻出版广电总局批准，即将开办正式的印刷版期刊。我们期待着与学界同仁更多的学术探讨和交流，希望学者方家和莘莘学子继续支持我们这个新生的学术园地。

（郭镇之、陈昌凤）

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封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

全球观中的真实性与专业性伦理

The Ethics of Truth and Professionalism in Global Terms

克利福德·克里斯琴斯[①]

Abstract: As the norm of healing is to medicine and critical thinking to education, so truthtelling is the occupational norm of the media professions. This is generally understood around the world. In the extensive work on journalism codes-of-ethics internationally, the code data base at Tampere University (Juusela, 1981; Nordenstreng, 1995) and Thomas Cooper's (1989) comparative survey agree that truth as objectivity and accuracy has priority in them all. In our study of social responsibility worldwide, the press' obligation for unbiased information had a central role (Christians & Nordenstreng, 2004). Truthtelling as the normative core of professionalism is not controversial. But for this assertion to be credible in global terms and with increasing technological sophistication in distorting the truth, both the concept of truth and the nature of news must be redefined.

Key Words: truthtellling, professionalism, *aletheia*

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1. Truth in History

The Occidental tradition lives out of Aristotle's legacy of truth as accurate or correct statement. "Falsehood is itself mean and culpable, and truth noble and full of praise (Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, bk. 4, ch. 7). Truth and lying are permanently imbalanced. We ought not grant them equal status and then merely calculate the best results. Lying must be justified while telling the truth need not be. In Sissela Bok's elaboration, only in a monumental crisis, or as a last resort, can lying even be considered for moral justification. "Deceit and violence—these are the two forms of deliberate assault on human beings" (Bok, 1999, p. 18). Those who are lied to are resentful and hostile, and reparations nearly impossible.

While Aristotle's predilection is Greek in its cadence, he speaks to the world and across history. For Hinduism, truth is the highest *dharma* and the source of all other virtues. In Serbo-Croatian the true is justified as with a plumbline in carpentry. In the Talmud, the liars' punishment is that no one believes them. For the former secretary general of the United Nations, Dag Hammerskjold, "the most dangerous of all dilemmas is when we are obliged to conceal the truth to be victorious." For Kierkegaard, truth is subjective, and Brunner speaks of truth as encounter. In Karl Jaspers' *Reason and Existenz*, "The moment of communication is at one and the same time the preservation of, and a search for, the truth" (1995). The fundamental norm of Islamic communication is truthfulness. Among the native Shuswap tribe in Canada, truth as genuineness and authenticity is central to its indigenous culture (Cooper, 1996).

The correspondence view of truth has dominated the Western tradition since the eighteenth century Enlightenment, with René Descartes its chief architect. Genuine knowledge is testable and objectively true. It is cognitively clean as mathematics, built in linear fashion from a neutral, noncontingent starting point. In his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind* (1628) thought was considered analytic calculation of a world that can be mastered technically. Descartes contended, in effect, that we can demonstrate the truth only of what we can measure. Science became the arbiter of truth and narrow calculation was accepted as the ideology by which modernity ought to live. From the certitude of mathematics, Descartes built a philosophy of the natural world and a picture of the human person on a quantitative foundation.

Consider the very conditions under which Descartes wrote *Meditations II* in 1642. The Thirty Years War was spreading social chaos throughout Europe. The Spanish were ravaging the French provinces and even threatening Paris. But Descartes was in a room in Belgium on a respite, isolated in seclusion. For two years even his friends could not find him hidden away studying mathematics. He limited his interest to precise, mechanistic, mathematical knowledge of physical reality. Descartes' *Discourse on Method* (1637) elaborates this objectivism in more detail, with pure mathematics the least touched by circumstances. As E. F. Schumacher has complained, no one sketched the modern intellectual map more decisively than Descartes, and his philosophical map-making defined out of existence those vast regions which had engaged the intense efforts of earlier cultures and non-Western peoples.

Scientific successes in astronomy and physics became the structural model for philosophy. The eighteenth century carried over Cartesian mathematics into its conception of human nature as defined by rational choice, that is, by the "fixed quantitative judgment" we call "calculation" (Levi, 1959, p. 35). One of the sacred Western texts of the twentieth century is the three-volume

Principia Mathematica by Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead (1910-1913) in which mathematics is established as formal logic. With Russell declaring that "the method adopted by Descartes is right" (Levi, 1959, p. 349; cf. p. 350), in his rationalism the world contains clear and distinct facts and properties that are true if they mirror objective reality. In Russell's *Problems of Philosophy*, "truth consists in some form of correspondence between belief and fact" (1912, p. 121; cf. Kirkham, 1922, ch. 4). Morals fall outside scientific logic and are therefore unverifiable; being unverifiable they are meaningless, and being meaningless they are incapable of being true.[①]

From the late nineteenth through the twentieth century's, the mainstream press has defined itself in terms of an objectivist worldview. Centered on human rationality and armed with the scientific method, the facts in new have been said to mirror reality. The aim has been true and incontrovertible accounts of a domain separate from human consciousness. Genuine knowledge is identified with the physical sciences, and the objectivity of physics and mathematics sets the standard for all forms of knowing. For Quine (1953) philosophical inquiry is natural science reflecting on itself. In the received view, truth is defined in elementary epistemological terms as accurate representation. News corresponds to context-free algorithms and journalistic morality is equivalent to the unbiased reporting of neutral data. In Stephen Ward's detailed and systematic history, objectivity as an idea is rooted in ancient Greek philosophy and early modern science (2004, chs. 1-6). He locates the invention of journalism ethics in terms of an objectivist ideal in the periodic news press of seventeenth century England (ch. 3).

Attacks on this scientific view of human knowledge originated already in Giambattista Vico's *fantasia* and Wilhelm Dilthey's *verstehen* in the counter-Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. The assault has continued with hermeneutics, critical theory in the Frankfurt School, Wittgenstein's linguistic philosophy, Antonio Gramsci's hegemony, and Lyotard's denial of master narratives. Taoism promotes a world where objective truth is inconceivable. The anti-foundationalism of the social sciences generally has combined with the long-standing attacks to create a crisis in correspondence views of truth. The demise of the correspondence view has created a predicament for the notion of truth altogether.

Despite its luminosity and catharsis outside the correspondence perspective, truth is dissentient. For J. L. Austin (1961) truth is an illusory ideal; there is no "truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth about, say, the battle of Waterloo or the Primavera." In Nietzsche's terms, often repeated, "there is only one world, and that world is false, cruel, contradictory, misleading, senseless….We need lies in order to live" (1967, p. 461). Institutional structures remain objectivity-driven, but in principle the tide has turned toward restricting mathematical rationality to the territory of the natural sciences. In reporting, objectivity has become increasingly controversial as the working press's professional standard, but it remains entrenched in various forms in our ordinary practices of news production and dissemination. In James Carey's dramatic terms:

The conventions of objective reporting were developed as part of an essentially utilitarian-capitalist-scientific orientation toward events….Yet despite their obsolescence, we continue to live with these conventions as if a silent conspiracy has been undertaken between

① For a comprehensive compilation of twentieth century scholarship on truth, see Lynch (2001).

government, the reporter, and the audience to keep the house locked up tight even though all the windows have been blown out (Carey, 1997, p. 141).

As Ward describes it, "the traditional notion of objectivity, articulated about a century ago, is indefensible philosophically, weakened by criticism inside and outside of journalism" (Ward, 2004, p. 4). "Traditional news objectivity is, by all accounts, a spent ethical force, doubted by journalists and academe" (p. 261). In Ward's view, our best option is pragmatic objectivity that "requires only a modest conception of truth that is close to common sense" (p. 267). In pragmatic objectivity there are various kinds of truth statements, with the scientific method only one approach to truth. Pragmatic objectivity keeps "truth as a goal of inquiry and redefines truth in a modest, realist manner. …We can understand truth as the slow process of coming to know more and more things about our empirical world and to grasp them in a more accurate and comprehensive manner" (p. 271).

2. Modernity in Crisis

This history of truth is necessary background for helping us understand how truth is the normative center of media professionalism in the twenty-first century. The ancient proverb is relevant here, "If we do not know history we are condemned to repeat it." The history of truth makes it clear that objectivity is no longer the core of journalism's morality. The issue can be described this way: Truth is a central component in modernity, with the correspondence version the dominant one epistemologically. Truth as an idea is in crisis because modernity is in crisis. On the new side of modernity, we need a different concept of truth as the occupational norm of journalism. If we allow correspondence views of truth that have dominated the Occident to set today's agenda, we will in effect be situating our analysis within a failing modernism. That is parochialism when we need an orientation to the global.

As the progeny of the Enlightenment mind, modernity has dominated the Western worldview and in its neo-liberal form organizes the globe North and South, developed world and developing, with industrial nation-states as preeminent. But modernity, this formidable juggernaut of politics, economics and culture, is in turmoil. The world influence of its icon nation, the USA, is in transparent decline and its Eurocentric originators are static. Muslims search for an alternative modern identity to counter the up rootedness and emptiness of Western modernity. Confucius Institutes around the globe and President Xi Jinping's "Chinese Dream" represent a distinctive worldview. The heart and soul of modernity is the self as autonomous, essentially purposeless and detached from the social context. Multimillions now seek a more satisfying worldview. Modernity's individuals are possessed with rights and self-sufficient as their own ends. The ethics of modernity is voluntaristic in that the moral life becomes a reality by the decision and will of individual agents. So moral issues are strident and unresolved. Discussion is interminable. Moral debate becomes essentially an exercise in rhetorical persuasion, unable to rise above indignation and protest.

Modernity, the industrial and scientific world rather than agrarian. Neutrality and reason. Modernity the home of free market capitalism. Modernity—secularism, scientific experimentation instead of history and divine revelation. Modernity with its "corporate ethos, marketing orientation, consumer culture," now considered oppressive and unsatisfying around the world, and in the modernist homelands too.

Therefore, in arguing for truth as journalism's professional core in a global age, truth needs to be freed from its modernist formations. Truth for the post-modernity era must be located in the moral sphere. Truth is a problem of axiology rather than epistemology. With the dominant scheme no longer tenable, truth becomes the province of ethicists who reconstruct it as the professional news media's contribution to public discourse.

3. *Aletheia* as Authentic Disclosure

When truth is articulated in a moral framework, it is most richly textured in the Greek *aletheia* [disclosure of the authentic, the genuine underneath].[①] Augustine (AD 354-430), professor of rhetoric at Milan for 41 years, and later Bishop of Hippo, established this term's non-correspondence meaning. Augustine's rhetorical theory is a major contribution to the philosophy of communication, contradicting the linear view of the ancient Greeks. Augustine's rhetoric entails reasoned judgment; however he "break[s] away from Graeco-Roman rhetoric, moving instead toward rhetoric as *aletheiac* act" (Settle, 1994, p. 49). Rhetoric for him is not knowledge-producing or opinion producing but truth producing (*aletheia*). Truth is not fundamentally a value-neutral prescriptive statement. *Aletheia* in Augustine "tends to be more relational than propositional, a dialogically interpersonal sacramental act rather than a statement,…taking into account and being motivated by faith, hope, and charity" (Settle, 1994, pp. 49, 57). The truth for him does not merely make things clear, but motivates us to belief and action.[②] In truthful communication, for Augustine, "[I]t is not enough to move our minds, merely for the sake of power; instead this power must be used to lead us to truth." (Murphy, 1974, p. 62). He conceived of truth as reason irradiated by love, the rhetorical process informed and directed by *caritas.* The Augustinian legacy subverts contemporary discourse which defines truth as facticity. His truth as *aletheia* has a constructive ambience while linking truth with moral discernment.

But there are reflections of this moral accent across the human family. In Gandhi's *satyagrapha,* the power of truth through the human spirit eventually wins over force. Buber finds truth in the I-Thou relationship. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa presumed that sufferings from apartheid can be healed through truthful testimony. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's *Ethics* contends correctly that a truthful account lays hold of the context, motives and presuppositions involved. For him, telling the truth depends on the quality of discernment so that penultimates do not gain ultimacy (Bonhoeffer, 1955, ch. 5). Truth means, in other words, to strike gold, to get at "the core, the essence, the nub, the heart of the matter" (Pippert, 1989, p. 11). In all such versions of *aletheia,* knowledge is life-related. We know and have moral convictions in the process. *Aletheia* is not the correspondence of intellectual knowledge and facts. We measure up to what we know and act accordingly.

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① The Greek term *aletheia* is standard for those who define truth in non-modernist terms. See Heidegger's "On the Essence of Truth," for example. Mark Lynch (2001, 2004, 2009) is doing the most extensive contemporary philosophic work on truth. See his adjectival use of the term in "Alethic Pluralism, Logical Consequence and the Universality of Reason" (*Midwest Studies in Philosophy,* 2008, pp. 122-140).

② The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa was based on this understanding of truth. Through the leadership of Bishop Tutu, speaking the truth about crimes committed and morally unacceptable behavior is the necessary first step toward reconciliation. The truth, when told and heard, leads to new ways of understanding human relationships and action that arises from confession and forgiveness. Augustine's claim that truth, when directed by caritas, leads to action is being worked out at present in Rwanda's "Love and Forgiveness Campaign" on the twentieth anniversary of the genocide.

In modernity's calculative reasoning, it is the mind alone which knows. In the different understanding of *aletheia*, there is no propositional truth independent of human beings as a whole. Truthtelling is not considered a problem of cognition per se, but is integrated into human consciousness and social formation. Truth as the disclosure of the authentic is rooted in our personhood, personal not in the sense of being individually relative but as a deeply meaningful concern.[①] Human existence is impossible without an overriding commitment to truth. As a primary agent of the lingual world in which we live, the news profession has no choice but to honor *aletheia* as obligatory for its mission and rationale.[②]

4. Knowledge Production

Aletheia, with its fundamentally moral referent, requires a robust view of news as knowledge production (Hammersley & Traianou, 2012, ch. 2). News gathering and dissemination are not simply informational. Reporters do not merely hold up a mirror to reality, or in online journalism serve as a module of an electronic network. The professional news maker's occupational task is knowledge production. The question for ethics is not primarily how reporters should treat their human sources or relate to their audience and viewers, minimizing harm and respecting their dignity. The media ethics of *aletheia* is intrinsic to the profession's occupational character, with news understood as knowledge production. News as the pursuit of knowledge itself is the ethical framework. In this sense, the fact that all knowledge claims are fallible does not deny that they can be authoritative. As with education, the news profession's obligation is the production of knowledge and the intrinsic character of this production establishes its moral obligations.[③]

Modernity's "news-as-information-processing" follows social scientific criteria for its validity. However, news as knowledge production follows the literary styles of logic and patterns of proof that are characteristic of the humanities. While interpretation is typically unexamined in social science, with humanistic theory the interpretive process is a preoccupation. Whatever is intelligible is accessible to us in and through language, and all deployments of language require interpretation. There is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols, and texts. The reality given by language is fundamentally given by sense data. Humans do not live first of all in an objective world but in systems of thought and culture. There is always a pregiven interpretive context. The accumulated history of meanings is a constituent element in our own interpretations.

One concept from hermeneutics of particular relevance is retroduction in the semiotician Charles Sanders Peirce (1932). For knowledge production, retroduction is the appropriate mode. Retroduction is interactive in character, from incomplete understanding to creative interjection, to the likeliest possible explanation. In interpretation, there are creative leaps of imagination and

① As developed in the "Surplus of Meaning" section below, truth as inscribed in our humanness is central to its universal character.

② Truth is the ethical standard for the communications phenomenon in all its forms, fro interpersonal to virtual. Therefore, for mediated communication, truthtelling is the occupational norm for the many different media professions. The emphasis in this essay is on news; however, truth as aletheia is likewise applicable to persuasion—advertising and public relations (aletheia as full disclosure) and to entertainment (aletheia understood as aesthetic realism).

③ The term "knowledge production" does reflect the academic research of scholarly disciplines. Research universities have the mission of "creating new knowledge." In order to describe information gathered and discussed in the public domain as a whole outside the scholar-expert system, Shilpa Shanbhag (2006) reviews other labels and models, such as "information literacy as a liberal art."

visualization. Retroduction typically begins with insight, and operates from there in the interactive modality. While received knowledge and canonical texts are incorporated, retroduction is not linear and scholastic. As Gerhard Vander Linde (2001) puts it, though in a different context, this alternative model of knowledge production is not measured by "credibility amongst peers but in terms of richness of implications, of the capacity to generate connections among disparate elements, of freshness of insights and scope" (p. 58).

The news-as-information model follows inductive reasoning: gathering evidence, identifying patterns and relationships, forming a conclusion. Generalizations are restricted to the data by journalistic guidelines, such as double referents, primary sources, and on-site observation. In a professionalism of news production, reporters interpret situations and discourse in the light of their several parts and any particular part in light of the whole. All interpretive activity proceeds by way of a dialectic between presumptions and validation. News professionals judge the relative importance of the several parts. They validate an interpretation by vindicating it against competing interpretations. Despite intellectual conflicts, they find criteria such as comprehensiveness, for determining which interpretation is more likely. If retroduction produces a plurality of coherent meanings, that plurality is a provocateur to further thinking and research.

This understanding of news as knowledge production is of particular importance in documentary journalism, investigative reporting and news features. It is the obvious mode in editorials. However, the liberal arts framework of constant learning and analytical thinking and rigorous argument characterize the everyday news cycle also.

5. Interpretive Sufficiency

When the news profession's occupational task is understood as knowledge production, with *aletheia* its normative axis, news is released from modernity's epistemological objectivism.[①] And the interpretive guidelines for knowledge production must be appropriate to this occupational character, not those that reflect modernity. For *aletheia*, the news media turn to interpretive studies or what has been and is often called yet today "qualitative research" (e.g., Denzin & Lincoln, 2011).[②] Forsaking the quest for precision journalism does not mean imprecision, but precision in authentic disclosure through interpretive procedures. Fiction and fabrication are not acceptable substitutes for fact and accuracy. Reporters aiming for robust knowledge production will follow what might be called interpretive sufficiency (Christians, 2004, ch.3). They will polish their research and writing skills in terms of the humanities and humanistic social sciences. Interpretive sufficiency is the press' standard in the context of global post-modernity.

Interpretive studies are an alternative view of human knowing. In this perspective, investigations must be grounded historically and biographically, so that they represent complex

① *Aletheia* is an alternative to modernity's objectivism. Understanding the news as social narrative is likewise contrary to modernity. Stories organize our lived experience, and through story narratives we teach one another how to live in common. Narratives contain in a nutshell people's beliefs. We tell stories to one another about our values and aspirations. Narratives point in the right direction, by anchoring the moral domain in lived experience rather than in rational individuals. Nevertheless, narratives of everyday discourse cannot in themselves yield normative guidelines about which value-driven stories ought to be valued. *Aletheia* establishes a normative center for distinguishing good practices from those that are morally unacceptable (see Christians, 2010).

② The strategy of "mixed methods" is often proposed for communication research, rather than relying on either quantitative or qualitative methods. If so, this methodology for journalists will have to meet the same intellectual tests for interpretive sufficiency.

cultures adequately. The interpretive model is not derived from a free-floating and abstruse mathematics, but resonate with the attitudes, definitions and language of the people actually being studied. Journalists trained in interpretive research identify with cultural meanings in their role as participants and as observers formulate seminal conclusions about these meanings.

Through Asian social psychology (2011), grounded theory methods (Charmaz, 2009), contextualization (Denzin & Giardina, 2007), thick description (Geertz, 1977), visual methodologies (Williams &Newton, 2010), case studies, coherent frames of reference (Schutz, 1967), naturalistic observation, news workers can stake out a claim to interpretive sufficiency and assume responsibility as professionals for their efforts. Through an understanding of interpretive methodologies, reporters come to grips with the complex ways ethnographers insert themselves into the process of news-making. In his study of mobile phone technology worldwide, Grant Kien (2009) introduces the concept "technography," in order to show how the new technologies should be analyzed anthropologically. A rich literature has been developed on constructing the life histories of ordinary people (Yow, 2005). In a fundamental sense, interpretive approaches are a temperament of mind—the "sociological imagination" C. Wright Mills (1959) called it—rather than merely a series of techniques for handling the iPad, smart phone, web technology, or minicam. However, while the creative process always remains central, tough-minded procedures for news professionals can be taught and learned.

Consistent with their own assumptions, interpretive studies enforce the maxim that research imprisoned within itself and therefore self-validating is unacceptable. The cases and illustrations that are selected for in-depth stories must be representative of the class, social unit, tribe or organization to which they properly belong. *Aletheia* arises in natural settings, not contrived ones; therefore, the more densely textured the specifics, the more closely a deep reading is achieved. (What Al Jazeera hints at in its slogan "The truth and the other truth," as does the Hutchins Commission in its call for "truth in the context of meaning.") The goal is finding representative cases that allow in-depth and holistic probing, rather than spectacular ones that are anecdotal and idiosyncratic.

Interpretive accounts of *aletheia* reflect genuine features of the situation under study and do not represent the aberrations or hurried conclusions of observer opinion. There must be sympathetic immersion in the material until the journalist establishes, in Blumer's (1954) phrase, "poetic resonance" with it. Does the reporter know enough to identify the principal aspects of the event being studied and to distinguish these main features from digressions and parentheses? Using the body as an analogy, the blood and brain must be separated from fingers and skin, all of which are parts of the whole organism but of differing significance.

Effective use of triangulation is one way to describe interpretive sufficiency for *aletheia*, as an alternative to the strategy of two independent sources in modernist journalism. The goal is to build up a fully rounded analysis of some phenomenon by combining all lines of attack, each probe revealing certain dimensions of the human world being investigated. The point is not to advocate eclecticism as such, but to avoid the personal bias and superficiality that stem from using only one kind of examination. Triangulation takes seriously the way humans attach meanings to social reality. The process of disentangling from within is complicated by the fact that reporters are interpreting a world that has been interpreted already. We only know something through its

representations. Different lines of interpretation each expose different aspects of reality, "much as a kaleidoscope…will reveal different colors and configurations of the object to its viewer" (Denzin, 1989, p. 235).

Triangulation occurs in several forms. It may refer, for example, to method—that is, combining content analysis of documents with unstructured interviewing with on-site observation, and combining this mixture in order to improve the interpretation. Reporters can take a social problem—prisons and incarceration, for instance—and triangulate it by viewing it historically (how does the contemporary situation differ from previous time periods), synchronically (what are the relevant facts about the problem today, using a variety of data sources), and theoretically (what ethical system is relevant in gaining perspective on it).[①]

Interpretive sufficiency only accumulates gradually, so the search is an ongoing one until the exact contours of the details are unearthed. "The facts never speak for themselves. They must be selected, marshaled, linked together and given a voice" (Barzun & Graff, 1992, p. xxii). In this sense, the crystal is a better image of triangulated design than the fixed, two-dimensional triangle.

Crystals combine symmetry with an infinite variety of shapes, substances, transmutations, multidimensionalities, and angles of approach. Crystals grow, change, and alter, but are not amorphous. Crystals are prisms that reflect externalities *and* refract within themselves…casting off in different directions (Richardson, 2000, p. 934).

The aim is always multiple insights of retroduction instead of swiftly concluding what is thought to be the *aletheia* of the matter. The emphasis in interpretation is on discovery rather than applying routinized procedures. What we see when we view a crystal depends on how we hold it to the light.

Sensitized concepts are a crucial dimension of *aletheia*, defined as opening up the genuine inside. Sensitized concepts, formulated during the interpretive process, generate an insightful picture and distinctively convey the meaning of a series of events. They get at the essence, the heart of the matter. Sensitized concepts display an integrating scheme from within the data themselves. *Aletheia*, the authentic truth, unveils the data's inner character. Examples of those well known in reporting and the literature are "just war," Cooley's "primary group," Ellul's "efficiency," "housing bubble," "watchdog role," Rousseau's "noble savage," "fourth estate," Janis' "group think," "mutually assured destruction (MAD)," Innis' "monopoly of knowledge," Kuhn's "paradigm," E. O. Wilson's "consilience."

With sensitized concepts, the retroductive process is obvious, concepts reflecting a dialectic of insight, observation, and history. They represent insider generalizations that arise from the language and definitions of the arena being reported. It requires a reflexive form of writing that is retroductive, turning the ethnographic and creative insights back onto each other. Sensitized concepts are analogous to map-making. When not a squiggly line but done properly, they

① This paper demonstrates that *aletheia* is not a correspondence theory of truth. It rejects the coherence model also by its claim that norms can be embedded in history.

authentically disclose direction, even though all reality, by the map's very purpose, is not represented.[①]

Interpretive-sufficiency serves as a standard to emulate even though demanding work days allow little time to sift through the intricacies. And in the digital age, the formidable problem of data mining makes *aletheia* a supreme challenge. The massive amount of electronic data is a goldmine of information for reporting. The weblogs and websites of online journalism are networked into big data systems that grow and change unceasingly. Using this resource effectively and representing it intelligently to the public require elaborate training and sophisticated talent. In 2013, 510 new websites were created every second. 340,000 years of online video were watched every day. There are now 31 billion searches on Google every month. The information that was created worldwide in the past twelve months is more than the previous 5,000 years. And no standard data categories exist. Information is typically stored at random, and *aletheia*—the genuine, the heart of the matter--buried under layers of the often irrelevant or inconsequential . Without knowing context, interpreting data is ambiguous and even mysterious. Data management is emerging as a degree and occupation, but so far not sufficient to the big-data challenge.

For the journalism profession, the issue is the technological imperative. Search and access are governed by electronics. Data sets indicate their own networks. Strings of apps lead the search process. Critics have long charged broadcasting with allowing the technology to determine news. Whatever best fits broadcast technology's visual and audio character define what is newsworthy. And the issue is magnified for big data. Instead of the reporter's competence and imagination leading the process of knowledge production, human initiative becomes secondary to the network's structure. The danger in data mining is instrumentalism, that is, moral ends buried under overwhelming technical means.

The McKinsey Global Institute estimates that big data can increase business profits by 60 per cent. Personal data helps companies customize new products and achieve efficiency. Big data companies like Amazon.com, Google and Yahoo accumulate personal information that threatens privacy. "Facebook is often at the center of a data privacy controversy, whether it's defending its own enigmatic privacy policies or responding to reports that it gave private user data to the USA's National Security Agency" (Waxer, 2013). Nordstrom, Target, and Urban Outfitters are businesses under attack or facing lawsuits over their misuse of customer information. Government data surveillance continues to expand as an issue worldwide. *Ethics of Big Data* is the first book on the moral issues, geared to business, and utilitarian in perspective. The complications for the *aletheia* of data mining in journalism warrant a book-length ethics also, but not centered on a reductionist utilitarianism of risk and harm.

Wikileaks illustrates the data-mining issue in journalistic terms. WikiLeaks.org, the website launched by Australian Julian Assange in 2006, publishes electronic data in abundance, leaked from government and business. WikiLeaks uses military-grade encryption to protect anonymity and keeps some of its servrs in a bombproof underground bunker in Sweden. WikiLeaks has documented toxic dumping in Africa's Ivory Coast that caused massive illness and a dozen deaths.

[①] Lynch (2004) uses mapmaking to refute the verificationism that science uses as the measure of truth as objective (ch. 3). Verificationism he describes as "the view that anything true can be scientifically verified" (p. 78).

In November 2010 WikiLeaks released 250,000 secret diplomatic cables from the U. S. State Department, and in March 2011 it leaked one million secret documents from governments and corporations in Asia, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and the former Soviet Bloc. It has leaked more than two million secret documents on every topic imaginable—from classified government material to financial records of banks and companies. One release, a video from a U.S. Army Apache helicopter that shows the killing of two Reuters reporters and tend unarmed Iraqis, has already been viewed 6.5 million times.

Using the modernist definition of truth as factity, supporters of WikiLeaks see such publication as truth-telling pure and simple. "Publishing improves transparency, and this transparency creates a better society for all people," the WikiLeaks website proclaims. Upon its debut, WikiLeaks audaciously claimed it would "crack the world open" by becoming a global watchdog more reliable than conventional media. It calls itself the "first intelligence of the people." The international scope of WikiLeaks material (from 100 countries) is said to provide a central repository of documents of international interest to compensate for the lack of on-the-ground reporters overseas. WikiLeaks sees itself as publisher of record, providing the world with materials that governments and businesses have tried to keep hidden from public view. Countries such as North Korea and Zimbabwe will no longer be able to maintain total censorship of its political affairs.

For the ethics of *aletheia*, a central issue is that of WikiLeaks structure and policies. When WikiLeaks publishes the items it receives, it does so as an indiscriminate data dump. WikiLeaks does not question the motives of those who steal and disclose corporate documents. It does not redact names of the innocents who may find themselves in harm's way. WikiLeaks publishes online everything made available to it without checking the facts, without putting them in context, and without analyzing them. WikiLeaks raises serious questions about quoting anonymous people reporters can't interview.

Computer efficiency and transmission capacity relentlessly multiply the data we receive, but not necessarily the *aletheia* of news production. In fact, globally networked digital systems are producing unmanageable data flows that make recognizing, ordering, and evaluating relevant information difficult, and a deterrent to *aletheia*. Censorship is wrong. But the raw and naked release of this material as though it's only an information flow is unacceptable too.

For *aletheia*, truth in context, authentic disclosure underneath the surface, WikiLeaks can only be a jumping-off tool, an occasional source for fresh leads in old stories and sometimes for new possibilities. The old version of truth as facts would lead to profusion, to release of its political information that will be sorted out in the marketplace of ideas. For *aletheia*, journalists trained in the best practices of interpretive sufficiency use WikiLeaks in that framework and not in isolation. WikiLeaks is not the new international mode of investigative reporting. Its abundance of data from unknown or ambiguous sources does not itself mean interpretive sufficiency.

Aletheia, the truth in context, news for critical consciousness—rather than the sensationalism of raw footage with WikiLeaks itself getting primary attention rather than the reporters with the story. A sufficient interpretation opens up public life in all its dynamic dimensions until the underlying meanings are disclosed. The people involved at all levels are portrayed authentically

without stereotype or simplistic judgments. To understand WikiLeaks, not truth as objective fact but *aletheia* as authentic disclosure following the guidelines of interpretive sufficiency.

6. Surplus of Meaning

This Roundtable recognizes that a historic shift is taking place in media ethics. The complicated cases and issues must now be understood as dramatically international in scope. Momentous news events in the global age are routinely multifarious, and cannot be domesticated without distorting them. In the diaspora, common now around the world, communities attached to local news live and work elsewhere. Global digital technologies make citizen boundaries irrelevant for news events, and the media institutions that produce news are themselves typically multinational. The bulk of our work in media ethics has been pre-digital and tidily geographical. Today's electronic globalism requires a repositioning of media ethics from print-and-broadcast domestic to cyber-international.

In order to understand news professionalism in this complicated globalism, truth has been moved from its Occidental moorings to the world as a whole. Truth as authentic disclosure belongs to the history and geography of the human race. The standard approach for the ethics of truth has been hierarchical, with theory and practice developed in advanced industrial nations and then presented to the rest of the world for emulation. The new generation of truth as journalism's occupational norm is horizontal in character, centered on our common humanity, rather than oriented vertically from resource-rich media concentrations of the North Atlantic that have dominated the news business.. The modernist theory of truth holds "that truth has only a single uniform nature" (Lynch, 2009, p. i). A media ethics of *aletheia* that is transnational in scope is situated in the lived and professional communities of the world, venues outside Enlightenment modernity, large and small, where the struggle over a new understanding of truthtelling is the most pronounced.

Scientific modernism's definition of truth now faces a world-class alternative in *aletheia*. But *aletheia's* world-orientation is not that of modernity's absolutism which lays the long arcs of latitude and longitude over the globe. Truth as authentic disclosure takes seriously the one-and-many dilemma in philosophy and seeks to answer it through Paul Ricoeur's (1976) surplus of meaning.

For Ricoeur (1974), whatever is intelligible is accessible to us in and through language, and all deployments of language require interpretation. There is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs, symbols and texts. The reality given by language is fundamentally different from the reality given by sense data. Humans do not live first of all in an objective world but in systems of thought and culture. Just as the astronomer's telescope and the biologist's microscope bring transformed realities into view, so languages represent conceptions of the world. Language serves as the infinity encompassing human finitude. There is a pregiven interpretive context. The accumulated history of meanings is a constituent element in our own interpretations.

Ricoeur defines surplus-of-meaning by challenging classical rhetoric's understanding of metaphor. Ricoeur notes that in traditional metaphor theory, the existence of multiple levels of signification presupposed a primary, literal one and another secondary, symbolic one. In Ricoeur's

interpretive process, there are not two significations, one literal and the other symbolic, but rather a fluid movement which transfers humans from one level to another. Ricoeur does not deny the existence of primary and ancillary, but directs inquiry to the movement of viewers between levels, to the viewer context. Perception is not just a product of the stimulus, but also of mental activity. We see with the mind as well as the eye. Words are polysemic as denotation, inference, etic and emic indicate. Language contains within itself resources that allow it to be used creatively. Improvisation in music illustrates Ricoeur's intention. Improvisations are creative, the musician's invention, but the music's melody is retained throughout. Surplus of meaning goes beyond the original without forgettingit.

In *The Rule of Metaphor* (1981), Ricoeur defined surplus of meaning as the linguistic imagination that generates and regenerates meaning through the power of metaphor to state things in new ways. Language as a metaphorical resource can be used creatively to produce new meanings. The signs in a language system do not refer only to other signs, but refer to a world that it claims to represent. When truth is understood in moral terms, it thereby creates surplus meaning. All moral truths inscribe in themselves surplus meaning. We understand moral universals such as the torturing of children is wrong because of our humanity, and apply the idea and act on it in different ways because of our personhood, what hermeneutics calls "our appropriated self-knowledge." Surplus of meaning with its local and universal orientation, recognizes the stability of our identities and the continuity of the species.

For surplus of meaning to be duly global, it requires moral claims such as truth that are intrinsic to our humanness. Michael Lynch (2009) uses the concept of pain to indicate that truth can be one-and-many. Pain is common to our humanness, as non-deception is to self-identity. The vocabulary of the pain experience is immense, but communicates a generally common meaning. "Getting to the heart of the matter," "disclosing beneath the surface," "seeing the genuine"—this vocabulary states truth's semantic core. This common meaning of depth disclosure is elaborated, applied to life across the age spectrum, taught to children, and insisted on in the classroom.

Language is the primary means of social formation, and therefore human existence is impossible without an overriding commitment to truth. Disclosing the genuine is rooted in our personhood, and in that sense illustrates what Levinas calls "the primordial." Living with others is inconceivable if we cannot tacitly assume that people are speaking truthfully. Lying, in fact, is so unnatural that machines can measure bodily reactions to it. When we deceive, Dietmar Mieth argues, the truth imperative is recognized in advance: "Otherwise there would be no need to justify the exceptions as special cases….Those who relativize truthfulness, who refuse to accept it as an ethical principle, indirectly recognize it as generally valid" (Meith, 1997). "Veracity functions as the foundation of relations among human beings: when this trust shatters or wears away, institutions collapse" (Bok, 1979, p. 31).

7. Conclusion

For modernist truth as accuracy and neutrality, what is true must be true in an explicit way—by verifying through measures of objectivity that facts correspond to reality. Modernity is monistic about truth, assuming "that there is one and only one explanation of what makes something true. Truth has a single inner structural essence" (Lynch, 2009, p. 3). In *aletheia's*

surplus of meaning, truth can be manifested in multiple ways. In a variation on Lynch, the contents of our various expressions of truth can be "both diverse in kind and yet cognitively unified;" the meaning of truth can be understood to be univocal and immanent, without claiming essentialism (Lynch, 2009, p. 3).. Surplus of meaning is not "simply different meanings appended to different beliefs" (p. 6). It represents the philosophical understanding of pluralism, where truth is many while retaining the idea that truth is one (p. 70). In *aletheia's* surplus of meaning, there is a "maximally coherent system of meanings" (p. 165) with authentic disclosure the axial core.

The human species is lingual. All humans learn languages at the same age. No languages are undifferentiated phenomena. All known languages around the world are equally complex in phonetic and phonemic structures. All languages enable abstraction, inference, deduction, and induction. All languages can be learned and translated by native speakers of other languages; in fact, some human beings in every language are bilingual. Humans therefore are naturally sympathetic to their kind. While they live in the culture of their own language, in principle they are disposed toward the commensurability of languages in the lingual. Meaning-coherence, and not gibberish, is the immanent property of the human race. In the philosophy of mind, immanent properties have multiple realizations. Ricoeur's surplus of meaning gives multiple realizability a particular form.

"If we are ever to come to grips with both the cognitive unity and semantic diversity" of the news' occupational norm, "we need a new way of thinking about truth" (Lynch, 2009, p. 191). *Aletheia* answers that challenge. News as knowledge production is a global definition of public communication, with the international *aletheia* its professional norm.

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封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

狭隘的情绪与全球媒体

Parochial Emotions and Global Media

史蒂文·沃德[①]

Abstract: Journalists face the emotional content of the stories they cover and the results of that reporting on a daily basis. Chief among those emotions in patriotism, what scholar Martha Nussbaum calls a political emotion. This *fraught relationship* between journalists and the political emotions raises two questions. First, to what extent is journalism ethics, as currently defined, compatible with patriotism and love of nation? Second, can nation-based political emotions provide appropriate primary values for a global ethics and an emerging global media ethics? With regard to the first question, I argue that only a narrow range of forms of patriotism –which I call moderate patriotism -- is compatible with the principles of journalism ethics in a democracy. With regard to the second question, I argue that a global ethics should not be based on nation-based values. It should be based on global emotions, or global political emotions.

Key Words: political emotions, patriotism, journalism ethics, patriotism

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1. Introduction

Journalism is redolent with emotion and value-laden judgments. Journalists feel the trauma of victims as they report on natural disasters. Investigative journalists have a passion to expose wrong-doing. Advocacy journalists express the frustration of marginalized social groups.

Not all of the emotion is 'internal' to journalists. Some are public emotions – public in origin and in expression. Journalists swim in a sea of public (and cultural) values and emotions. Journalists work in societies where people express the emotions of anger or approval towards leaders, and laws. Journalists internalize the public emotions of love of country, of democracy or Communism, of individualism or social solidarity.

In this paper, I examine one class of public emotions -- the "political emotions." Prime examples are patriotism and promotion of the national interest. Martha Nussbaum defines the political emotions as that which "take as their object the nation, the nation's goals, its institutions and leaders, its geography, and one's fellow citizens . . . (2013, 2)". These emotions are more than approval, they express love for a nation as "one's own" (2013, 208).

My focus is the *fraught relationship* between journalists and the political emotions, in two ways. First, to what extent is journalism ethics, as we have known it, compatible with patriotism and love of nation? Second, can nation-based political emotions provide appropriate primary values for a global ethics and an emerging global media ethics? With regard to the first question, I argue that only a narrow range of forms of patriotism –which I call moderate patriotism -- is compatible with the principles of journalism ethics in a democracy. With regard to the second question, I argue that a global ethics should not be based on nation-based values. It should be based on global emotions, or global political emotions.

I begin by summarizing my view of the relationship between journalism and patriotism as found in my previous writings (Ward 2010, Ward 2013). Then I use Nussbaum's recent book (2013) on political emotions to deepen my analysis. I conclude by critiquing Nussbaum's parochial model of emotion. I argue that Nussbaum's model is insufficiently global for the ethics of today's news media.

2. Section One: Moderate Patriotism

Journalists are pressured to report in ways that show their patriotism. On the positive side, people call on journalists to create 'community' and a feeling of common purpose. On the negative side, people call on journalists to uncritically support their nation's decision to enter a war, or to not cover sensitive stories that damage the honor of one's country.

Patriotism is a contested value. Some see it as essential to a robust, unified society; others see it as a dangerous emotion. Tolstoy (1987, 142) wrote: "Seas of blood have been shed over this passion (of patriotism) and will yet be shed for it, unless the people free themselves of this obsolete relic of antiquity." Therefore, is patriotism an unruly emotion or an essential civic attitude?

In previous writings (2010, 213-37), I discussed to what extent patriotism and ethical journalism are compatible. My answer was that a moderate patriotism is most compatible with the ideal of free and democratic journalism.

Here is the substance of this theory. I said patriotism, like all political emotions, is a group loyalty (or group partiality) that is presumed to have some ethical weight. Partialities can be good or bad. The question is what kinds of political emotions should we embrace and what weight should we give them? I used Nathanson's definition (1993, 110) of patriotism as "a special affection for, identification with, and a concern for one's own nation and a willingness to act on its behalf." I then distinguished between moderate and extreme forms of patriotism. Extreme patriotism (Nathanson 1993, 37-8, 55) includes: (1) a special affection for one's country as *superior* to others; (2) an *exclusive* concern for one's country and few constraints on the pursuit of its interests; and (3) uncritical support for one's country's actions. In contrast, moderate patriotism consists of: (1) a special but not exclusive concern for one's country; (2) constraints on the pursuit of its interests; and (5) conditional and critical support of one's country's actions. For moderate patriots, their country is one of several objects of loyalty. It does not exaggerate the uniqueness and superiority of one's country as a basis for aggression.

In democracies, moderate patriotism has a more specific political object -- a political association that is republican in its stress on liberty and democratic in its egalitarian stress on civic participation and equality (see Viroli 2002).

A claim of patriotism is a claim that, if someone wishes to be a patriot, they should act in a certain way in a specific context. On my analysis, a claim of patriotism upon citizens has prima facie ethical weight if and only if: (1) *The claim of patriotism is inclusive*. It respects the rights and freedoms of all citizens within a nation. (2) *The claim of patriotism is restrained*. It is not xenophobic or aggressive toward other peoples. (3) *The claim of patriotism must survive sustained public scrutiny and investigation*. Such evaluation requires an open public sphere informed by a free press.

I then addressed the "compatibility problem" in journalism – to what extent patriotism and journalism ethics were compatible. My answer was that moderate patriotism has the largest degree of compatibility with journalism ethics because of an overlap in values. The democratic patriot and the democratic journalist will be on the same side of a number of public issues: both will support accurate, unbiased information; free speech; a critical news media; and a public sphere with diverse perspectives.

It is also worth noting that a moderate patriotism may be part of the public culture of countries that are not robustly democratic or, perhaps not democratic at all. It is possible for a wise and benevolent leader, or a king or queen, to rule a land that is peaceful towards other countries, and does not cultivate extreme nationalism among its citizens. However, moderate patriotism and democracy have a closer relationship. A moderate patriotism that encourages a critical public discourse about a country's actions is more likely to conflict with a country's political system the further the latter departs from democracy. Moreover, a critical moderate patriotism is a necessary condition for a robust democracy, and therefore is an emotion that democracies need to make every effort to instill.

Therefore I concluded that ethical journalism is compatible with patriotism, at least in a democracy, only if journalists are moderate, rationally constrained patriots. They serve their country by fulfilling their distinctive social role as critical informers of democratic citizens. They evaluate claims of patriotism according to the principles of inclusivity, rational restraint and public

scrutiny. When journalists serve a different form of patriotism, they violate their ethical role in an open democratic society (Ward 2010, 215).

3. Nussbaum's Theory of Emotions

My theory of moderate patriotism and journalism did not explore the nature of the emotions, let alone the nature of political emotions. I identified patriotism as a special affection, but I did not analyze that affection. However, Nussbaum's *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice* (2013) does explore the political emotions. I cannot do justice to her erudite book. I only summarize her views on the emotions and how to cultivate political emotions.

1) Cognitive theory of emotions

Nussbaum's view of the political emotions is an extension of her theory about the emotions (2001). She starts with our common sense category of emotions, such as grief, fear, hatred, love, anger, envy, jealousy, and empathy. She distinguishes them from desires, 'objectless' moods like feeling irritable, bodily states such as hunger and thirst, and bodily sensations such as shivering when afraid. Nussbaum puts forward a neo-Stoic "cognitive" (or a cognitive-evaluative") view of the emotions that make them 'intelligent'. She rejects the idea that emotions are unthinking energies that "simply push people around" (2001, 24) and whose opposition to rationality means they should be excluded from ethical deliberation. Rather, Nussbaum regards emotions as "intelligent responses to the perception of value (2001, 1)." All emotions involve an (a) intentional thought or perception directed at an object and (b) some type of evaluative appraisal of that object from the person's viewpoint.[①]

The cognitive content of emotions – how we understand the emotion and its object -- is particularly important. The emotions depend on how we "see" or interpret the object. The difference between fearing and loving a person depends on our beliefs about the person, and information about the world. The visceral pain of grieving a spouse "violently tears the fabric of attachment, hope, and expectation that we have built around that person (2013, 400). That fabric is comprised of beliefs, goals, interpretations, and other cognitive elements. Even our emotional response to a piece of music involves a cognitive interpretation of the lyrics and musical phrases. Moreover, emotions are "shaped by social norms and specific societal circumstances (2013, 401)." Even biologically 'given' emotions such as anger are expressed in different ways in different societies. I would add that our emotional response to artistic productions, e.g., watching Shylock ask for his 'pound of flesh' in Shakespeare's *The Merchant of Venice*, is mediated by our norms, beliefs, and cultural ways of interpreting the play.

The evaluative aspect of emotions consists in value judgments about the importance or salience of objects outside the person's own control (2001, 30, fn21).[②] The emotions are *eudaimonistic*, which roughly means 'concerned with one's flourishing.' The value of an object

[①] Nussbaum says that elements of her theory can be found in other theories of emotion such as by Lyons (1980), Gordon (1987) and de Sousa (1987) but these theories do not stress the "evaluative nature of the emotion's cognitive content" (2001, 22, fn2). She notes that Solomon (1976; 2nd ed. 1993) argues against the "hydraulic" and non-rational models of emotion and stresses their intentionality, but his theory is based on "value-positings" that are willed and altogether subjective so that emotions are said to crate our values, and purposes, and "constitute our world" (2001, 22, fn2). Nussbaum does not take a stand on the nature of value but prefers to write about the valuational nature of appraisals from the internal viewpoint of the person having the emotional experience.

[②] Nussbaum notes there can be value judgments that do not involve emotions, e.g. someone values mathematics unemotionally.

is determined relative to a person's own values, goals, projects and worldview. Objects of emotion are in some sense "mine" and contribute to my overall flourishing. Therefore, as Nussbaum says, my emotion for my dying mother is due to the fact that this mother is *mine* and is a valued object in my flourishing. "Emotions," she writes, "view the world from the point of view of my own scheme of goals and projects, the things to which I attach value in a conception of what it is for me to live well (2001, 49)". Emotions are eudaimonistic in being "localized" (2001, 31) in the sense that the objects are objects of value for me.

Nussbaum's conception of emotion is rich. Emotions contain beliefs, interpretations, feelings, and imagination. We can value not only loved ones but civic virtues, principles, friendship, and many types of things. Objects are valued not only instrumentally, as satisfying my goals. We also value objects as intrinsically valuable. I value my mother as having both intrinsic value in herself and also as a constituent of "my life and not someone else's (2001, 32)." Yet despite this complexity, Nussbaum thinks the self-referential aspect is primary. It is ineliminable and is a necessary condition for emotions, since without some linkage to my flourishing, and what is mine, no emotion can exist. She writes: "A eudaimonistic judgment must ultimately be formed in order for the emotion to occur (2001, 54)." Moreover, the self-referential aspect is essential to the identity of the emotion. My emotional attachment to my dying mother is distinct from other emotions by virtue of the fact that it is about my mother.

Does Nussbaum believe that all emotions are eudaimonistic (2001, 53)? She concedes that some emotions, such as wonder or awe at the world, appear to be so wrapped up in the value of the object that awareness of myself is minimal or non-existent (2001, 54). But such emotions are not great in number, and her discussion of such emotions suggests that even those emotions can eventually be traced back to a self-referential link.

2) Parochial emotions

Nussbaum's approach to emotions as eudaemonist, self-referential, and localized leads to what I call her "parochial" view of their origin and scope. By parochial, I mean a dominant interest in what is near and dear.

Emotions are parochial in origin. The child learns how to emotionally respond to, and care for, things that are near and dear -- their parents, their friends, community and eventually their nation. Unfortunately, this loyalty to the near and dear too often goes along with an indifference to (or fear of) what is not near and dear.

The scope of human emotion is not limited to the near and dear. We can hate, love, care for, or be disgusted by people, social practices, events, and objects far from home. But, the parochial nature of emotions leads us to prefer and prioritize objects that are near over objects that are far away. Our most intense and strongest emotions are objects that are familiar and close to our circle of concerns. This is why, Nussbaum says, we care more for events that affect me directly, and care less for disasters far away; this is why I love my country more than other countries; this is why emotional appeals for foreign aid for strangers tend to have temporary and wavering effect. The problem, it seems, is that I need to find a way to link far away objects with my goals and projects. Therefore, she says, even when we invest importance in events that take place at a distance "that is, I think, because the person has managed to invest those events with a certain importance in her

own scheme of ends and goals" (2001, 31). Some emotions, such as empathy, can be "extended" to strangers, at least temporarily. But empathy, compassion and care 'start at home', and often stay at home, especially when local aid conflicts with foreign aid.

For Nussbaum, emotions and principles need to work together, correcting for the limitations of each other. Abstract principles, such as love of humanity or equality for all, often fail to move us to action or concern. To have motivating power, they need to be supported by the emotions. Principles are psychologically inert unless supported by emotions. They are "empty of significance and motivational efficacy (2013, 157)." Emotions are central to motivation. This is why she contends that love "matters" for justice. Love gives meaning to the principles of justice.

On the other hand, we should not simply act on our emotions. They need to be critiqued by impartial reason and principle. This is why she contends that love "matters" for justice. Love gives meaning to the abstract principles of justice.

3) Summary

Given the complexity of Nussbaum's theory, here is a summary of the theory:

Cognitive thesis: Emotions are cognitive and 'intelligent' responses; not non-rational or irrational. They contain interpretations, beliefs and other information-based mental states.

Evaluation thesis: Emotions are based on appraisals of objects as salient or important.

Eudaimonia thesis: Objects are evaluated according to the object's salience or importance to the flourishing of the person in question. Without this self-referential link, we do not have a distinct and powerful emotion.

Parochial thesis: Emotions as parochial in origin, priority, and scope. All emotions are eudaimonistic and parochial.

Cultivation thesis: Since emotions have strong parochial and eudaimonistic elements, we should support global principles and values by showing how 'far away' matters link to our concerns and flourishing.

4) Political Emotions

Let us examine how Nussbaum's eudemonistic theory of emotion – with its five theses – shapes her approach to the political emotions.

On her view, a political emotion, such as patriotism, is a type of eudaimonistic, parochial emotion. It is distinguished by the nature of its object – the nation as a whole, rather than some smaller object such as one's family, ethnic group, or city. Patriotism exhibits all of the features named by the five theses. It is an intelligent response because it contains cognitive elements such as interpretations and ways of seeing one's country. It is evaluative and eudaimonistic because one's nation is loved as a salient or important object for one's flourishing and it is part of one's schema of goals and concerns. Love of country is love of *my* country. Finally, love of one's nation is parochial since it is inculcated early in one's life as a group loyalty. It often takes priority over less parochial or 'global' concerns. As Nathanson says, we have a special affection for our country that we do not have for other countries.

However, why are political emotions important? She gives several reasons. First, societies are cooperative ventures. They need citizens willing to work together to reach common goals. This willingness requires a love of nation. Second, a society cannot be stable if citizens don't emotionally support its principles. Third, the cultivation of appropriate political emotions counter-balances the manipulation of these emotions. Overall, political emotions can inspire citizens to think "larger thoughts" and entertain a wider "sympathy" (2013, 3).

So the task of all societies is to develop the types of political emotions appropriate to their political structure. For Nussbaum, the key issue is how to cultivate political emotions in a *liberal* society characterized by equal respect for all, basic liberties and basic entitlements. Emotions must be cultivated, not indoctrinated. Also, society must "keep at bay" xenophobic and 'exclusive' forces that lurk in all societies and in all of us. These forces need to be energetically counteracted by "an education that cultivates the ability to see full and equal humanity in another person, perhaps one of humanity's most difficult and fragile achievements" (2013, 3).

5) How teach liberal patriotism?

This thesis of emotional parochialism has important implications for how we teach people to have political emotions them, and how we deal with their limitations.

Nussbaum thinks liberal societies need to imagine ways in which emotions can support the principles of an overlapping national consensus on liberal principles (2013, 6). How should cultivation proceed? In her book, Nussbaum discuses two ways: (a) teaching a critical patriotism in schools and in the public sphere; and (b) by learning from those who have practiced humanistic patriotism across history. In schools, we should teach critical thinking early and keep teaching it. We should use "positional imagination" that asks students to imagine cultural differences, such as imagining the experience of minorities (2013, 250-51). Schools should teach the reasons for past wars without demonizing cultures (2013, 252), and teach a love of historical truth and methods for evaluating historical evidence, and how the nation as it really is. Patriots too often dislike reality and want a glorified version of past and present (2013, 255). They fear that citizens can't take the truth. This teaching should be supported by institutional measures such as protection of constitutional rights an independent judiciary (2013, 255), and an emphasis on free speech and a free press. We study the patriotic rhetoric of Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King Jr., and Mohandas Gandhi (2013, 225-56).

Nussbaum thinks the best response to fears about the emotion of patriotism is: We must be extremely vigilant about the values we encourage people to love and pursue. Vigilance is through the "cultivation of a critical public culture, the teaching of history in a critical mode, and the teaching of critical thinking and reasoning in the schools (2013, 213)."

5. Critiquing Nussbaum

Nussbaum's account of political emotions is one of the best on offer. Yet, the theory has ambiguities and troubling implications. In the rest of this chapter, I raise doubts as to whether Nussbaum's model is sufficient for ethics in today's global world and for today's global media. My conclusion is that we need a more radical, global approach to understanding and cultivating the emotions – especially what I call the global emotions.

I organize my criticism into two categories or worries: logical worries and normative worries. I use the word "worry" to indicate that I do not see myself as 'refuting' her theory or providing a fully developed alternative. Rather, I am probing her theory from a global ethics perspective and identifying areas where future research and thinking is needed.

1) Logical worries

The idea of emotions as eudaimonistic sounds so obvious that we may feel that serious doubt is impossible. All emotions are *mine*, or belong to somebody, do they not? Emotions are not abstract entities that exist apart from individual human beings. Furthermore, is it not obvious that we see the world from our own perspective? We evaluate objects, emotionally, according to *our* own flourishing, do we not? Finally, the view that all emotions are parochial in origin is indisputable. How could it be otherwise?

My logical worry is that this over-simplistic understanding of Nussbaum's eudaimonistic theory misses what a closer reading reveals – the theory is not a set of self-evident truths. When any view seems obvious, we can be lulled into a false confidence. We can fail to notice the shallowness of some claims. For example, 'all emotions are mine' amounts to the uninformative truism that 'my emotions are mine, your emotions are yours, and so on.' Also, what appears obvious can hide ambiguities in the use of key terms such as "mine" and "my flourishing."

Consider, for example, the ambiguity that surrounds the idea that all emotions are *mine* and refer back to my schema of interests and concerns. What is the significance of the term *"*mine" in this context, a term that Nussbaum frequently places in italics for emphasis? I take it that "mine" does not refer to the aforementioned truism that emotions belong to people. It must refer to something more substantial, such as the claim that all emotions refer back to, and are evaluated from, my flourishing. But what does "refer back to" mean? For Nussbaum , "refer back to" means evaluated according to my flourishing. Self-reference plays a crucial role in almost every emotion, as an evaluative response.

But does it?

The answer is not clear. Nussbaum includes so many things under "my flourishing" that the concept struggles to bear the load. What does "my flourishing" include or exclude? As noted, Nussbaum includes many objects in flourishing – just about any good that someone could consider as part of their flourishing, from my own pleasure seeking to a love of civic virtue or strangers. She includes objects that have instrumental *and* intrinsic worth, such as other human beings. All of these emotions and objects of emotions can be part of my flourishing. One benefit of appealing to a wide notion of flourishing is that it avoids the charge of egoism (I value only what directly benefits me) and moral subjectivism (What I value is due to my subjective desires and will, not the world).

This wide notion of eudaimonia and flourishing blurs important differences between the types of objects that human value. There is a difference between my valuing, emotionally, what brings me (and only me) pleasure, e.g. a sexual encounter, and my valuing, emotionally and intrinsically, my mother or a friend. Also, there is a difference between saying I value my bank account as *mine* (and this evaluation is according to my perspective, and my flourishing) and saying I value my "schema of goals and projects" or I value some political or moral principles, or

I value my 'worldview.' Can all of these objects be lumped into one generous category of "my flourishing?" Not clearly. What makes them mine? All are *mine* in some ambiguous, questionable sense of being part of my flourishing.

By expanding "my flourishing" in such a manner, eudaimonistic theory avoids counter-examples and objections, such as egoism. But it does so at a cost. An expanded concept of "my flourishing" skates around some important counter-examples and it comes perilously close to begging the question at issue: Do non-eudaimonistic emotions exist or not?

For example, it would seem that one type of emotion that is not grounded in eudaimonism or "my flourishing" are emotions for objects that have little or no impact on my interests, e.g. social justice for some tribe in New Guinea, or my opposition to a legal principle or social practice in a far-flung community. Eudaimonia theory tries to accommodate these apparent counter-examples by arguing that, if I value (emotionally) such objects, it is because they have become part of my flourishing or my "concerns." The theory requires a self-referential link and this link must play a central role in creating such emotions. After all, as we have seen, a eudaimonistic judgment must be formed to have an emotion of any object, near or far.

But in what sense can "my flourishing" be said to include all of these objects, especially objects far from my daily life and interests? The primary and proper meaning of "my flourishing" is determined by the adjective "my" –what advances or promotes my major interests and goals. The term implies some direct connection between the object valued and my own flourishing. But what if the object valued does not have any direct impact or connection on my life? How can I say it is "part" of my flourishing? It may means that the object (or value) is an item in my moral conceptual scheme, but how is that the same as being part of my flourishing and my interests? To say that some principle or value, which has no direct impact on me, can be included under "my flourishing" is to strain its meaning to the breaking point.

Nussbaum employs this inclusionary approach of placing objects of value under "my flourishing" when she encounters an emotion that seems to stray far from the idea of being concerned with my own flourishing. But, if over-used, the approach becomes a questionable strategy that allows us to dodge counter-examples and to avoid empirical refutation. Wherever one encounters what appears to be a non-eudaimonistic emotion, the theory posits – requires – that some self-referential link exist to explain away the appearance of a counter-example. Psychological egoism falls into this trap. It asserts that we always act only to benefit ourselves as individuals. When counter-examples are raised – concern for others, altruism, martyrdom – the psychological egoist (implausibly) re-describes the examples in her own terms. Altruistic acts, it is said, are really 'hidden' egotistical acts – we do them because they bring us pleasure or benefit. From the perspective of psychological egoism, all actions *must* be reducible to egoistic actions. But rather than insist on this "must," one could just as easily (and with more plausibility) see the awkward re-descriptions as a theoretical limitation, a limitation that makes the theory immune from refutation. Nussbaum's attempts to re-describe apparent non-eudaimonistic examples of emotions suggest to me a similar limitation in her theory. I do not charge eudaimonistic theory with explicit and illegitimate reductionism, a la psychological egoism. However, I do charge that some of its main terms – e.g., "mine" and "my flourishing" -- are ambiguous and need to be clarified to avoid such charges.

What these reflections tell us is that we need to re-examine the apparent and pre-theoretical distinction between eudaimonistic and non-eudaimonistic emotions. This is the distinction that is at stake between eudaimonistic theory and other conceptions of emotion.

In my view, the difference is not a matter of 'ownership' or psychological origin – between a eudaimonistic emotion that is mine and a non-eudaimonistic emotion that is not mine (whatever that would mean). As already noted, all emotions belong to someone. I believe the distinction is based on the *basis* for the evaluation of value – the grounds I could give for valuing the object. The non-eudaimonistic emotion has a different basis than the eudaimonistic emotion.

The basis for a non-eudaimonistic emotion can be explained in terms of a negative and a positive criterion:

Negative criterion: The emotion is an evaluative response to an object in terms of salience and importance without direct bearing on my own interests and benefits.

Positive criterion: The emotion is an evaluative response based on independent considerations and rational argument concerning the flourishing of others, and other objects that are not part of my flourishing.

The justification of the emotion, as an appraisal of value, is independent of, or not derived from, considerations of my flourishing. I am able to provide, in the case of non-eudaimonistic emotions, a justification that is not linked to my flourishing. Non-eudaimonistic emotions transcend the sphere of my flourishing and deal with a social flourishing or a flourishing of others that may or may not have a bearing on my flourishing. Humans have, or at least some humans have, the capacity to value objects that promote "our flourishing," or "their flourishing," or the flourishing of humanity at large. And "our flourishing" is not reducible to "my flourishing." Such emotions are not reducible to eudaimonistic emotions based on a self-referential link. To value, emotionally, some state of affairs in New Guinea, or in the remote past, is not to find a way to include such affairs in my flourishing. It is to value such things intrinsically and apart from any appeal to my interests or flourishing. If this view is correct, we have theoretical space to develop a theory of emotion that includes, but is not based on, not reducible to and not derivative from, eudaimonistic evaluation.

For non-eudaimonistic emotions to exist, it doesn't matter if emotions are learned parochially. It doesn't even matter if some non-eudaimonistic emotions developed from prior parochial, eudaimonistic emotions, such as care for one's kin. What matters is that humans appear to have the ability to alter the source, nature and justification of their attachments, replacing "my flourishing" with a genuinely independent "our" flourishing or "their flourishing." Therefore, the parochial thesis is not a universal truth. Humans can prefer and prioritize non-parochial values and objects.

This critique, therefore, redefines the issue at stake as such: Are non-eudaimonistic emotions, *as defined above*, possible and, if so, to what extent do they affect human conduct? We need to take another look at the human world and see if non-eudaimonistic emotions exist. I do not presume to answer the question, since this is in large part an empirical matter that deserves extensive study. However, it seems that such emotions do exist, and the pre-theoretical distinction of eudaimonia and non-eudaimonia emotions is correct. For examples, we can look to acts of

altruism, acts of heroism, acts devoted to building a more peaceful humanity, acts devoted to protecting human rights, and acts justified by cosmopolitan and universal moral principles.

2) Normative worries

I now change our focus from the logic and psychology of emotions to the ethics of emotions. The ethics of emotions asks many questions. The questions that are most important for this chapter are: What types of emotions, e.g. empathy and kindness, support ethical conduct, and which emotions, e.g. selfishness and greed, inhibit it? Do certain human traits and emotions, e.g. parochial inclinations, help or inhibit certain types of ethical values, principles and projects? For instance, are parochial emotions an obstacle to cosmopolitan values and projects, such as a love of humanity and a just global world? Most generally, we ask: what sorts of emotions and values are needed and appropriate to face the challenges of the world today? What approaches to ethics and normative system should we teach and prioritize?

The last two questions in this list generate most of my normative worries. My worries are encapsulated in one claim: Emphasizing a parochial, eudaimonistic approach to our emotions and values is not the best approach to dealing with the problems of our global world or global media. The project of constructing a global ethics, in particular, requires an emphasis on cosmopolitan principles supported by global emotions that are non-eudaimonistic. Nussbaum's parochial theory of the emotions, including the stress on nation-based political emotions, is not sufficient for, and may work against, the project of global ethics. It is important to develop a global, non-eudaimonistic theory because such a theory could be an important psychological basis for global ethics.

6. Priority of Global Emotions

Let me explain this position by defining what I mean by global emotions.

Global ethics is not only a set of principle but also a set of emotions. By global emotion I mean an attachment that is not defined by or limited by national or cultural boundaries. Examples of global emotions are a love of humanity and human flourishing, a love of global social justice and human rights, a love of peace and abhorrence of war; a desire for a healthy global climate. Among these emotions are global *political* emotions. They are directed at the political structure of the world. We may have a love for the spread of democracy across the world; or we may have a passion for erecting global structures that address transnational issues such as immigration. Our patriotism may be the patriotism of a global citizen.

Would Nussbaum dismiss these global emotions? No, she wouldn't. She is a leading thinker in global ethics, advocating the promotion of universal human capacities as a test for human development policies (2001), which she sees as a form of human rights theory. She has been a voice for a liberal education that cultivates "humanity" and teaches students to see themselves as citizens of the world (1997). She believes that global principles of ethics require the support of the emotions. But her parochial view of emotions does not allow her to embrace (or have much confidence in) the global emotions as non-eudaimonistic and as independent of concrete, parochial emotions. Therefore, Nussbaum believes that much (or most) of the emotional support for cosmopolitan principles will be extensions of parochial emotions, e.g. caring for fellow citizens of our country is extended to caring about foreigners.

I am skeptical of the view that "extending the parochial" is the only or best approach in cultivating global emotions such as love of humanity, given human psychology. This is *one* way to try to turn people into globalists. But we should consider other approaches. We *do* learn other-regarding emotions in a parochial setting, literally at the knees of our parents. We learn to love the near and dear and gradually extend it to our nation. But is it not possible that we can come to have global emotions by a process *other* than an extension from parochial emotions based on eudaimonistic reasoning? Even if the *origin* of emotion is parochial, this does not preclude that, once my emotional capacities are established, I may become capable of strong global emotions.

Consider an example from my own experience. I became a cosmopolitan in ethics because of my direct experience with human conflict, ethnic cruelty, narrow patriotism and unspeakable acts of brutality. Reporting from among the victims, I came to see all persons as first and foremost humans, united around central human needs that transcend borders. It seems to me that I acquired the global emotions of cosmopolitanism *not* from – or at least not only from -- eudaimonistic reasoning. Nor does it seem to be an adequate account of my embrace of cosmopolitanism that I simply "stretched" my empathy to strangers in the field. My decision to make love of humanity my primary ethical emotion was not "hitched" to my own interests or even my personal concerns. My point here is that "extending the parochial" is not the only educational strategy for teaching love of humanity. It is possible that a global emotion of love of humanity can arise in moments of experiencing the Other as valuable and human to the core. In some cases, people acquire global emotions through an almost direct apprehension of the value of being human and the human goods that allow for a decent life, anywhere. I believe there are other pathways to the global emotions than through the thickets of parochial emotions and their precarious extensions. Those pathways may be equally (or more) helpful for the project of global ethics and the cultivation of humanity.[①] They are worth exploring.

Nussbaum's parochial theory of the political emotions appears to blind her to counterexamples. She asserts confidently that "it makes no sense" to suppose that strong motivation can be generated by art, music, and rhetoric "that are the common coin of all nations, a sort of Esperanto of the heart (2013, 14)." Why? Because 'particularity' and 'being localized' is the key to motivation. Yet it is possible to think of art and music that strike a global key, and do act as a sort of Esperanto of the heart. In popular music, consider John Lennon's song, *Imagine*. In classical music, think of Beethoven's *Ode to Joy*[②] or the great artistic works in medieval and Renaissance cathedrals which portray all humans as images of God and part of a universal history. Those 'global' themes and emotions have motivated millions of people over the centuries.

Also, we need to think about the "plasticity" of human emotions -- their ability to evolve in new conditions. Are we forever trapped – condemned? – to be parochial emotional creatures in a world of contending nation states? Maybe not. Patriotism and even our parochialism are products of a social evolution still in progress. Humans have complex and fascinating ways of *giving*

① The idea that some of our emotions are not parochial, and not acquired by psychological extension and analogy, is not new. Adam Smith (1976) and David Hume (2004) are among philosophers who assert that humans have an innate capacity for universal sympathy or benevolence for others. They did not explain this capacity as an extension of other emotions developed, for example, by parochial self-interest or prudence.

② Beethoven adapted the ode from Schiller. The ode celebrates the brotherhood and unity of humans. Beethoven used the ode in the last movement of his Ninth Symphony. In 1972, the Council of Europe made the ode the Anthem of Europe.

themselves new or different emotions. Often we act in new ways and then find we have developed new interests and emotions. What new emotions and "perceptions of value" will evolve as we interact with our new, global world? We see increasing numbers of people, especially the young, making a global mind set (and a global emotion set) as their *dominant* perspective on value, not merely an extension of a parochial mind set. Large numbers of people are involved with online, global networks of human rights activists. Their reasoning is not particularly eudaimonistic, and often originates in a global consciousness. Others are involved in what is called "grassroots cosmopolitanism" – using global media to push for greater global justice around the world. "Ethical globalism" – making global values ethically prior to local values – may be gradually acquiring its own rituals and symbols, such as the celebration of Earth Day. Our experience with a global public sphere may do more to cultivate humanity than attempts to extend our parochialism. Why should globalism not have its own independent set of symbols, emotions, ways of teaching, and ways of capturing our hearts? If, as Nussbaum says, emotions are intelligent responses to the perception of values, then there is no reason why embracing global emotions 'straight up' – and not as any sort of extension – cannot be a non-derivative and intelligent response to our global world.

Moreover, from a normative perspective, there are reasons to reverse the priority of parochial values and eudaimonistic reasoning over global values and non-eudaimonistic reasoning. There are reasons to not *start* with an ethic of parochial emotions and then hope to develop a global ethic. Rather, to address our global issues, we should start with global ethics, global emotions and global principles as ethically prior and trumping parochial values where they conflict. The argument for "going global" in ethics and in media ethics has been made in detail in my writings and the works of others (Ward and Wasserman 2010, Ward 2013). These works suggest that we need a new approach to teaching compassion, empathy and values.

Another problem with the "extend the parochial" approach is that it can substitute internationalism for true globalism. Internationalism begins with a world of warring and competitive nations. It promotes international treaties and cross-border cooperation. Somewhere between a world government and warring nations, internationalism hopes that "organized cooperation among nations" may secure a better future for mankind. Internationalism in politics and emotive parochialism in psychology share a cautious realism – we must lower our expectations of global politics and global ethics because of the nature of human beings. For some, this realism is an attractive feature. For me, realism can prevent us from being more radical and from being more challenged – when we desperately need a more radical approach that challenges the status quo. We settle for second best. Internationalism is not a 21st century globalism that seeks global structures and institutions for global issues. Internationalism was a product of 19th century nationalism, spreading from Europe after the Concert of Europe to North America (see Mazower 2012). The Olympic Games is an example of internationalist, not globalist, thinking. It consists of national teams meeting to test their athletic skills. The power of nationalism is so strong that the idea of "one humanity" is betrayed, cynically used for emotional power, and overwhelmed by overt nationalism (and economics) on almost every level. The Olympic Games is a faux globalism. My fear is that, by stressing globalism as an extension of nation-based values, we settle for a sort of 'second best' internationalism in ethics. We fail to see the urgency in creating the much stronger ethics of globalism.

A parochial approach of hoping to extend nation-based emotions may fail to see that, in many cases, global values *conflict* with – not extend – parochial values. Global values, emotions and principles are together a valuable counter-balancing force to nation-based values, especially where the latter become extreme or intolerant. Perhaps the right approach of cultivators of political emotions in a global world is to work *against* the established order of parochial values, when global values are secondary 'extensions' of our attachments to what is near and dear.

7. Conclusion

As liberal philosophers, Nussbaum and I agree on fundamentals. We agree that Tolstoy's call for eliminating patriotism is neither possible nor desirable. We agree that the political emotions can be manipulated, and therefore we need scrutiny and rational principle. We agree that society should actively develop the emotions of compassion, liberty, and justice. Nussbaum's humane patriotism is compatible on many levels with my moderate patriotism.

We also differ. She is more positive than I about the ability of societies to cultivate moderate forms of political emotion. I remain guarded about the use of political emotions. My cautiousness is due to my experience as a reporter with narrow nationalism and the dark history of patriotism. No thoughtful person can visit the site of Hitler's rallies in Nuremburg without coming to fear demagogues who channel political emotions into rituals and genocide. Also I differ from Nussbaum in advocating global political emotions as a counter-balance to nation-based political emotions.

I have explained how Nussbaum's *Political Emotions* provides a valuable exploration of the political emotions, adding substance to my moderate patriotism. However, I questioned whether Nussbaum's eudaimonistic, parochial approach is adequate for the ethics of a global world and global media. Maybe it is time we started talking about a global patriotism for humanity.

The greatest task of moral theory today is to transform itself into a global ethics that challenges dominant forms of parochial ethics, from ethnocentricity to nationalism and political realism. We should be radical in the ways of moral invention, envisaging a global ethics and a global media ethics for our interconnected world. Rather than start from the parochial and hope for global extensions, we do the reverse – start with the global and hope for national extensions.

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封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

媒体、专业主义和公共理性

Media, Professionalism, and Public Reason

夏琨塔拉·拉奥[①]

Abstract: While much has been written about journalism as a profession, current thinking provides specific yet fluid guidelines that lay out why journalism and media practices need "collective strategies for asserting control over standards". Professionalism in practice links traditional values of journalism to a more richly participatory and wide available style of journalistic inquiry. This insistence on a scopic, or experienced, idea of media professionalism is one of great potential value for journalists across the globe. Such analysis should include public reason as a guiding principle. The need for increased scrutiny and more rigorous critical assessments is meant to serve as a guide toward a more fruitful public discourse. Public reason can result in the prioritizing evaluative concerns within a social and political system. Public reason is the process by which citizens arrive at the ordering of and *prioritizing of* the plurality of reasons. Media can play an important role in fostering the conditions of public reason.

Key Words: professionalism, public reason, media practices

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1. Introduction

The two Asian giants, the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Republic of India, are home to some 2.3 billion people — two-fifths of humanity — and currently boast two of the world's fasting-growing economies. Over the past three decades, China's move from an autarkic, centrally-planned economy toward a socialist, market economy underpinned by its integration into the global economy has generated robust economic growth in the country. With a gross domestic product (GDP) that grew at an average rate of 9.5% per year over the period 1980–2004, 9% per year in the period 2005–2007, and which currently sits at $1.6 trillion, China is now the second-largest economy in the world. Although its growth has not been as spectacular as China's, India's post-1991 economic reforms and integration into the global economy have contributed to economic growth of more than 6% per year, on average, since 1992. This has laid to rest the ghost of the anemic "Hindu rate of growth," a scant 3.5% growth trend that had seen India seemingly perennially trapped in a cycle of underperformance from the early 1950s through the mid-1980s (Rao, 2010; Sharma, 2009). India's average annual growth as measured in GDP reached 7.3% in 2003, and has fluctuated from 8.5% to 9% in the years since. If India maintains this growth momentum over the next several years, as is expected, it will spur further growth in the country's $80 billion economy — sufficient to take what is currently the tenth-largest economy in the world, and the third-largest in Asia, and make it the fifth-largest in the world by 2020. Both countries have tackled poverty, but in China the poverty reduction effort has been unprecedented. On the eve of the reforms in China, the incidence of poverty was among the highest in the world. Between 1981 and 2001, however, the proportion of people living in extreme poverty fell from 53% to just 8%. This means that across China, there were more than 400 million fewer people living in extreme poverty in 2001 as compared to twenty years earlier (Sharma, 2009). Few countries have experienced such rapid growth over such a prolonged period of time; similarly, few have succeeded at so sharply reducing poverty among their populace.

Such economic indicators and a growing body of comparative literature on what is referred to as "Chindian media" require a more sustained research effort if we are now to consider two of the largest media in the world, with attention given to their professional and ethical practices (Thussu, 2013). In this paper, I focus on public reason as an ethical principle underlying discussions of global media ethics. While I provide some comparative perspectives between India, China, and the other countries included in the group of developing nations known as BRICS — which, in addition to China and India, includes Brazil, Russia, and South Africa — the main point I will address here concerns India's growing media and how an inclusive and non-parochial process of public reason has to be an ethical condition for media practices in India and elsewhere.

2. Global Media "Professionalism"

While much has been written about journalism as a profession, Meyers, Wyatt, Borden, and Wasserman's (2012) article, "Professionalism, not professionals," gives readers specific yet fluid guidelines that lay out why journalism and media practices need what they refer to as "collective strategies for asserting control over standards" (2012, p. 199). Instead of undertaking a comparative analysis with other professions — say, with doctors and lawyers — and studying the actions of individual journalists, they argue media workers will be better informed if they act as a group that has the potential to arrive at a collective understanding of their professional ethics and

values. The authors give readers a comprehensive and inclusive list of action-oriented possibilities, encouraging their audience to, for instance, "Cultivate collective consciousness," "Defend ethical commitments," "Stand in solidarity with others," "Look past your own back yard," and, "Frame the fight" (Meyers et al., 2012, p. 200–201). While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed analysis of each such category Meyers and colleagues suggested, it is worthwhile to enter into a discussion of their advocacy for professionalism. For Meyers and colleagues, professionalism in practice "depends on harvesting traditional values of journalism and applying them to a new, more richly participatory, style of journalistic inquiry and making it more widely available" (2012, p. 202). The challenge, they write, "is to marry the current clamor for democratization to a restatement of the values that are worth carrying forward: reverence for fact, commitment to verification, independent discourse, humility, trustworthiness, accountability, public service and so forth" (2012, p. 203). Meyers and colleagues' aims, which are in broad accordance with the principles of global media ethics, give us a much needed blueprint to use in shaping future action, and their insistence on a scopic, or experienced, idea of media professionalism is one of great potential value for journalists across the globe.

I will extend Meyers and colleagues' analysis to include public reason as a guiding principle for global media ethics. The word "reason" has been under heavy attack in recent decades, with critics citing its Eurocentric perspective and limited applicability. I will argue that reflected evaluation — that which Meyers and colleagues refer to as the "intelligent skepticism" of the journalist (2012, p. 200) — demands the exercising of reasoning as it relates to its relative importance to values and ethical principles. The need for increased scrutiny and more rigorous critical assessments is not just a demand for self-centered evaluation by secluded individuals steeped in cultural behaviors, but instead is meant to serve as a guide, or route-marker, toward a more fruitful public discourse, and a sign of interactive public reasoning: social evaluations are starved of useful information and sound arguments if they are entirely based on separated and sequestered cogitation. It is the lack of public reason, as economist and noble laureate Amartya Sen has argued, that leads to "capability deprivation" (2009, p. 244). He specifically wrote about capability deprivation in the context of poverty and gender bias in India. "Real poverty in terms of capability depravation goes beyond studying income approaches to poverty," wrote Sen, "If the family income is disproportionately used to advance the interests of some family members (for example, if there is a systematic preference for boys over girls in the family allocation of resources), then the extent of the depravation of the neglected members may not be adequately reflected by the aggregate value of the family income" (2009, p. 246). One can only address poverty and deprivation, Sen argued, by looking at the plural features of reason. It is the exercise of public evaluation, Sen wrote, that accommodates different kinds of reasons and evaluative concerns (2009, p. 396). For instance, if in India the evaluative concern is over the basic survival of the female fetus, it cannot be held to be *more reasonable* than the discrimination of women in the workforce in the United States on the basis that it is *unreasonable* for women in the United States to speak up against discrimination because, unlike women in India, they had survived their birth. Plurality of reason, Sen argued, is the "prioritizing of evaluative concerns" within the system of deprivation (2009, p. 398). Indeed, women in the United States enjoy a longer life expectancy and have better access to education and health care as compared to women in India, but that cannot and should not minimize their experiences of deprivation when compared to their male counterparts in terms of economic, social, or political power. Public reason is the process by

which we arrive at the ordering of and *prioritizing of* the plurality of reasons. Media can play an important role in fostering the conditions of public reason.

An essential non-parochialism of reason is necessary if public reason is to be useful for the global media. An "open" approach to reason requires a certain level of decontextualization — that is, one has to accept that reason must not be confined to a particular locality, group, country, or region. It is the limitation of and reliance on parochial reasoning that needs to be abandoned. Sentiments must be viewed from "a certain distance from us," and, thus, they will be seen to scrutinize not only the influence of vested interests but also the captivating hold of traditions and customs. In the evolution of the non-parochialism of reason, Sen (2009, p. 174) asked readers to accept and invoke an oft-used phrase he borrowed from the economist and philosopher, Adam Smith, when appraising specific practices — the "eyes of the rest of the mankind." For instance, if one evaluates a group of practices that includes selective abortions in India and China, the stoning of women by the Taliban in Afghanistan, and the widespread application of the death penalty in the United States, it shows how discussions within a given society can be circumscribed within a narrow understanding and, as a result, can be counterproductive.

What follows is a brief critique of India's media, in particular of its failure to provide a platform for non-parochial public reason, and a discussion of why it therefore is necessary to constantly reconsider and centralize questions of public reason in discussions of global media ethics.

3. The "Uncertain glory" of India and Indian media

1) India and its various inequalities

I will begin with a comparative analysis of the economies of India and China. Were one to unpack the comparison between the two countries, the resultant picture would be rather grim for India. Images of a new and dramatically changing India are now plastered all over the world's media, frequently representing the country's own incessant and obsessive focus on Bollywood, a shorthand reference to its large and flourishing movie industry, as well as the growth of high-tech firms and the concomitant evolution of technology centers in cities such as Bangalore and Hyderabad, and India's ability to hold the world's largest democratic elections, with 800 million people voting to elect their parliamentary representatives. Such celebratory focus on India's success stories cannot hide an obvious and alarming fact: the rapidly growing India of today remains riddled with the same historic, deep, and severe inequalities that have long characterized Indian society, and the majority of Indian people have been left behind, kept from enjoying the benefits of improved living standards. For instance, even the notion of considering India within the BRICS framework is misleading, as India is the exception within this group. World Development Indicators (2013) showed that each of the five nations, with the exception of South Africa, had achieved universal or near-universal literacy among its younger age cohorts; nevertheless, India lags far behind in this elementary foundation of participatory development. One-fifth of all Indian men ages 15–25 years — a group totaling approximately 70 million individuals — and one-fourth of all women in the same age group — approximately 100 million individuals — were unable to read or write according to data collected in 2010. This analysis focused only on the "crude literacy rate," and looked for only basic reading comprehension of a single language. Child immunization, nearly universal in all other BRICS countries, also lags in

the Indian context. India's immunization rates, in fact, are lower even than in comparison to neighboring South Asian countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. India stands out among the BRICS nations also in the extent to which under- and mal-nourishment remain a problem among children. This problem has largely disappeared in China, Brazil, and Russia, and is not so acute in South Africa, but remains rampant in India, where more than 40% of all children five years of age or younger are underweight, and an even higher proportion — approximately 50% — have seen their growth and development stunted. India's per capita GDP is less than half that of China. Compared to China, India has failed miserably in almost all areas of human development for the majority of its citizens. China, on the other hand, has made enormous progress in securing universal access to elementary education, health care, and social security — and this groundwork was in place long *before* the country began to pursue market-oriented economic reforms in 1979. China's growth-oriented policies belie a clear focus on setting a solid foundation for development and social progress. In the academic literature on "Chindia," there has been some criticism that it is the ungainly and inefficient practices of democracy in India that, unlike authoritarian China, do not allow for the country's rapid growth and income and land redistribution (Antholis, 2014; Smith, 2013). However, even if one were to compare India to Brazil — like India, a relatively stable democratic state over the past two decades and perhaps a more directly comparable peer nation within the BRICS group — China and Brazil look quite similar across those same social indicators, and both reveal deep failures in India's approach to development.

All countries have different inherent inequalities with which they must contend. India, however, is faced with a unique cocktail of lethal divisions and seemingly irresolvable disparities. Few countries have to contend with such extreme inequalities across so many socio-cultural dimensions, including large economic inequalities as well as major disparities in caste, religion, class, and gender. In order to determine just how unequal is income distribution within India, I considered a recent study that claimed that income disparity in India was at the same level as that in Brazil and South Africa, and, "Far worse than China" (Ghosh, 2010,p. 20). This conclusion was based on a single survey and the study concluded with calls for further research but what is clear is that income distribution in India reveals a growing and massive economic inequality. For instance, per capita expenditure data suggest a growing rural-urban disparity, as well as growing inequality within urban centers. The comparatively affluent in urban areas have been the main beneficiaries of the rapid economic growth of recent decades, and per capita income data indicate a growing concentration of income at the top; data on wealth, patchy as they are, also point to growing disparities between the urban upper and middle-classes and the urban and rural poor and very poor (Ghosh, 2010 p. 19).

Many countries, including China and Russia, have had in the past caste-like institutions that placed people within sometimes rigid hierarchies. India seems to be unique, however, in how caste has retained its centrality in modern society despite numerous laws meant to outlaw discriminatory practices based on caste. Caste stratification often reinforces class inequality, imbuing it with a resilience that is harder to conquer. Aggarwal, Drèze, and Gupta's 2013 study of Uttar Pradesh, a northern-Indian state, revealed the near-total grip the higher castes had on all positions of power and influence, including in press clubs, among university faculty, at major NGOs, in trade unions and media houses, among bureaucrats, and in the police force. The two

upper-most castes, Brahmins and Kshatriyas, occupied 75% of the top jobs in these institutions, despite the two castes comprising only approximately 20% of the population in Uttar Pradesh. Other castes and communities, including tribal groups and Muslims, are not completely unrepresented. However, given the demographics of the state, it can be said that members of these upper castes enjoy remarkably unequal access to power. Gender inequality, too, is exceptionally high, particularly across large swaths of the country in the north and west, where the subjugation of women is systemic and near complete. The brutal rape case of a woman in Delhi, which occurred in December 2012, received enormous media attention and highlighted the extent of cultural discrimination and culturally-sanctioned violence against women, but the deprivation women in India suffer on a daily basis, across caste and class, is profound. It is beyond the scope of this paper to outline the nature and extent of this deprivation except to note that India is consistently ranked as one of the worst places for women in the world, with the lowest gender ratio — lower even than countries of sub-Saharan Africa (World Development Indicators, 2013). The works of Butalia (2000), John and Nair (2000), Kumar (2002), Mohanty (2003), Nabar (2000), Nussbaum (2000), and others on this issue are comprehensive. The reality is that the social norms and value systems underlying these historical inequalities are still alive, even if their manifestations are moderated by modern laws, norms, and institutions.

Had the distribution of incomes and expenditures remained unchanged — or even improved, instead of becoming more unequal — perhaps those living in poverty would have shared in the gains resulting from India's rapid economic growth. Instead, poverty has declined at a sluggish pace, more or less in line with earlier, pre-reform trends — and, in some Indian states, poverty has even *increased*, even as the rate of growth has greatly accelerated. The dividing line between India's "haves" and "have-nots" is not just a rhetorical cliché but a reality that a staggering 600 million people have to live with on a daily basis.

2) "Uncertain glory" of Indian media

I have borrowed the phrase "uncertain glory" from Drèze and Sen's book, *Uncertain Glory: India and its contradictions* (2013), where they applied it in charting India's high-growth trajectory and its troubling ramifications. While Drèze and Sen acknowledged India's many achievements since the end of the colonial period — including the capacity to run a functioning democracy, and to do so without fear of a violent disintegration of the country — nevertheless, systematic failures loomed large, especially in regard to tackling issues having to do with poverty, literacy, caste, and gender discrimination. I would suggest that Indian media, too, have rarely concerned themselves with the significant injustices and inefficiencies that shape the social and economic lives of the majority of the Indian people. The absence of high-quality, ethically-practiced journalism — albeit with a few exceptions — is evident in the media's consistent and exclusive presenting of a "glittering picture of the privileged and successful" (Drèze & Sen, 2013, p. 262).

As in China, the growth of the Indian media in the post-reform period has been spectacular. In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the government of then-Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao was faced with a fiscal crisis that forced them to introduce policy changes relaxing restrictions on multinational corporations; such companies in turn were quick to invest in the Indian media market. The arrival of international, satellite-based

television — with the debut in India of CNN International in 1991, as the young network covered the first Gulf War — signaled an onslaught from the skies that radically changed the Indian media landscape (Pelton, Oslund, & Marshall, 2004). A few months later, Hong Kong-based Star TV, a subsidiary of News Corporation, began broadcasting five channels into India using the ASIASAT-1 satellite. Between 1991 and 1995, several Indian, satellite-based television services were launched, most prominent among them being Zee TV and Sony TV. As a result, the Indian broadcast media economy underwent a dramatic change. The sale of television sets increased at a nominal rate of 13.9% during the period 2005–2010 — a period that saw India emerge as the third-largest cable TV-viewing audience in the world, after China and the U.S., with more than 100 million cable TV households by the end of 2011 (Hawkes, 2012). Having previously depended for their news solely on *Doordarshan*, the state-owned and operated television network, post-reform Indian audiences have been able to choose from among hundreds of 24-hour news channels. The Indian Information and Broadcasting Ministry today boasts of more than 800 cable channels available for audiences, of which roughly 300 are around-the-clock, all-news channels that provide news-based programming in multiple languages (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 2013). In addition to this widespread and expanding access to broadcast media, newspaper circulation in India has remained robust, with daily circulation of various publications totaling some 330 million copies. A staggering 750 million people — approximately 75% of the population — have access to mobile phones, a figure second only to China (Parthasarthi et al., 2012). India has entered an era of intense media saturation as consumers are increasingly able to access global and satellite television, the internet and social-networking services, and the ever-proliferating new media and technologies that now co-construct and disseminate major events as they unfold. Thussu's (2012, p. 433) "million media" gives us a convenient means of referencing India's multi-ethnic, multilingual, and multicultural media systems that are able to reach the subcontinent and its global diaspora.

The quantity of Indian media, and the economic success story associated with its growth, has not been matched by an increase in quality or by the practicing of a more ethical journalism. Given the breadth and scope of this media, it would be impossible here to analyze the work being done in the newsrooms of each of the 86,000 newspapers and weekly magazines published in the country and of the 300 news channels broadcasting diverse content to the Indian television-viewing audience. There is, however, enough research available for us to conclude that Indian media has, in general, failed to challenge India's biggest and most intractable problems, including the disparities and inequalities that continue to characterize Indian society. Rather than confronting these issues, the media often has gone along with the established norms and what they consider to be easy to sell. The researches of scholars such as Jeffrey (2000), Mehta (2008), Mudgal (2011), Rao (2009), Sainath (1996), Sonwalkar (2002) and others have highlighted but some of the biases that plague Indian media practices. These are complex biases having to do with media representation but what is remarkable and obvious is the lack of interest shown in the lives of India's poor, based on the balance of news selection. For instance, in Mudgal's study of the content of the three English and three Hindi daily newspapers with the broadest circulation, the author found that only 2% of reported news items addressed issues with which India's rural population was concerned — for example, reporting on drought or floods, livestock, the price of grain, or issues surrounding land rights — all the more shocking given that approximately 70% of Indians live in rural settings. The majority of news coverage, as Rao (2008) concluded in her

research of broadcast news content, is devoted to crime, politics, and entertainment. Rao's research conducted among local journalists found that these men and women spent more time cultivating relationships with top politicians than collecting actual information, and that they create the illusion of professional independence through the careful enacting of "performances of distance" (2012, p. 81). Rao argued that in so doing, journalists in India are able to reconcile a professional code that insists on objectivity and impartiality with a cultural code that places leaders — who often belong to a higher caste — at the center of Indian politics and political news reporting. Another bias is attributable to the near-complete corporatization of the Indian media in the past two decades, which has resulted in strong pressures from the owners and proprietors for editors to pander to advertisers. The proliferation of "paid news" — the phenomenon of paying newspapers or television news channels to report certain facts as truthful accounts — has presented serious ethical concerns (Guha Thakurta, 2009). The practice of "paid news" not only has helped to disseminate misinformation; troubling as it may be, the real harm is in the reduced space it leaves in its wake for public discussion of the less dazzling matters that are of importance to ordinary people — topics such as education, health, nutrition, and sanitation. The caste and class affiliation of many journalists, as mentioned earlier, also can play a vital role. In a 2006 survey of 315 Delhi-based editors and well-known journalists, not one of them reported that they belonged to the *dalit*, the lowest caste of Indian society (Chamaria, Kumar, & Yadav, 2006). In fact, about 85% belonged to either of the two top castes, which combined constitute only about 16% of India's population, and about half of these were Brahmins, the highest caste. The hold that certain castes and classes have on Indian media, as noted earlier, leads to the exclusion of concerns over and for India's poor, tribal groups, and otherwise marginalized populations. The coverage of the 2012 rape incident in Delhi highlighted the exclusion of the poor more starkly than ever before. While there are four rape cases reported daily in Delhi, Rao's (2014) research showed that the only cases that receive continuous media coverage are those in which the victims are urban, educated, and middle-class — as was the case in the incident of December 2012. The rape of poor and *dalit* women, frequent and omnipresent, especially in rural areas, is ignored by the urban-centric national and regional media. While one cannot assume that a more equitable representation of caste and gender will automatically lead to media content which is more sympathetic experiences of women and lower castes but one can conclude that the caste and class monopoly over the media is a huge problem because the media is not only molded by the unequal society within which it exists, but its potentially corrective role in Indian social and political thinking is made that much more difficult by the society that has molded it.

The failure to remove or otherwise address the sharp divisions between the privileged, the poor, and the very poor is central to all functioning democracies, including India. India's democratic system has given rise to opportunities to solve some failures but its achievements in removing inequality and addressing injustice nevertheless have been limited. The Constitution of the Republic gives a series of "Directive Principles" to the state that elucidate several fundamental economic and social rights, such as the reduction of economic inequality, the right to equal pay for equal work regardless of gender, the uplifting of weaker segments of society, and universal education with the concomitant belief that, if left unaddressed, the public would have recourse to seek change through the power of their vote and the electoral process. We have seen changes in governments, with smooth transitions of power, but the democratic system has not been able to provide any remedy for the glaring inequalities mentioned above. The tracing of India's economic

and social inequality, and the failure of the Indian media to report on and accurately depict such inequality, is both an ethical and a professional failure. The media's failures have been on multiple fronts but the most acute outcome, in Thussu's words, is that the "media has created democratic deficit in the world's largest democracy" (2005, p. 126). It is necessary here to return to Sen's notion of a "plurality of reasons," in order to centralize media's role in the deliberative — and inclusive — process of democracy.

4. Public reason in global media

If one were to invoke the idea of reasoning in its simplest form, it would involve presenting one's point of view and paying serious attention to the points of view of others. People, in the process of reasoning, must connect to each other through conversations on relevant subjects, and, should that fail, must resort to demonstrations, agitation, and campaigning. The channels of public reasoning, however, must be made available in order to arrive at a collective course of action and to allow for decisions to be made on social policies and choices. "The role of public reasoning," wrote Drèze and Sen, "do not depend on any credulous assumption that what we tell each other must be well reasoned and persuasive. Rather, it is pubic reasoning that helps to make us understand each other's problems and to see each other's perspective" (2013, p. 266). While much has been written, in poststructuralist literature and in analytical philosophy, about reason and its historical roots, Sen is clever to delocalize all aspects of reason. It is important, he asserts, to see the global roots of reason and understand that even in non-Western societies the history of reason is a long one. Specifically giving examples from emperors Ashoka and his Buddhist councils (2nd century BC) and later Akbar (14th century AD) from the Indian context, Sen takes issue with Habermas, Rawls and others to argue that any notion of a reasoned public sphere cannot be perceived or presented as a uniquely Western experience. In my work on nyaya philosophy, I have argued that 2nd century nyaya philosophers were very much invested in the idea of reasoned justice and in fostering deliberations between members of a society (Rao, 2013). Sen accepts that neither Ashoka nor Akbar advocated for the rights of democratic representation even as they each championed some elements of democratic practice in their pursuit of reason. For a more contemporary idea of public reasoning in a democratic society I would like to invoke a perspective that John Stuart Mill explored and Sen paraphrased as "government by discussion" (Dreze and Sen, p. 258). "How people vote depends," write Dreze and Sen (p. 259), "on their understanding of the problems to be addressed and also their perceptions of what others – as well as they themselves – have reason to seek." Social and economic problems are not always easy to understand, and a vigorous exercise of public reasoning can play a major role both in expanding public understanding and in broadening politics. It is in the broad framework of public reasoning, involving both epistemology and social ethics, that we have to examine the ways in which Indian democratic politics and media content has tended to leave substantial gaps in the social understanding of what is needed by the Indian society and of what the voters have reason to seek.

It is because of public reasoning, economists have argued (Bhatia, 1991; Keneally, 2012; Ó Gráda, 2009; Sen, 1983), that a country such as India has not faced famines of the same type and intensity as under colonial rule. With a free and vocal media and a functional democratic process in place, elected representatives have had to fear electoral backlash and, thus, have made every effort to avoid famines by implementing food redistribution programs, investing in food production, and recognizing the urgency of public intervention in times of drought. Even with a

population approaching one billion, political representatives could never envision implementing policies such as forced sterilization or limits on the number of children a family could have via state-mandates. Only once in India's post-independence history, in 1975 and under an emergency act, was an effort made by the government of then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to force sterilization upon Indian citizens under the guise of "family planning" policies (Mosher, 2008). The massive protests and resounding defeat of Gandhi's government in the 1977 election was a notice to future governments not to intervene in the reproductive rights of the country's citizens. The strength and resilience of Indian democracy — matched by open modes of public reasoning such as its media — has allowed for successful resistance to subsequent authoritarian moves on the part of the state.

Even if we recognize such successes, the question still must be asked: what is it that tends to limit adequate discussion of the critically important problems of deprivation and inequality in India? And, do those limitations limit the very nature of democratic practice? The pro-affluent bias in the media limits public reasoning and fails to recognize the composition of the public itself. Indian media is not unique from media in other parts of the world that similarly flood their content with trivia and entertainment. What is unique about India's media is that, were one to watch the news channels, or read a newspaper or magazine, one would arrive at a misguided understanding of how the *majority* of Indians live, and likely would be ignorant of the fact that many merely subsist, rather than thrive. The deprivation and struggle that the majority of Indians face on a daily basis is the *missing story* — missing are stories about the 40% of young children in India, some 100 million in total, who are malnourished; about the rampancy of female feticide, which has led to the world's most-pronounced gender imbalance; about the 50% of Indians, some 500 million people, who do not have access to a working toilet, and the danger that fact poses for men, women, and, in particular, adolescent girls; and, about the 30% of Indians, some 280 million people, who do not have access to clean water.

For Sen (2009), the plurality of reasons was not solely about informing others of capability deprivation, but also about *prioritizing choices* through public reason. For instance, it would not be *unreasonable* for Indian media to focus on business ventures and technology, and to highlight other growth-oriented stories. However, the media has to prioritize what is more, or most, significant for the public to know. Is it more significant for the public to know the conditions of inequality and deprivation that mark Indian life, or stories about the lives of the privileged few? If social and class inequality is not *prioritized* in media, as a critical space for public reason in a democratic society, the overwhelming disparity in the lives of the people will be less discussed and thus will be allowed to grow deeper. Such deepening would also, whether directly or inadvertently, breach practices of democracy. The quality of a democracy is undermined if its people are not flourishing and they are deprived of even basic necessities. If media fails to serve as a platform for public reason, it is likely that public policy and the spending priorities of the state would also be misplaced, resulting in fiscal irresponsiveness. In the exercise of evaluation, reasons may sometimes compete with each other in their efforts at persuading us in one direction or the other, but there is no impediment to prioritizing and weighing distinct concerns. The presence of different kinds of considerations does not entail that an impasse need arise, or that definitive conclusions are impossible given the diversity of reasons. The prudential argument in favor of plurality of reasons is ultimately based on the principle of mutual benefit: it is *most reasonable*

that the lives of the majority in a society improve over those of an individual's — or, in India's case, a very small minority's — achievements and individuals' access to luxury and wealth.

Meyers and colleagues warned journalists to stop thinking of themselves as privileged members of an exclusive profession, and instead encouraged them to acknowledge that "journalistic professionalism confers [on them] an obligation to collaborate with the crowd" (2012, p. 202). The seeming participatory nature and inherent interactivity of new media, as Meyers and colleagues understood, make it necessary to rethink and re-envision journalism and news production. Whether new media in India — understood here as that disseminated on hand-held devices such as iPhones, and via social media — is leading to a more participatory and inclusive news and information culture remains a question open to debate. Doron and Jeffrey (2013), in their work on the pervasiveness of mobile phones, suggested a slow but steady change in social structures due to the proliferation of these devices, especially in regard to family dynamics and arranged marriages. However, if we analyze the past two decades of growth of Indian broadcast and print media, and correlate it to the lives of the majority of Indians, the resultant picture is skewed. If the majority of Indians yet live in poverty — in many cases in extreme poverty, unable to afford even basic necessities — and if the media does not reflect or accurately depict the gulf that exists between their lived realities and the realities of the more prosperous minority with any intensity, then the economic success of India's media is suspect, as is its contribution to the deepening and strengthening of democratic practices.

Efforts and evaluative concerns in global media ethics traditionally have focused on the nature of universals, the tension between the local and global, and the multiple approaches with which to address the ethical issues that arise from our presence in an increasingly interlinked world (Christians and Nordenstreng, 2004; Couldry, 2006; Rao and Wasserman, 2007; Ward, 2013). "Global media ethics," wrote Ward (2013, p. 3), "is a felt need that motivates a loosely connected set of activities and studies united by the belief that ethics must go global…" If we are to agree that media practitioners and journalists ought to be more globally minded and show a greater investment in global ethics, then public reason, used in a broad sense, can be enormously useful in theoretical and practical discussions of global media ethics. First, I suggest that it is necessary to recapture reason from the straitjacket into which it has been forced. Reasonable judgments can take into account non-congruent considerations *within* a broad theory of practice. Second, I suggest, in line with Sen's position, that media must recognize a matrix of plurality of reasons — that is, it needs to *prioritize* evaluative concerns that benefit the society at large. Lastly, I argue that media is the primary vehicle of and for public reason, and therefore it must be inclusive in fulfilling its role in order to ensure the efficient working of democratic institutions and to facilitate democratic engagement — in short, for democracy to flourish.

How can public reason be a guiding principle for media professionalism? By its very nature, a media committed to public reason would recognize the value of universals such as the sacredness of life and human dignity. In such a scenario, media professionalism would be based on inclusiveness and would be responsive to the needs of the broader public, rather than catering to the power politics of advertisers, the wealthy and privileged, and political actors. Such professionalism would be based on the principle of democracy and would make extensive provisions for fair and just political representations. Media in India, and unfortunately elsewhere, have drifted from these core principles and rarely reflect non-parochial public reason. Its limited

focus on deprivation and inequality, a trait that plagues modern Indian society, creates a system in which media weakens democracy, perpetuates social injustices, and participates in the exclusion of a large portion of the population from essential facilities and opportunities.

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封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

自下而上的伦理：聆听作为专业主义替代方式的南非视角

Ethics from the bottom-up: South African perspectives on listening as an alternative to professionalism

赫尔曼·沃瑟曼[①]

Abstract: Despite ongoing criticism of 'professionalism' as a concept to orientate journalists towards ethical practice, the notion still continues to be a prominent one in debates about journalism standards. Commercial pressures, globalization of media and ethical lapses in recent years have stimulated a renewed assertion of 'professionalism' as a guiding principle. This paper however argues that 'professionalism' can create distance between journalists and their publics, which firstly goes against the more participatory journalistic practices that have emerged in recent years due to the pervasiveness of new technologies, and secondly is especially highly problematic in contexts like the South African one, where huge social and political inequalities impose an ethical imperative on journalists to strive for more inclusion and diversity in journalism. The paper proposes the ethical stance of 'listening' as a better alternative to the notion of 'professionalism' in this context.

Key Words: professionalism, ethics, journalists, listening

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1. Introduction

The question of whether media practitioners are 'professionals' is one that keeps returning to media ethical debates, especially as concerns journalism. Over the last decade and a half a global movement towards professional standards for journalism has been emerging. This professionalization can be seen as a response against various contextual factors that are seen as having a potential negative impact on journalistic standards. These include the growth of big conglomerations that exert commercial pressures on journalistic values, as well as the globalization of news media that has given journalists a sense of being connected to a global body of like-minded practitioners and inspired a desire to consider global standards for the profession (Reese 2001:173). Journalistic professionalism is often invoked during crises over standards, embarrassments and ethical lapses (Zelizer 2004:35) – in other words it gets affirmed by its absence.

The global growth of journalism education has been cited (Reese 2001:173) as another reason for the rise in the discourse of professionalism, as research is adding to the knowledge base of journalism as a home discipline. Much of this education, as Josephi (2010:1) points out, is however premised on equipping students with skills and knowledge to operate in democratic countries, where journalism plays a fourth estate role and facilitates a deliberative culture.

Despite the relative lack of scholarly attention to actual journalistic practices in non-democratic countries, an appeal to professionalism from journalists in those contexts can be seen as a response against conditions that deprive them from the freedom and independence that their counterparts in open societies enjoy. An assertion of a professional identity can provide such journalists with a foothold with which to negotiate greater freedom for themselves (more about this strategy later).

This professional identity is based on a 'common core of professional doctrine' (Christians and Nordenstreng 2004:11) that shows similarities in many democratic environments around the world. This doctrine relies largely on the American-inspired social responsibility model that was derived from the Hutchins Commission in the US in the mid-1940s and later applied to the international landscape by UNESCO's MacBride Commission whose report came out in 1980.

The relation between professionalism and journalism ethics is one that is commonly assumed – acting ethically is after all a hallmark of professionalism in other spheres such as medicine and law – but agreement over this link does not necessarily include consensus over what normative framework should underpin journalistic practices. Professional ethics is furthermore usually articulated in the form of press codes developed among professionals, linked to regulatory bodies that enforce them. The norm is that such enforcement should be done by bodies that have some degree of independence from the state, e.g. self-regulatory or voluntary co-regulatory bodies. As Christians & Nordenstreng (2004:14) however point out, these codes, developed as they are within local, regional or national contexts, are inadequate foundations for global media ethics. The link between professional standards of practice and ethics needs to be based in a deeper and more *substantive* understanding of journalists' roles and moral obligations in society than can be articulated in the *procedural* language of codes and regulation. This substantive understanding, if it is to form the foundation of a professionalism suitable for a globalized media, furthermore needs

to be developed in relation to the diversity of cultures and political conditions around the world. The question of journalistic professionalism around the world is therefore related to the question about global media ethics.

This paper will seek to explore the relationship between the notion of 'professionalism' and the search for global media ethics that have developed a small but growing literature of its own in recent years (Christians, Rao, Ward & Wasserman 2008. Rao & Wasserman 2007, Ward 2013, Ward & Wasserman 2010). It will do so through the lens of a new democracy in the Global South, in order to unsettle some of the assumptions around professionalism and ethics that have been developed in relation to established democracies in the North. By taking South Africa as an example, the point of departure will still be that of a democratic media, which provides a link with the dominant consensus of professionalism and social responsibility, although the recent history of oppression and exclusion, and the continued contextual constraints of economic inequalities and social polarization will resonate with current conditions in other parts of the world today where media operate in partly free or unfree (to use Freedom House's controversial definitions, see Josephi 2010:2) environments or in conditions of severe inequalities where the moral imperative for media to support developmental and social justice imperatives is stronger than in the more affluent countries of the North. The challenge is to find an approach to think about professionalism that firstly is more accommodating of the varying conditions under which journalists work globally than the social responsibility model, and secondly to engage with the debate about professionalism in such a way as to inform the explorations of a global media ethics.

This paper will first provide an overview of the notion of 'professionalism' as it has been developed in relation to journalism. Thereafter the argument will proceed to outline the positive potential of journalistic professionalism, illustrated with examples from South African media and its relationship to a young democracy. Thereafter the pitfalls of a discourse of professionalism will be discussed, again with reference to developments in South Africa during the first two decades of democracy. Lastly the link between professionalism and global media ethics will be explored in response to the question – what can we learn from the potentials and pitfalls of the concept of professionalism as we seek to develop a global media ethics? Here the concept of 'listening' will be proposed as an alternative to an elitist version of 'professionalism'.

2. The problematic concept of "professionalism"

The question of whether journalists in fact belong to a 'profession' has been around for some time. The 'checklist' of professional traits – 'certain levels of skill, autonomy, service orientation, licensing procedures, testing of competence, organization, codes of conduct, training and educational programmes' (Zelizer 2004:33) only partly applies to journalists. Professionalism usually also implies a disciplinary basis, a specialized knowledge base, and although journalism studies has grown as a field in recent years, a common, specialized knowledge base does not yet exist for journalists to draw on in order to qualify as professionals, nor do they fit the criteria of orientation towards client well-being (Meyers, Wyatt, Borden and Wasserman 2012: 192). Meyers et al. (2012:189) state categorically that 'journalism is not a profession (…) despite the many journalists and scholars who regularly refer to it as such, not to mention that the moniker of the practice's leading association in the United States – *The Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ)* – declares otherwise' (2012:190):

(C)alling oneself something does not make it true. Yes, the term is used widely and loosely, but its meaning is, at its core, normative and historical: To be a professional, even in a minimalist sense of the term, is to be so dedicated as to see such work as a calling. It is also to engage in work (a) that serves a vital individual or civic need, (b) that is primarily intellectual and thereby requires specialized training and skills, (c) that is at least mainly autonomous and self-regulating (usually with some form of licensure), and (d) that is committed to furtherance of basic ethical norms, particularly with respect to satisfaction of clients' needs.

Reese (2004:175) indicates that while journalism 'does not resemble the traditional learned professions with required credentials and licensing procedures', it does have 'many professional features'. These includes journalists' ascription to ethical codes of conduct. Meyers et al. (2012:190) use this position to argue that professionalism can still be used as an adjective to describe good journalistic conduct – and even if such professional journalistic work is done not only by those who would describe themselves as full-time journalists: 'Per this meaning, one can act professionally, regardless of the labor, when one is highly competent to the task and engages it in an ethical manner'. Historically this commitment to professional ethics has been articulated in press codes and enforced by regulatory bodies such as press councils. But in recent years doubts have been raised globally about the efficiency and even desirability of such codes and regulatory bodies. The reverberations of the phone hacking scandal and the subsequent Leveson inquiry in the United Kingdom are still being felt around the world, and have led to renewed criticism against self-regulatory bodies such as the Press Complaints Commission in the UK under whose watch these flagrant violations of privacy and human dignity were allowed to take place. The uproar against *News of the World* is only part of a bigger uncertainty about which information can be trusted to be accurate and truthful (Meyers et al. 2012:191).

But even if there would be consensus that press codes are a useful way to ensure professional standards, this does not mean that there will be agreement upon what form of regulation would best accompany such a code. In South Africa in recent years, the self-regulatory Press Council that had been tasked with setting and regulating ethical standards in the democratic dispensation that followed the highly legalized and repressive environment under apartheid, has also come under attack. Its critics, especially from within the ruling party (the African National Congress, or ANC), accused it of serving an industry clique, for not having enough 'teeth' to prevent ethical lapses, and for lacking sufficient sanctions to punish offenders and bring justice to victims. The ANC's proposal for the establishment of a Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT) to replace the self-regulatory system has led to the revision of the procedures and constitution of the Press Council to include more representation from citizens.

The inclusion of citizens in media ethics has become all the more pressing in a global media environment where the boundaries between media producers and media consumers is blurring under the influence of new media technologies that have made it possible – in theory at least, if questions of access are suspended – for everyone to perform journalistic functions. The exclusivity of journalism that came with having a monopoly over sources has been swept away by new media technologies (Meyers et al. 2012:192). There is a need for media ethics to become more open and participatory in response to this technological sea change, but also using the potential that new media offer to include citizens in media ethical debates (Ward & Wasserman 2010). This has led to an irony: At the same time as technological changes have undermined claims to professional

exclusivity, and have exerted pressure on traditional notions of journalistic professionalism, these changes have provided a 'strong temptation to professionalize' (Meyers et al. 2012:192) in order to know whose information can be trusted and whose not. Yet Singer (2006:2) argues that while historically journalists have been defined by professional practices and their association with media institutions, the rise of online networks have made it possible for ordinary citizens to produce and disseminate information constantly. If in the past journalists could see themselves as 'gatekeepers', the barrage of information online, including social and mobile media, is now impossible to be kept at bay behind a gate. Nor can the information produced in this way be limited to a local or national audience. The irony that Singer also points out (2006:9) is that many bloggers actually keep 'professional' journalists to account by checking their facts and by 'decrying the journalistic tendency toward arrogance and aloofness'. This can be seen in contexts such as Zimbabwe, for instance, where state control over mainstream media has spawned satirical Facebook pages like 'Baba Jukwa', or resulted in the proliferation of online political chatrooms and rumours, gossip and jokes being circulated on mobile phones (Willems 2011). Not only is the notion of 'professional journalist' as sole custodian of information and news put under pressure in this new environment, but the public is also splintering into 'parallel media universes' (2006:11) that can no longer be defined in terms of national boundaries. But, says Singer (2006:3), not all publishers of information can be called journalists, and reserves this designation to people who – given the conditions of independence within which to do so – are committed to social responsibility. Independence, while for Singer a necessary precondition to journalism, is therefore the enabling condition that makes the commitment to the social good possible – and it's the latter rather than the former which is the final arbiter of professional journalism. Ultimately such a definition orients the professional journalist towards the public, who has to know what information to trust or not, rather than towards the industry who insists on autonomy for its own sake (Singer 2006:3). Professionalism is therefore also a normative concept – it assumes the underwriting of 'social values of freedom, equality, and order' (Reese 2004: 175), and in the current globalized, online-dominated environment, the definition of 'professionalism' has to move from an 'emphasis on process' to an 'emphasis on ethics' (Singer 2006:12). Meyer et al. (2012:193) seem to agree: instead of continuing to call journalists 'professionals', we should rather aim to identify those practices that conform to professional – which also includes ethical – values and norms, whether those practices are performed by people who perform them for a living or citizens that make use of the technological means to their disposal to do so. For them, then, the term 'professionalism' is still relevant, if even if 'professionalist' isn't – and the practice of professionalism is closely tied to ethics. An 'ethical doctrine' is 'integral' to journalistic professionalism (Meyers et al. 2012: 194).

But what system of ethics? And whose ethical norms? Reese (2001:174) reminds us that the individual attitudes of journalists – such as their orientation towards professionalism – should be considered against the background of a hierarchy of other influences within specific social and cultural contexts. He also points (2001:175) to the problem that 'professional education' of journalism students at universities often serves the agenda of the media industry needing skilled entry-level workers, rather than instilling a civic-mindedness among aspiring journalists. This distinction between professionalism as an orientation towards industry as opposed to an orientation towards citizens will be explored in more detail later in relation to the South African example. The point here is that professionalism is controversial because in the past it tended to

orientate journalists inward – to their own group, their industry and their market – rather than outward to a broader conception of society and the citizenry to whom they are primarily responsible.

It is becoming clear now that the idea of journalistic professionalism is not only under pressure to adapt to a changing global media industry and shifting practices, but the very notion of journalists as professionals is surrounded by a fair amount of controversy. Before dealing with some of the critiques against professionalism, let us first look at some of the things that professionalism might actually be good for.

3. The potential of professionalism

Perhaps the biggest advantage of the discourse of 'professionalism' is that it provides journalists with a strategic foothold to demand more freedom and independence. Reese (2001:176), in his consideration of professional values internationally, concludes that 'freedom is perhaps the most vigorously articulated international professional value.' Although usually articulated in relation to journalism's relationship to the state, his freedom also extends to journalists' freedom to 'follow their own professional dictates against organizational pressure' (Reese 2001:176).

This has also been the case in South Africa, where the media have historically been suppressed under the apartheid regime (although several media institutions also supported the regime or provided limited critique) and have again come under political pressure in the democratic era. The media's criticism of the democratically elected government has over the past two decades of democracy led to several confrontation between the government and the media, and the South African National Editors' Forum (SANEF) has played a role as a professional body to mediate tensions. Increased commercial pressures arising from the South African media's need to compete within a fast-changing globalized media market, have also put strain on the identities and practices of journalists. These pressures have led to the establishment of an informal body of professional journalists, ProJourn, intended as the 'voice of working journalists', as explained by its founder Michael Schmidt (personal communication 18 March 2014):

The media is under severe strain with hostile legislation and the battle for political control of the likes of the SABC and the former Independent Newspapers, so journalists need to be informed, and have access to responsive defence mechanisms that can not only protect their jobs and improve their working conditions, but defend journalistic ethics and values, and uplift previously disadvantaged colleagues and community journalists.

The codification of professional values and ethics in the form of a Press Code presided over by a Press Council has also been used by South African journalists as a shield against political pressures. When the ruling party in South Africa, the ANC, proposed the establishment of a statutory Media Appeals Tribunal (MAT) to replace the self-regulatory system because of perceived weaknesses in the system, the Press Council's embarked on a consultative process to revise its code, procedures and constitution. This was followed up by the establishment of a Press Freedom Commission chaired by a retired (now late) judge, which recommended a change from a self-regulatory system to an independent, co-regulated system in which the citizenry would have greater say. In their response to this revision it became clear that journalists and editors saw the Press Council and its regulatory processes as an unavoidable inconvenience to safeguard press

freedom. Although not everyone in the media was happy with the diminished representation on the Council by industry insiders, nor the greater power of sanction given to the Council, the revisions were seen as a way to ward off pressure from the government. This is against the background of another development in the country that has threatened to stifle the climate of free expression, namely the passing by Parliament of a Protection of State Information Bill (dubbed the 'Secrecy Bill'). If signed into law, it will be possible to classify state documentation – down to local government level –as 'secret' and criminalize the possession thereof by the media and social movements. The then chair of the South African National Editors' Forum (SANEF), Mondli Makhanya, said being 'above reproach' was important to protect journalists from the opponents of press freedom. 'We must make sure we do not do anything to put weapons in their (the government's) hands,' he said (Serino 2012).

While such a strategic-pragmatic approach to professional ethics might have the good consequence of ensuring more freedom for journalists, it is hardly a foundation on which to build a substantive engagement with media ethics in a new democracy. The approach to professionalism as a way to ensure social cohesion and the proper functioning of institutions in society can be associated with the functionalist approach of Durkheim (Christians & Nordenstreng 2004:15). In this framework, professionalization of journalism through the Press Council and associated processes can contribute to the modernization of society after the havoc of apartheid, and ensure harmonious co-existence of media and government.

When one however takes a Weberian view (Christians & Nordenstreng 2004:15), the entrenchment of professional interests in a young democracy such as South Africa could lead to the further broadening of societal divides. According to this perspective, professions are 'bastions of narrow and elitist interests rather than of overall societal and democratic interests' (Christians & Nordenstreng 2004:15). Although the revisions to the South African regulatory system to give greater involvement to citizens to some extent responds to this criticism, the discourse around professionalism as an attempt to ward off political pressures remains one that is based on the rather thin foundation of *procedural* ethics rather than in a rigorous engagement with the *substantive* ethical demands of the media in a post-apartheid democracy within conditions of huge social inequality. In a professional mode, the media are likely to remain locked in an arrangement where citizens become consumers in a commercialized environment, with media professionals wielding power over communication and media-making.

The danger of using professionalism as a basis for thinking about ethics in this context, is that it narrows the debate about the role of the media in society to that of processes aimed at assuring a negative freedom – i.e. the freedom from state interference – rather than a positive freedom to identify ways in which the media can substantively contribute to the good of society. Let us look at some of the pitfalls of the notion of 'professionalism' in more detail.

4. The pitfalls of professionalism

Zelizer (2004:33) recalls James Carey's criticism of the idea of journalism as a profession as being a 'great danger', because it establishes a client-professional relationship that takes away control over information from the public. When this criticism is considered within the framework of media ethics, it can be argued that professionalism as an orientating concept can impact

negatively on the universal 'protonorms' of human dignity, truth and nonviolence (Christians & Nordenstreng 2004: 21).

Professionalism encourages thinking about ethics in procedural rather than substantive terms, and in terms of negative rather than positive freedom (as discussed above). This means that the protonorm of 'truthtelling' may be seen to result automatically from a 'free marketplace of ideas' in the absence of state interference, and that 'professional journalists' can exercise power over the construction of meaning as long as they remain free. In this conception, 'truth' does not require a reciprocal relationship between journalists and (other) citizens, but can be produced by 'professionals' that retain control over the process of meaning production.

Professionalism also sets up boundaries between 'experts' and the rest of society. The identity that 'professional' journalists claim for themselves has often been that of an insider with close connections to the machinery of power, or, when the relationship between journalists and powerbrokers breaks down, as that of an informed expert with the ability to provide technical analyses to inform and educate their audiences (Reese 2001:175). Nerone and Barnhurst (2003: 121) remark in this regard that the emergence of the notion of the journalist as a 'professional' was linked to the 'rise of the reporter as expert', a (usually male) 'privileged observer of the social and political scene, a super citizen'. This shift, as part of the making of the modern newspaper, also signalled a return to 'monovocality in the form of professional uniformity (2003:122) , allowing for fewer voices to provide contrasting or competing visions of social reality. This leads to an impoverished version of the ethical protonorm of 'truth' because citizens that do not qualify as 'professionals' or 'experts' are not given the opportunity to co-construct the truth, but is rather viewed as sources of information over which professional journalists retain the ultimate control. It is also an affront to the dignity of citizens (another protonorm), as they are not given a voice nor listened to as equal participants in the meaning-production process, but relegated to a subordinate position to that of experts.

While journalists in the 'professional' mode are routinely reminded in press codes that they should minimize harm (cf. Black, Steele & Barney 1995 – the assumption is that journalism usually harms someone, and that such harm is not always ethically indefensible), and in so doing adhering to the universal protonorm of 'non-malificence' or 'nonviolence', this again is conceived in terms of a negative injunction – to not consciously act in such a way so as to cause hurt or damage that can be avoided, or to minimize such harm where possible. However, when professionalism means a separation of expert journalists from the majority of society, this could unintentionally amplify the inequalities and societal polarisations that, in a country such as South Africa, were brought about by the morally unjust systems of colonialism and apartheid. Ethical conduct, in such a discourse, is conceived of in terms of a top-down *avoidance* of harm, rather than a bottom-up *restoration* of historical injustice. Professionalism can therefore hinder social change and contribute to the entrenchment of historical injustices, even within the well-intentioned discourse of harm avoidance.

In the South African context, the value of truthtelling in the professional mode should therefore be evaluated in terms of how it contributes substantively to the betterment of society after centuries of colonialism and apartheid inclusivity. If certain groups, especially those that have historically been marginalized as a result of social injustices like colonialism and apartheid,

are moved further away from the processes and institutions that produce journalism, truthtelling will suffer. If journalists as 'professionals' form an elite class in society, the likelihood is increased that the story they will tell will also be from the perspective of an elite. In South Africa, where the mainstream media is owned and staffed by a middle class whose daily lived experience differs greatly from the majority of citizens who remain poor and voiceless even after twenty years of democracy, this is a problem. Although journalists frequently defend themselves against government pressure by claiming that they work in the 'public' interest, this public is fragmented, socially polarized, and economically highly unequal. The result, as Friedman (2011) observes, is that the media provides us with a 'view from the suburbs' instead of an insight into matters that affect the broader population, from their perspective. The South African case, given its history of exclusion and suppression, vividly illustrates the importance of the principle of inclusivity is an essential requirement of any ethical media practice (Alia (2004: 52).

We have seen recently, in media reporting of the Marikana miners massacre (Wasserman 2013), how the sociology of news production within a 'professional' mode results in the alignment of mainstream journalists with these official sources that occupy positions of power, such as the police, politicians and businesspeople. In the case of reporting on the Marikana massacre, this led to a significant omission of certain facts that, when subsequently uncovered, shone a completely different light on the event. When journalism sides with power, be it military, political or economic, their position is often hidden or presented as neutral. That is because the alignment of journalism with power mostly takes place unintentionally as a result of established journalistic routines and practices associated with the notion of 'professionalism', rather than through conscious choice. Journalists may write news, but are themselves also 'written by' the discourses and practices of journalism. Journalism operates as a 'system of meanings and common-sense understandings' (Reese 2001, 183) that appears natural but is subject to various levels of influence, internally in news organizations and externally in the media's relationship to society.

It should be stated unequivocally however that despite the problems with a narrow conception of 'professionalism' which can impact negatively on ethical protonorms, the alternative to professionalization in the narrow sense is not unfreedom and repression. In the name of the universal value of truthtelling, journalists should insist on the freedom to uncover and tell stories that may offend the powerful. However, our insistence on inclusivity and openness as foundations for truthtelling means that 'speaking truth to power' can be better justified on an ethical basis of that truthtelling happens from the bottom-up, rather than from the top-down as is usually the case in the 'professionalism' mode. Such a bottom-up approach to truthtelling also requires that we pay attention to the specificities of context, without lapsing into ethical relativism. In the next section I will argue for an approach to such a bottom-up truthtelling that is rooted in the ethical notion of 'listening'.

5. Listening in localities

It should be clear from the above discussion that professionalism as an approach to media ethics has severe limitations that can hinder and even undermine ethical protonorms. Furthermore, professionalism as a concept made and developed in the established democracies of the Global North, cannot easily be transplanted anywhere without needing modification. Guo (2010:16), from a Chinese perspective, states that the concept of professional journalism 'typically slant

toward idealistic principles rather than realistic practices, toward perceptions of journalists as professionals rather than practitioners, toward beliefs of diversity rather than monopoly, and toward ideas of romanticized excitement rather than routinized operation'.

Garman (2005), speaking from the South African context where a number of incidents some years ago (including high profile plagiarism cases and an audit that highlighted the lack of skills in newsrooms) created a public crisis of credibility for journalism as a profession, argues in favour of a journalism education that would produce 'interpretive communities' rather than 'professionals'. The notion of journalistic professionalism, with its assumption of mastery of and control over communication brings with it the power to 'weed out' particular forms of knowledge and set boundaries around the journalistic domain (2005:202). The influence of conglomerisation and commercialization has also had an impact on journalism practice in South Africa, and Garman argues that the discourse of professionalism has secured a safe space for journalists to serve these commercial interests rather than act as 'citizen advocates' (2005:205). Professionalism becomes a 'moral cloak' to claim special privileges for journalists, but in reality the 'democratic pretensions' merely mask a servitude to corporate interests (Garman 2005:206). Professionalism becomes an excuse for ethical hedonism, in other words.

Also with reference to South Africa, the founder of ProJourn (Schmidt, personal communication, 2014) concedes that the reference to 'professionalism' in the title of his organisation does not adequately capture the work journalists do, and might lead to a narrowing of the practice to serve elite interests. He confirms that in his own experience, South African journalists in the 'professional' mode tend to be biased towards official and prominent sources, and are subject to significant commercial pressures that limit their independence.

It seems therefore that South African journalists will be better able to tell the truth about their evolving democracy by including the citizenry and immersing themselves in contexts of the poor from which they as an elite have historically been excluded. In their case, this may mean literally getting out of their 'professional' environment, leaving the office and walking the streets of the poor townships. The need remains however for them to exercise vigilance over the exercise of state and commercial power – a soft-touch, collaborative or 'sunshine' journalism will not be sufficient to hold power to account. How, then, can a bottom-up alternative to professionalism, that is committed to inclusive dialogue *and* monitoring of power, be theorized ethically?

One approach would be that of 'listening'. Such an approach would be especially useful in local contexts marked by inequality and difference, such as the South African one, but could also offer useful insights as we seek to develop a transnational, global media ethics that will be dialogic, inclusive and cognizant of historically informed power differentials. This approach is also in keeping with Christians and Nordenstreng's (2004: 16) argument in favour of a 'citizen-centred' paradigm to replace a professional paradigm.

Theories of listening[①] provide approaches to the complexity of dialogue and debate in democracies around the world. An ethics of listening is appropriate for a media ethics that is global in scope. This is because an ethics of listening is well-suited to communication environments marked by inequality, conflict and cultural diversity (Bickford 1996: 14).

[①] The section on listening below draws on my discussion of the concept in more detail in Wasserman (2013) and, within a different context, in Ward & Wasserman (forthcoming).

If we accept that all persons have human dignity (which is linked to the 'protonorm' of sacredness of human life conceived of by Christians and Nordenstreng, 2004), and that dignity is respected when people have the opportunity to express their life experiences through narrative, we can view 'voice' as an ethical value (Couldry 2010: 9). However, the act of speaking is meaningless if that which is being *spoken*, is also *heard*. The notion of 'giving voice to the voiceless' is a recurring one in media discourses, especially in the monitorial role (Christians et al., 2009), when media claim to hold powerful interests accountable to the public that cannot do so directly. Within the liberal understanding of democratic deliberation such 'giving voice' takes place within an open and free environment where different voices compete for legitimacy, and truth is seen to emerge from such contestation. Such robust contestation is however premised on the assumption that individual voices have free and equal access to the public sphere where deliberation takes place. Due to historical, social and economic reasons, this is not the case in South Africa with its high rate of inequality (nor, one could add, globally).

An alternative approach to ethical dialogue in democratic contexts is that of 'listening'. Listening does not assume that everyone has equal access to the public sphere, nor that the media can 'give voice' to everyone. Instead, the assumption is that societies (and again one can extend this to the global context) are unequal, and that mutual mistrust exist between people and communities as a result of historical conflicts as well as social and economic disparities. The challenge is to reach across these gaps and differences by imagining oneself in the place of another, and to listen to the other point of view even if one doesn't agree with it. 'Listening' as an ethical concept resonates with relational ethics where ethics 'begins with listening, not with telling' (Arnett 2009: 28; although [Bickford 1996: 15] does not see a communitarian or relational orientation as required for listening to take place). If listening is seen in the context of care ethics, it can also be connected with the protornorm of human dignity. To listen, it can be argued, is to care for another, and to treat them with respect as human beings. If this is extended to the global realm, 'listening' would demand of the media to reach out across differences, to imagine oneself in the position of another (politically, culturally, socially, economically, geographically etc) and to narrow the gap between oneself and that of another. Viewed from this perspective, the notion of 'professionalism' – when conceived of as constructing a social elite with privileged access to information, or with truth claims that are more legitimate than general members of society – can work against listening. Professionalism, in its conventional form of 'giving voice to', is likely to increase the distance between 'professionals' and other citizens, and in so doing undermine dialogue rather than stimulate it.

Important to note within a global context where journalism is practiced in many places under conditions of unfreedom, is that 'listening' as an alternative to the aloofness of a conventional notion of professionalism does not imply the absence of criticism. Even within conditions of conflict or difference, an ethics of listening will be aimed at seeking common ground, even if listening becomes difficult, it will remain inclusive (Dreher 2009: 450). Within a revised concept of professionalism, in which citizens will have a greater role and in which professionalism is used as an adjective describing an ethical action regardless of the actor, rather than a social status describing a person, the notion of listening can deepen our understanding of ethics.

Within such a dynamic notion of ethical journalism – one that is not fixed to a specific 'profession', actors would actively seek out lesser-heard voices, and engage in active listening that

would require them to imagine themselves in the shoes of the Other. Such imagination is hard, and requires the suspension of the desire to control the outcome of the narrative.

What would such a listening look like in practice? This will differ from context to context, depending on who the Other is that needs to be listened to, the levels of access to media available, and the historical, social and economic conditions that determine the distance between interlocutors. One concrete aspect of listening as an ethical stance would be to go 'down to the bottom' rather than (at least, in the first place)'up to the top' – it would mean inverting the routine of going to highest sources first, or viewing those in power as the authoritative voices on a matter. Instead, listening would actively seek out those voices that are not heard in routine public discourse, those without power, those that are marginalized, and view those voices as equally authoritative. It would go further – listening may require that the power over discourse and the production of meaning is ceded to those marginalized and powerless. This goes against the conventional professional ideology that keeps journalists in control of the news agenda and the holders of expert knowledge. Practically, this may result in asking communities to set the news agenda – to ask them what stories they would like to see in the newspaper or on television. Or it may mean handing over the means of production to them, for instance by giving them access to cameras and recording equipment to tell their stories. In the era new media technologies, this has become much easier than in the past, even if access to mobile phones, the internet, email etc remains asymmetrical.

At the very least it would require of 'professional' journalists to leave the comfort of their offices and walk the streets, spend time in communities, move out of their comfort zones – not as parachuted-in observers that describe what they see, but as listeners that allow others to say what they experience. The difference between a descriptive, empirical account and an ethnographic, immersive one is subtle but highly significant. Of course, bloggers – because they tend to focus on one particular issue or set of issues, rather a broad range of topics like 'professional' journalists – are usually well-positioned to drill down into a subject, mostly because they are often themselves directly attached to the topic they write about. But this attachment also means that bloggers are more likely to write in emotive, subjective terms that would go into some professional notions such as distancing.

On a global level, the same criteria would apply, but expanded. For instance, news organizations based in the North could decide to actively seek out voices and viewpoints from people in under-represented regions, give them a more active role in setting news agendas and in constructing stories. Again, this would be quite a radical departure from the routinized assumption that reporters based in the North have the skills needed to parachute into a foreign context, observe and describe the reality there with minimal involvement from locals. It would also require of Northern reporters to spend time in locations that are inconvenient to their lifestyles, listen to views that challenge their perspectives, and imagine what news angles and agendas are important for the communities they report on rather than for their own market. Again, this is different than the 'foreign correspondent' model of reporting where journalists from the North insert themselves in narratives from the South. It would require of journalists in the North to unlearn their privilege as their loss (Spivak 1987) – to know that their privileged position and their 'skill' might actually inhibit them from learning the truth about other contexts. This of course would require a radical repositioning that is likely to be seen as too idealistic for major news organizations. As a scholarly

project, this would require a radical epistemology which as of yet has not yet pervaded the study of global media ethics to the extent that it should have in order for the South to be validated as a site of production of theory rather than raw material and case studies for Northern theories.

Detractors of the argument that an immersive, ethnographic approach of listening is preferable to the professionalism of experts, might argue that listening provides journalists with a weak footing from which to take on the powerful and to demand their freedom. Quite the contrary. Journalists that move closer to citizens and communities by listening to them, will be in a better position to facilitate a bottom-up resistance to power and a citizen-led demand that authorities respect the protonorms of truth, human dignity and nonviolence. In such a bottom-up politics, in which journalists can connect horizontal community struggles with the vertical axis of power, is vastly aided by the rise of new media technologies, such as mobile phones and social media platforms. From Tahrir Square to the streets of Maputo, these technologies make a bottom-up, dialogic engagement with ethical norms more attainable than ever before. In repressive contexts especially, or environments that are still marked by the inequalities inherited from previous undemocratic dispensations – like South Africa – 'listening' can provide a much more powerful strategy to bring about social and political change than that of professionalism, traditionally conceived. Instead of seeing themselves as apart or above the rest of the citizenry, journalists that engage in active listening to their compatriots will move closer to them, and will be in a much better position to facilitate public dialogue and harness popular sentiment to effect positive change than when they remain aloof as experts.

6. Conclusion

Journalists in different countries around the world are differently positioned towards the liberal-democratic conception of journalistic professionalism. This paper has argued that while it may be acknowledged that recourse to the discourse of professionalism might be pragmatically useful in certain contexts, where journalists insist on greater freedom and autonomy, the concept of professionalism also presents significant problems that may impact negatively on the attainment of universal ethical protonorms of truthtelling, human dignity and non-malfeasance. Furthermore, the distance created and enforced between journalists and other citizens may also weaken the ability for journalism to speak truth to power. Instead, this paper has argued that an approach of 'listening', rooted in dialogic ethics and aimed at overcoming political, social and economic differences – be they local or global – can provide a better ethical foundation for a journalism that can speak truth to power and facilitate social change. It bears re-iterating that listening as an alternative to top-down professionalism should not become an excuse for refusing to stand up against injustice and repression in the name of the public – on the contrary, it will provide a much stronger ethical foundation from which journalists and citizens can work together to bring about positive change from the bottom up.

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封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

专业勇气：维持新闻卓越性的例行事务

Professional Courage:

Daily Duties that Sustain Journalistic Excellence

李·威尔金斯[①]

Abstract: Courage is one of the four cardinal Greek virtues that finds a place in the writings of Confucius. Contemporary cultures define courage in the form of exceptional, bold acts. This paper places courage within the larger philosophical discussion of character and the impact of emotion on ethical action. It also situates courage within a concept of journalism as professional practice. Courageous journalists need the support of courageous organizations. While acknowledging that certain exceptional situations require individual courage, this paper suggests that the kind of courage that forms professional character is based in daily duties that hold even the most routine journalistic chores to a high ethical standard. This routine articulation of high standards, the practice of courage on a daily basis, builds both individual and organizational character. The result is professional solidarity, the courage to engage in bold acts where required, emerging standards of professional excellence, and the potential strengthening of ties between journalists and the public whom they serve.

Key Words: courage, ethical action, journalism, daily duties

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1. The character heuristic

The concept of character, that human beings irrespective of external pressures and internal states, will behave in consistent ways is one of the longest standing concepts in ethical theory. In the west, Artistotle was the first philosopher to write about character, which he linked with the concept of practical wisdom. For Aristotle and for the Greeks in general, character was a constellation of traits—what the Greeks called virtues—that were integrated into a consistent pattern of behaviors. The conceptualization of character as a morally integrated approach to life that finds a parallel in the writing of Confucius. The *Analects*, for example, include repeated remarks by Confucius that he is fallible in his choices, tries to learn from his mistakes, and in large part because of this welcomes dialogue. There is the striking suggestion that faults and virtues form 'a set' (in the Arthur Waley translation of Book IV, 7), (Kupperman 2001, 249). Regardless of intellectual approach, the concept of character includes a stable pattern of responses to particular external events, a focus on the individual actor, and the suggestion that character itself is not a single element of thought or response but an integrated approach to life that calls on different individuals' strengths (or weaknesses). Different historic periods do emphasize different elements of character. For example, during the Jacksonian era in the 19th Century United States, people were praised for their democratic and egalitarian character, a value of the Jacksonian era that reflects the political history of the US as much as it reflects the actual content of character itself (Hume 2000). However, this historic and cultural emphasis on different aspects of character have not negated the underlying concept itself and the virtues that have comprised it in the west for most of the past 3000 years. In contemporary terms, character is what psychologists refer to as a heuristic way of understanding and explaining human ethical behavior.

Doris (2005) calls this long-term disposition to act in certain ways "globalism," which involves (a) consistency of character traits, (b) stability of character traits, and (c) the integration of various such traits, what in Aristotle is usually called "the unity of the virtues." It is possible to read Aristotle, or at least portions of *Nicmachean Ethics*, as asserting that character, once formed, is essentially unchanging. Aristotle likened character to a muscle that needs exercise—less exercise weakens the muscle, more strengthens it. Thus, it is possible for human beings who possess the virtues, those who are of good character, to behave ethically in difficult situations. Good people, in general, make good choices. The reverse is also the case. Character is what makes human beings reliably predictable in their responses to moral questions.

Theoretical philosophy aside, this notion of human beings as reliably predictable in different circumstances makes a great deal of common sense. Human beings do not have to be reliably good—or bad—but the element of predictability implied in the concept of character makes much daily activity possible. Daughters rely on their mothers to behave in certain consistent ways—clean up your room, honor your parents, tell the truth, and love me. Fulfilling these role-based expectations requires character and virtue. Professional organizations, including journalistic ones, operate under the same sorts of expectations; consistency is valued, and the heuristic of character supports both the expectation of it and the common human experience that something like an integrated character comprised of virtues exists. People expect to know, in a deep sense, who they are dealing with.

But, the heuristic of character is also under contemporary empirical dispute. Doris, for

example, rejects the notion of character, citing evidence as well known as the Zimbardo experiments and as recent as experimental work in the social sciences that has documented that human beings will predictably behave in ways so inconsistent as to bring the concept of character itself into fundamental question (2005). While Doris' effort seeks to undermine the entire concept, others scholars suggest that character does not explain as much as theoretical philosophy, particularly the work of Aristotle and other virtue ethicists, would like. "Character consists of such traits as honesty and trustworthiness that are more or less resistant to social or interpersonal pressures. But character is never fully formed and settled. It is always vulnerable to circumstances and trauma," (Solomon 2003, 45).

Part of the way to account for this variability of character is the concept of voluntariness, an element that both social psychologists and philosophers believe is at the core of character. Contemporary philosopher Robert Audi analyzes the nature of voluntariness in this way:

"It is essential do distinguish among three kinds of responsibility for traits, none of which implies the others. As applied to traits, there is generative responsibility—which is responsibility for having produced a trait in question (a kind of genetic responsibility), retentional responsibility, which is responsibility for retaining the trait, and prospective responsibility, which is responsibility for taking on the trait—as where one promises to develop patience—and normally for retaining it thenceforth," (Audi 1997, 160).

In Audi's conceptualization, character is capable of development. He notes, " The future can remain open even if one could not help getting to where one now morally is. Virtue is not a precondition for its own development, any more than it is necessarily self-sustaining; it can arise from the ashes of vice as well as from sound moral education." (Audi 1997, 161). The idea that character develops over time is not limited to philosophy; the entire field of developmental psychology, and within that moral development, has amassed a substantial quantity of empirical data as well as theoretical work that suggests character is malleable and that it respond to environmental factors—from family, to education, to work environment, to environments of extreme stress such as concentration camps or genocidal historical moments--in a variety of ways. (For examples of this work, see Paiget, 1965; Erikson, 1964: Gilligan, 1982; Power, 2002.) The concept of moral development, as it is linked to character, has been explored in many professions, among them journalism (Wilkins & Coleman 2005).

This contemporary understanding that character is malleable distinguishes between the possession of "traits" or "habits"—the Aristotelean conceptualization of character—and the desire, ability and autonomy to act on those traits. Skills and knowledge are necessary but not sufficient to possess a virtuous character. Contemporary philosophy acknowledges that, when dealing with character, thinking and theorizing must recognize what Kepperman calls the fluidity of the self, "….especially if one accepts the analysis in Chinese daoist texts such as the Zhuangzi (in the older romanization, Chuang Tzu), that the self must be viewed as multi-layered, with aspects going back even to earliest childhood, and in general with an openness (that one can try to deny only at great cost) to large areas of behaviour and experience. Is it possible for someone who accepts this to have a character, or to ascribe it with confidence to others?" (Kupperman, 2001, 249).

The developmental approach accepts the character heuristic as lodged within the individual actor while acknowledging that the individual actor is a complex being, capable of change and, in the right circumstances, of growth.

However, there is a significant body of work that suggests that individual actors are influenced substantially by the organizations—be they work oriented or the larger community and political society—in which people find themselves (see, for example, Adams &Balfour 2004; Lipton 2000; Gardner, Csikszentmihalyi & Damon 2001). Organizations provide what western scholars refer to as a culture or climate that establish both formal and informal boundaries of actions, including ethical decision making. "Organizational climate does not replace individual thinking or the emotional components of ethical decision making. But organizational ethical culture can enhance or degrade individual ethical choice in both inconsequential and fundamental ways,"(Wilkins 2014, 34). "Assigning moral agency—and hence responsibility—to a group…provides a richer and philosophically based way in which to understand ethical choice, including a profession-based way to describe a circumscribed range of decision options distinct from the autonomy asserted by classical ethical theory," (Wilkins 2014, 39). It is in the nexus of self within an organization which is embedded in a political culture that is the multi-layered environment in which character, as it is expressed by professionals, exists.

These views, too, reflect common experiences. Children learn that their parents are fallible when those parents do not behave in ways that the children have been taught to expect. Citizens become disenchanted to the point of cynicism with public officials who, despite repeated public assertions and even lengthy public records, behave in ways that contradict those statements and commit acts that are everything from questionable, speaking angrily to a subordinate, to illegal, taking bribes or condoning extortion. Journalistic organizations that claim to "speak" on behalf of the citizens, and then engage in practices that devalue those citizens, as the British tabloids did during the phone hacking scandal, bring their own professional character—their standards--into question (Folkenflik 2013). Just as a heuristic of character makes common sense, a parallel acknowledgement that pinpoints the fragility of character and the impact of external forces on it is also part of how people cope with daily life. A robust conceptualization of character must account for a range of possibilities, possibilities that match human experience in all its variety. As Solomon notes, character is vulnerable to environment but it is also a bulwark *against* environment. Character supplies that familiar and sometimes uncomfortable or even uncanny resistance to untoward pressures that violate our "principles" or morally disgust us or are damaging to our "integrity." It is character and not God or the Superego that produces that nagging inner voice called "conscience," (Solomon 2003, 45, italics in the original).

As theory is applied to us as individual human beings, we can strive to be of better character, irrespective of our current states or environments. Character itself is an elastic concept, it can grow and develop as well as devolve, but all take work. For journalists, this idea of an evolving professional standard linked to individual character and professional goals has important implications for choices that journalists and news organizations may make now or in the future. Central to these choices, in the routine of daily work as accomplished by individuals, is the virtue of courage. Courage remains one of the four cardinal virtues as originally explained by Aristotle. Whether in ancient Greece and China or in the contemporary, global culture, courage remains a

central component of character. In the case of journalism, courage is a distinguishing element of professional accomplishment.

2. The nature of professional courage

From its inception, the broad concept of character has been linked to virtue. Virtue, in the words of Christains, Fackler & Ferre (2012), pinpoints "the important issue is living well, developing capacities that are distinctive to us as human beings. For Confucius and Aristotle the question is what dispositions or virtues should I acquire. They become settled over time through education and habit." (Christians *et al*, 2012, 182-183).

The Greeks, beginning with Aristotle, built an entire ethical system around the four cardinal virtues, justice, wisdom and courage, all moderated by temperance. Aristotle said there are five different kinds of courage and the first is "political or civil courage" and is the most clearly akin to true courage. (Aristotle, 91). This ancient link between courage and politics is central not only to Aristotle's construction of the life well lived but to the sorts of actions that comprise that life. In contemporary society, journalists and journalism are clearly implicated in the type of courage of which Aristotle speaks. Contemporary political society requires communication between and among stakeholder groups, between leaders and followers, and among followers, to function. This is the work of journalism, and thus is makes good sense to investigate how journalists themselves and their news organizations can demonstrate the virtue of courage in their daily work.

Aristotle, quoting Socrates, said that courage was a kind of knowledge. Courageous habits have theoretically been linked to reason (Aristotle, 92)—to thinking about what it means to be courageous in specific circumstances. Its motive is virtue or longing for what is noble. But Aristotle also infused courage with an emotional quality; in *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle connects courage and fear. "Although courage is concerned with sentiments of confidence and fear, it is not equally concerned with both, but chiefly with the causes of fear. For he who is cool in the circumstances, and shows a proper spirit on the occasions which excite fear is more truly courageous than he who shows a proper spirit on the occasions which inspire confidence. It is endurance of painful things, as has been said, that entitles people to be called courageous. Hence it is that courage is painful, and is justly a subject of praise; for it is more difficult to endure pains than to abstain from pleasures." (Aristotle, 96-97).

With this sort of conceptualization, it is not difficult to understand why courage in the west was exemplified with single bold acts, often connected with war. Indeed, Aristotle says that courage is a willingness to die a noble death. "Thus he who faces and fears the right things for the right motive and in the right way and at the right time, and whose confidence is similarly right, is courageous; for the courageous man in his emotions and actions has a sense of fitness and obeys the law of reason." (Aristotle, 89).

This definition of courage, at least in the west, was supported largely unchanged for more than 1,000 years. "For Thomas Aquinas, courage involves a conception of sacrifice associated with military battle and especially with martyrdom,"(Dunn, 2013, 37). In the Christian tradition courage was frequently associated with the pursuit of justice, particularly as defined by the church, an historical example of the impact of an organization of the definition of virtue and on the support for specific acts as defined from the organizational perspective in preference to others that

did not meet the organizational view. But as John Bowlin notes, the relationship between courage and justice is complicated by the circumstances of a largely unjust world (Bowlin 1999). Nonetheless, the linking of courage with a single, bold act persists in both philosophical theory and more popular articulations of it to this day.

However, single, bold acts do not encompass the entire range of courageous professional behavior. Contemporary feminist philosophers have provided a necessary critique of the Aristotelean articulation of the virtue of courage. This feminist perspective suggests that any discussion of courage must begin with an acknowledgement of social and political inequality. That inequality most often results from the hierarchical nature of social and political structures—everything from executive political power, to corporate and conglomerate ownership structures, to the marginalization of some political actors, for example the poor, or a lack of attention to issues which affect marginalized groups, for example requiring equal health care coverage for both genders during childbearing years.

Feminists argue that social recognition begins with an acknowledgment of embodied difference, expressed socially in forms of hierarchy and marginalization. In making interventions in the meanings of virtue—for example, courage—the feminist critique suggests that dominant social interpretations of virtue are frequently unjust. By addressing the difficult but important relation of courage to justice, feminist theorists demonstrate that critiques of power and social difference (with their emphasis on relationships of social accountability) exist in dialectical relationship with the recognition of mutual dependency, (Dunn 2013, 29).

That courage must occur within community, and as a response to how communities are organized, is a significant insight, particularly for professionals. The historic lodging of courage within war masks the connection that courage has with community and with the lived experience of daily life. Journalists, because they function within a professional community, and because they report, write, photograph, and examine other communities, must work to lodge professional virtue within a community of fellow professionals who work within and for the benefit of the larger political community. This kind of professional courage reflects Aristotle's definition of the highest form of courage: political or civil courage. But, it is not the courage of a single, bold act but rather the courage to make the systemic inequalities in any community visible to its citizen-members. Because Aristotle does not flesh out this concept of courage so much as label it, it has been the work of contemporary philosophers to add both context and additional meaning. Merritt, for example, moves away from the Aristotelean conceptualization to one that is more recognizable in daily life. She takes her understanding of courage from Hume.

The Humean perspective is centered on the recognition of elementary human problems and goods, with respect to which personal reliability in various kinds of conduct produces welcome effects: hence the value of the virtues. From this point of view, seeking to live well involves comparatively modest aspirations: at minimum, to belong to a society where conventions of cooperation allow us to live more peacefully and prosperously than we could in their absence; beyond this, to cultivate the fruits of advanced social organization and the enjoyments of private life. An acquaintance with history, and with conditions prevailing in much of the world even today, reminds us that these aspirations are not so modest in the practical sense of being easy to fulfill. But they are anyway ethically modest in that they do not require a sage-like perfection of personal

character. They are also philosophically modest….It focuses on avoiding human disaster and securing the basic goods of cooperative society, (Merritt, 2000, 379).

Combining these ancient and modern conceptions provides journalists with a place to begin: courage includes the rational analysis of contemporary situations. Courageous journalism examines systems of power and inequality from the local to the global. The Humean approach to the virtue of courage expands the definition beyond a single, bold act to one that includes a way of thinking that incorporates another virtue—justice—in the decision of what to be courageous about. Deciding what to be courageous about is an every day activity, one that does not rely on a single act but rather the systematic and consistent making of decisions around a particular set of issues. Journalistic courage employs truthtelling as a mechanism to help human beings create, over time, a more just society. In this instance, courage becomes decoupled from fear—or at least the acute sort of fear that human beings experience in life and death situations. Rather, it requires a sort of steadfastness to continue to engage around issues of importance, despite the entrenched nature of some elements of the problem and the seeming inevitability of defeat in attempting to change those foundational understandings and structures. In some sense, this is courage in the face of life as it is, and of the willingness to engage in actions that promote the development of a more ethical community. "What the Humean normative ideal of the virtuous person presents us with is the figure of someone with whom it would be reasonable to want to live in every kind of cooperative social relation," Merritt says (2000, 379). Change the word person to "journalist" and Merritt's view of the role of journalists in the sustaining of the social relations that define political society makes profound sense within the context of virtue ethics.

This sort of courage is at the core of living well, as it is defined in the field of virtue ethics, and its opposite is not fear but rather an unwillingness to envision a better life and take action to move toward it. Christians, Fackler and Ferre link courage to moral imagination and the willingness to act on that imagination. They link courage and communitarian thinking to thinking about questions from the perspective of the audience. Such actions are not merely the purview of war but of professionals who see themselves and their profession as fundamentally connected the creation of a better society, one that enables individuals and communities to flourish. Journalists and journalism are clearly included in this effort.

Lambeth (1986, 37-38) links this expanded definition of professional courage to fortitude. It takes courage to act differently and professionally independently. Courage also can be an element of stewardship—of being a steward of the profession as is contributes to the discussion of an "ideal" society. Stewardship does not mean advancing a particular news story or even a news agenda. Rather, stewardship means preserving and strengthening free expression, a fundamental context for the practice of citizenship in any political culture. However, Lambeth also connects stewardship to journalists acting responsibly in order to promote professional goals (Lambeth 1986, 204). He connects this sort of courage to Ross' duty of self-improvement (Meyers 2003).

3. The role of emotion in understanding courage

Aristotle's discussion of courage is rare in traditional philosophy: it explicitly links an emotion with ethical acts. However, it has not been until last years of the 20th Century and early years in this one that philosophers have directly addressed the role of emotion in ethics. These

insights come primarily from the work of neuroscience, and they contradict some of what Aristotle asserted when it came to ethical acts, specifically courage.

Current research (Hauser, 2006) has found that ethical action is not a purely rational endeavor. To act ethically—as opposed to only reasoning about ethics-- requires a "firm handshake" with the emotions. Furthermore, these emotions are not limited merely to the fight or flight mechanism common to mammals and many other species—the sort of fear which Aristotle described—but to the equally compelling human drive to nurture and to sustain connection, particularly through empathy with ones fellows. Philosopher and neuroscientist Patricia Churchland (2011) cites Aristotle as well as the classical Chinese philosopher Mencius in her discussion of the virtues of character. For Churchland the virtues are not cerebral but arise from the structure of the human brain (structure that does not vary across cultures and nations) and human biological drives, including the ability to live in groups, to cooperate in parenting young, to engage in pair bonds that are stable over years, and to solve problems in way that privileges flexibility. "Social wisdom, in Aristotle's view, depends on the early development of good habits, and the capacity to reason sensibly about specific social issues…Putting Aristotle's prescient ideas into more contemporary form, we could say that for the most part, the brain's continuous decision-making business depends on a continuous process of settling into solutions to constraint satisfaction problems." (Churchland, 2011, 164). In other words, our brain structure and biological drives predispose human beings to consider and respond to the problems of living with other human beings in organized social environments; such problems are inherently social and ethical. Churchland argues against locating "the virtues" in any specific gene or brain structure but rather locates them in the intersection of brain chemistry—specifically those neurotransmitters that sustain the nurture of young—and the ability of human beings to live in groups and to develop knowledge based on the experience of living in those groups. This argument is not biologically reductionistic but rather aims to provide a species-wide basis for the emergence of ethics, and for the particular construction of ethical acts including the virtues, across cultures and historic eras. Far from discounting emotion as it is linked to specific acts, Churchland argues that the emotions are essential to ethical behavior. "These problems suggest that counting on pure rationality and consistency to undergird morality is mistaken. In any case, Kant's conviction that detachment from emotions is essential in characterizing moral obligation is strikingly at odds with what we know about our biological nature….The *social* emotions are a way of getting us to do what we *socially* ought," (Churchland 2011, 175, italics in the original).

By expanding the range and the sort of emotions that fuel courage, it is also possible to extend the definition of courage itself beyond war and to include more than a single, bold act. This expansion also dovetails with the insights of feminist philosophy, placing courage in realm of a systemic understanding of power structures and of a willingness to confront injustice on a regular basis and as part of a professional obligation. Steadfastness that supports the continuing exercise of the professional moral imagination also becomes a way to demonstrate courage, a way that is familiar to many professionals, among them journalists. This is the courage of community, not in the sense of "going along to get along" but rather in the deeper sense of professional solidarity around a professional goal.

Despite Aristotle's assertion to the contrary, the difficult but pleasurable work of doing one's job well and of furthering the development of community is every bit as courageous an act as

anything that springs from a fear of harm. This professional courage is not lodged exclusively in a single act but rather in the daily exercise of the moral imagination and the passion to further that vision in acts large and small. Journalistic courage is bound to justice; it speaks for and to citizens and in can be both a collaborator with and a fierce opponent of political and economic power. Journalistic courage is a steward of professional norms and professional well-being. Two scholars, each in a different way, have examined these elements of professional courage.

4. The courage of professional solidarity

Ethicist Sandra Borden has developed a normative theory of journalism as practice based on virtue ethics and relying on courage as one of the sustaining virtues in this normative endeavor (Borden 2007). Borden argues that journalism is a particular kind of intellectual practice that is "suited to the rational production of knowledge using cooperative standards of investigation and interpretation that allow practitioners to vouch authoritatively for their products." (Borden, 63). What gives journalism its normative dimension is that news is not created for its own sake but to provide opportunity for civic participation and hence human flourishing.

Borden quotes McIntyre about the role of virtue in any sort of practice, specifically a practice built of relationships among people, as in the journalist-source relationship, or among colleagues. "To have such relationships, McIntyre says that all practices require the virtues of courage, justice and honesty," (Borden 2007, 71). For Borden, it is this relationship among colleagues that forms the core of journalism as practice and that gives individual journalists the strength to resist the outside forces that currently batter the profession, whether it is the loss of a business model to sustain journalistic work, the exigencies of competition, or the sort of political and social pressures that many governments and political systems attempt to exert on journalistic work. Borden lodges a sense of professional practice in a feeling of solidarity among colleagues, the sort of solidarity that runs deeper than the conviviality that characterizes most western newsrooms. For Borden, solidarity is founded in a sense of individual identification with and internalization of the normative goals of journalism. This internalization of values allows professional to provide moral support to one another—across newsrooms as well as across national borders. "Moral support has two aspects: Solidarity makes group members want to help colleagues who are in need, and it helps individuals overcome self interest when required for the common good…..In other words, practitioners do not have to face alone their fear or the harmful consequences of acting courageously," (Borden 2007, 90).

Organizations such as Reporters Without Borders or Investigative Reporters and Editors demonstrate this sort of professional solidarity. So does the cooperation of three news organizations, the New York Times, The Guardian, and der Spiegel, in their initial reporting of Wikileaks. This sort of professional cooperation not only provides a deep well of support for individuals, but by embodying exceptional professional practice, such activities elevate professional standards. This kind of moral support also means there is a willingness to sanction poor professional performance. In the US, such sanctions most often take the form of public criticism; Jon Stewart's mocking of the unthinking conventions of news on The Daily Show is another form of such criticism—this time directed at the sometimes unwitting public that journalism is meant to serve.

Borden also takes on the difficult question of whether courage requires heroism. Many scholars have noted that courage cannot require heroism. Indeed, there is a certain sort of practical wisdom in this approach; heroic acts are by definition exceptional and often exact great personal sacrifice. Here Borden quotes Larry May, who suggests that heroic acts must meet two conditions: the good to be achieved must be very great or the person who is expected to sacrifice must gain significant support from his or her professional community.

Daily journalism is seldom heroic, but it can often be courageous. Relatively routine acts—coming to work on time, expecting and achieving high professional standards on every story, doing the best one can within a difficult political and economic framework, all demonstrate journalistic courage and form the core of professional solidarity as Borden conceptualizes it. These daily acts, the routine of professional practice, are the muscle of the professional character of which Aristotle wrote. Thinking about courage in this way also allows journalists themselves, as well as those who observe and sometimes critique them, to acknowledge professional shortcoming without always making them a moral failing. Sometimes courage fails. It is the professional willingness to try again, to learn from the problem and to put that learning into practice, that is the professional bulwark that courage provides. This is retentional responsibility as articulated by Audi. It is the courage of facing professional life as it is.

The work of ethics scholar Patrick Plaisance recounts how individual journalists have demonstrated courage during their professional careers.

5. The intersection of character and the historical moment

Plaisance, like Borden, places courage in a social context and defines it as sharing the common features of the presence of personal risk, the development of the habit over time, and a quality that takes into account the socio-environmental context (Plaisance 2014, 145). Courage is a daily, professional activity. He adds to this the quality of vision: "critical components of courage are freedom of choice, fear of a situation, and the willingness to take risks in a situation with an uncertain but morally worthy end, (Plaisance 2014). Courage, Plaisance says, motivates professionals toward moral excellence.

Theoretically, Plaisance places his project—to understand how professionals whose actions and in many cases careers demonstrate sound ethical choices—in the realm of moral psychology, and as such he integrates some findings of personality theory with lived experiences of journalists and public relations professionals.

Rather, the exemplars repeatedly volunteered challenges in their lives—moments of ear and risk that they drew upon to illustrate events that shaped their behaviors and outlooks and that simultaneously suggested the presence of moral courage. So closely did they seem to identify with notions of perseverance amid adversity and a motivation to translate the ideas of virtue into their daily lives with good work, that the idea of moral courage became an intrinsic, of often implicit, part of their personal and professional narratives, (Plaisance 2014, 149.)

Based on interviews, this distilled profession wisdom illustrates courageous professional acts as follows:

From a Pulitzer-prize winning journalist who is also a manager: "Have I let somebody down because they needed by ability to defend them, and I didn't step up?...I believe an editor's worth is shown not by whether he was able to take the most talented person and direct them, but whether he was able to take the least talented person and direct them." Extrapolating this insight to daily journalism, it is any reporter or editor who squeezes every ounce of meaning out of even the most routine report.

From a working reporter: "I believe to stand and fight for your goals…you have to respect everyone and you have to find a way to do less harm to reach your goals". For many journalists, doing less harm means finding new ways to report and then tell a story. Often, this means challenging existing journalistic norms, as when reporters or photographers work with their subjects to make things that might normally be quite private—the identity of a rape victim or the physical scars of pain and injury—public within a context that promotes understanding and empathy.

From a public relations professional: Refusing to become complicit in the bad behavior, most often dishonestly or self dealing, of others, even at the professional expense of losing the account.

From a foreign correspondent: "It's more instinctive than that, but when it comes to doing my job, it comes down to not about personal glory or ambition, it comes down to trying to get good stories, get them right, and get them early." For new organizations, merely fighting to keep international bureaus open requires the courage to buck the "less expensive" way to report international news.

Several exemplars linked their behavior to specific philosophical approaches, for example early religious training or the teaching of individual philosophers. One newspaper editor said that, despite repeated failures, he still tried to live his professional life "as if your every action will become a universal law." Others championed values such as fairness and doing as little harm as possible as guiding principles.

Still others noted a life-long struggle with what they perceived to be structural inequalities in the profession. Martha, an accomplished national affairs editor who now heads an on-line news organization, recounted her "years-long struggle with entrenched gender discrimination in the business." She told Plaisance, "Those kinds of limitations were still very much in play when I started my career, and the expectations that people had of what a woman would do were very different, and so I guess sort of sorting out my own aspirations and trying to no overreact or under-react to the situation, and then create the kind of life that I wanted to live—I think that's probably been the biggest challenge." These are the journalists who refuse to "settle" for things the way they are, whether it is the editors of papers in the US south who reported on the civil rights movement despite reader opposition, or pioneering journalists such as Gloria Steinam or Seymour Hersch whose affinity for justice led them to see issues and events in ways that others ignored or attempted to cover up.

And, others credited the ethical climate of the organizations for which they worked as influencing their own actions. "So the one corporate environment I've seen people change their behavior to be more ethical and more mindful of what they're doing is (name of corporation redacted) because it [ethical behavior] was tied to compensation." This is a place where leadership

can matter, those in charge infuse their organizations with their own high standards and are able to teach others how to live up to them.

In his conclusions to the chapter on courage, Plaisance returns to the ancient idea that the need for courage often arises quickly and can be dangerous and unsettling. However, he also notes that empathy and pro-social norms can fund courageous responses. His exemplars, in their own words, go beyond these generalizations. While professional courage can require the single, bold act, it is just as often linked to a daily effort at professional excellence, of holding self and others to the same standards of account. It is with this daily exercise of courage, and of the development of professional standards, that this paper concludes.

6. Conclusions: Courage beyond fear

In contemporary ethics, it has become accepted to define courage as that which is exceptional. This paper takes a different approach, insisting that for professionals, courage is the stuff of daily virtue. Courage, instead of being linked exclusively to fear, is instead linked to the moral imagination, and a willingness to pursue high professional standards for the sake of professional excellence. Social emotions, those that promote nurture of individuals and communities, are every bit as central to this sort of courage as is the fear that undergirds a single, bold act.

For journalists, this means meeting professional life "where it is", in political systems that are far from perfect, within organizations that sometimes promote and sometimes degrade ethical action. Employing the insight of one of the exemplars in Plaisance's study, those standards include summoning the best from those who are "ordinary" professionals doing the ordinary work of daily journalism. The courage to expect the same standard of excellence in every journalistic task—not just the big stories or the noteworthy confrontation with political and economic power—builds professional character and the weave of professional solidarity. The commitment to be steadfast in the face of adversity is the hallmark of the journalistic virtue of courage.

Finally, readers, listeners and viewers notice such courage. It becomes an essential element in the development of a relationship that can only emerge when journalism becomes instrumental to political engagement. Contemporary scholarship suggests that when newspapers disappear—when journalism is no longer as present—civic engagement declines (Shaker 2014). In civic engagement, journalism and citizens are partners; they respect and encourage one another. Journalistic courage is essential in achieving this a larger political end.

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封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

艰难的中国新闻自律

Self-regulation in China : A Dilemma

陈立丹[①]

中文摘要：中国新闻传播界的职业意识长期确立不起来。主要靠宣传部及新闻出版广电总局等国家机关下达行政规章，以此来约束传媒各种属于职业道德和职业规范范围内的事项。这有着文化渊源、体制和新闻教育等方面的原因。总体上看，中国传媒人缺乏人性的忏悔意识。这种情况在 2004 年后出现了改善。目前新闻教育界只有继续坚持和完善职业道德教育，更重要的是从小学开始进行普及基本社会道德的教育。

关键词：职业道德, 职业规范，新闻自律，社会道德

Abstract： The professionalism and media ethics are absent among Chinese journalists. Professional morals and norms are regulated and restricted mostly by the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, as well as the rules and regulations issued by state organs such as Ministry of Culture. Overall, Chinese journalists are not used to confession. The situation has improved after 2004. Higher education in journalism needs to sustain and improve the education on media ethics. More importantly, basic social moral education is needed for the whole society from elementary school.

Key Words： professional morals, professional norms, self-regulation, social morals

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中国新闻传播界的新闻职业意识长期确立不起来。目前，主要仰仗中国共产党中央委员会和其职能部门——宣传部不断下发红头文件，以及中国国务院新闻出版广电总局、国家新闻办公室、文化部等国家机关下达行政规章，以此来约束传媒各种属于职业道德和职业规范范围内的事项。

这是为什么？

从文化渊源看，中国没有西方意义的宗教（救赎）。中国的儒教讲求的是一种带有政治色彩的修身养性（吾日三省吾身），因而人民的道德意识主要存在于生活层面，表现为朴素的建立在自然人性基础上的道德感。

最近几十年来，中国经历了五六十场政治运动，特别是 1966－1976 年的“文革”浩劫，使得一般的社会道德意识也所剩无几。

紧接着，中国社会很快进入并不完善的市场经济体制（法治和契约意识是随后才提出的），传媒迅速变成了一个个利益单元，以利益为核心的价值观进一步侵蚀着新闻人尚存不多的道德意识。一旦发生自身利益和社会利益的冲突，记者原来还可以仰仗新闻职业道德作出恰当的处理，现在却会首先选择抛弃道德。

从体制上看，中国的新闻界曾在几十年内不是一个行业，当然更谈不上新闻职业理念，也不知新闻职业道德为何物。

1952 年，中国大陆经过没有声张的“社会主义意识形态改造”，报纸、广播电台（以及后来出现的电视台）和通讯社，成为了党政权力机关的一部分。新闻传媒不是一种社会职业。1949 年成立的政务院新闻总署，因此也于 1952 年撤销。

在新闻教育方面，1952 年经过全国高校院系调整，新闻教育被集中管理。北京各高校的新闻系几经变动，最终合并到中国人民大学新闻系；上海各高校的新闻系被合并到复旦大学新闻系。1949－1983 年 30 多年间，中国的高校新闻系没有出版一本国人写的新闻学教材，上课直接使用苏联中央党校新闻班的讲义。政治要求即是最高的道德。

当时的新闻理论主要告知人们：传媒是党的喉舌，必须宣传党的方针政策；新闻真实被解释为“本质真实”，传媒的基本任务是报道社会主义社会光明的本质；“新闻客观性原则”被批判为资产阶级新闻观点。在“以阶级斗争为纲的年代”，一度连“报纸是人民的教科书”都被认为是修正主义观点。在这种情形下，新闻职业意识逐渐被泯灭，替代它的是党的宣传纪律。

那时，新闻记者为了宣传共产主义而说假话，没有丝毫的羞愧感，反而觉着自己很聪明。例如 1952 年 12 月 21 日人民日报头版刊登的关于志愿军战士黄继光的通讯《马特洛索夫式的英雄黄继光》写道：

“……坑道里营参谋长在望着他，战友们在望着他，祖国人民在望着他，他的母亲也在望着他，马特洛索夫的英雄行为在鼓舞着他……”

前苏联史学家考证，苏联电影《普通一兵》中的原型马特洛索夫没有堵过枪眼。

1959 年第 3 期的《美术研究》刊文《解放后连环画工作的成就》写道：

“志愿军英雄黄继光在朝鲜英勇牺牲时，他的口袋里还珍藏着一本‘马特洛索夫’的连环画。这样的例子是列举不完的。新连环画之所以受到群众欢迎，就在于它帮助人们新品质

的成长，使人民更加热爱祖国和忠于共产主义理想，从而鼓舞了建没新生活的热情和斗争意志。”[①]

《马特洛索夫》连环画的最早版本，是 1957 年 6 月由人民美术出版社出版的，而黄继光是 1952 年牺牲的。这种不真实的想象匪夷所思。

1992 年中国实行市场经济体制以后，除共产党机关报以外的传媒被推向市场（仍要归口管理），于是职业道德问题也被提上了日程。

2002 年山西繁峙金矿矿难，新华社等传媒的 11 名记者受贿无闻，引发中共中央宣传部从 2003 年起进行“三项学习教育”，以学习马克思主义新闻观、学习“三个代表”、学习新闻职业精神的名义，将职业意识问题提上了日程。

这场学习运动延续至今，但在传媒的现实运行中，因为有很多与传媒和记者利益相关的潜规则无法破除，树立新闻职业意识依然很难。例如你若不拿红包，那别人（而且是多数人）怎么办？于是不拿红包的记者被孤立。记者若因为“舆论监督”而得罪广告客户，就是他所在传媒最大的敌人，这个人将难以在这家媒体生存下去。

从新闻教育界看，中国人民大学新闻学院有专门的基础课“新闻法治与道德”，要讲一个学期。但是学生们到了真正的传媒工作后，往往感觉与学校所讲的不是一回事，因而学校教育的收效很小。传媒和社会都太缺少新闻职业意识了。例如“媒介审判”在中国的传媒上随处可见、多数传媒都会公开未成年嫌犯的姓名，当事的记者或编辑往往感觉不到存在问题。

现在中国新闻界最普遍的职业道德问题是所谓“有偿新闻”（受贿新闻、金元新闻），报纸版面和新闻节目中的“软文”（将广告内容写成广告通讯）俯拾皆是，记者“跑会”普遍会拿红包，最极端的表现就是“封口费”。

中国《广告法》第 13 条规定：“广告应当具有可识别性，能够使消费者辨明其为广告。大众传播媒介不得以新闻报道形式发布广告。通过大众传播媒介发布的广告应当有广告标记，与其它非广告信息相区别，不得使消费者产生误解。”该法的执行者是各级工商管理局，而在中国，这些机构是管不了传媒的，因为传媒的直接管理者是同级党政机关。

2014 年 3 月 27 日，我给人民大学新闻学院本科生布置的新闻理论课程作业是：“审视 2014 年 3 月 25 日《北京晚报》2 版和 20 版下半版的内容是否具有新闻价值，为什么？然后对照《中华人民共和国广告法》第 13 条，分析一下它们如何违法。为什么我国报纸上会有如此多的这类东西，请从法治管理角度做一分析。”

这两个版的软文均署名“本报某记者”，这该是记者做的事儿吗？但它却普遍存在，而且多数作者从来没有想到过这样做有什么不妥。

承担这次作业的两位同学就此致信《北京晚报》编辑部，指出这样做违反《广告法》。编辑部不肯采用文字邮件回复，委托一位编辑给我打电话，让我转告同学，承认这两篇文章是广告，但说文后有一个内部使用的、很小的数字编号，可以识别（但读者看不懂）。

这件事同时还说明，在北京日报集团下，《北京日报》编辑部、《北京晚报》编辑部与集团的广告部是同级的不同部门，尽管广告与新闻同在报纸的版面上，但编辑部管不了广告部的广告设计和安排。

[①] 布及：《解放后连环画工作的成就》，载《美术研究》，1959（2）。

还有就是传媒对人性的忽视，典型的例子是 2002 年 10 月传媒关于湖南长沙某饭馆出售“人乳宴”的报道。当时采访的记者问的第一个问题是：人乳经过卫生检验了吗？老板拿出一摞检验报告，说明没有问题。记者问的第二个问题是：工商管理部门有禁止性的法规吗？老板说，查遍了工商管理方面的法规，没有。于是记者报道说，请来一位湘菜大师，品尝了用人乳做的菜，味道好极了；有人听说是用人乳做的菜，感到别扭，半天不敢动筷子。有的报纸还就此展开讨论，有人说，人血可以卖，为什么人乳不能卖？最终，国家卫生部下令禁止这样做。记者的采访和报道还显得挺有“法治”意识，但却不知道在“法治”之上，还有一道底线——道德。根据现代社会的基本道德来判断，这样的事情是反人性的，记者应该揭示这种行为的不道德，而不是维护这种反人性的行为。

2004 年，中央电视台第四套节目播放俄罗斯人质危机的新闻报道时，屏幕下滚动播出了这样的信息：“俄罗斯人质危机目前共造成多少人死亡？下列哪一个选项是正确的：A、402 人；B、338 人；C、322 人；D、302 人。答题请直接回答至：移动用户发答案至 8003111；联通用户发答案至 9850111。当时的网评写道：“这是一道带血的有奖竞猜题，它让我战栗，让我感到羞耻。”

在新闻真实的问题上，传媒让自己的或官方的主观认识统领事实的现象很普遍。例如 2003 年 10 月中国第一个宇航员杨利伟返回地面，出仓时满脸是血。他自己后来在公开的日记中写道：“着陆时有巨大的冲击力，因为麦克风有不规则的棱角，让我嘴角受伤；要是在颈上，后果不敢想象。”

而当时人们从电视新闻中看到的杨利伟，尽管脸色稍显苍白，身体状况还是良好的。人们看到的是血迹被擦干后重新表演的“事实”。决定掩盖这一事实的人和拍摄照片的记者，心中“扬国威”的理念压抑了“不说谎”的道德意识。

关于杨利伟出仓的假新闻照片 2004 年被评为第 14 届中国新闻奖二等奖，在事实被揭露后也没有撤销该奖。获奖文字说明写道：“在刚刚打开飞船返回舱门的第一时间赶到现场，拍到了中国航天第一人杨利伟平安和返回舱完好无损的瞬间。”

可见，我们缺乏承认错误的勇气。完美的作假，留下的结果只是作假；有缺憾的成功，留下的终究是成功。

这是 2011 年中央电视台关于利比亚战争的新闻画面：在政府军攻打反对派的画面下面，央视打出了“胜利在望”的字幕。当战争以利比亚卡扎菲政权失败告终的时候，电视台不能直面自己的报道，做出职业规范方面的反省。

中国传媒人总体上缺乏人性的忏悔意识。马克思说：

“自由报刊是人民精神的洞察一切的慧眼，是人民自我信任的体现，是把个人同国家和整个世界联结起来的有声的纽带，是使物质斗争升华为精神斗争，并且把斗争的粗糙物质形式观念化的一种获得体现的文化。自由报刊是人民在自己面前的毫无顾忌的忏悔，大家知道，坦白的力量是可以使人得救的。自由报刊是人民用来观察自己的一面精神上的镜子，而自我审视是智慧的首要条件。”[①]其中后面两句话，表达的是新教伦理，中国传媒人缺少这种人性的忏悔意识和自我审视。例如下面无意识表现出来的问题：

[①] 《马克思恩格斯全集》（第二版 1 卷），人民出版社，1995 年，179 页。

《北京青年报》2006 年 7 月 11 日头版大照片，特大黑体的主标题是“巴空难确认无中国乘客”，而很小字的肩题是“巴基斯坦一架客机起飞后坠毁 45 人无一生还”。

外国人死了，就不重要吗？使用“无一生还”的表达，不显得太冷漠了吗？为什么不能用“不幸罹难”呢？应该将肩题的内容改为主题，主题改为消耗字的副题。

2010 年，新闻照片《挟尸要价》（2009 年 10 月，湖北荆州三名大学生救人时溺亡，照片揭露了打捞学生尸体者向学校索取“打捞费”）被评上中国新闻摄影协会的唯一金奖，引发了巨大的争议。

我在当时写的文章中指出：“世界各地的新闻界同行对于刊登死难者照片，一向有着严格的自律，即尽量避免图片上出现清晰的死尸形象。《挟尸要价》被评上中国新闻摄影的最高奖，以及作者为说明照片的真实性而在网上抛出前后系列照片的事实表明，中国传媒人普遍缺乏职业道德意识。这对中国的新闻行业来说，是可悲的事情。”“生命的神圣性应是全社会的共识，所有人都应当尊重生命、敬畏生命。请自我检查一下我们的报导，有没有对生命的轻视倾向，有没有对死亡的麻木？不论出于什么重大而严肃的理由，使用多么煽情的语言和画面描写、展现死亡，在和平时期，任何东西都没有任何理由凌驾于人的生命和尊严之上。”

然而，这篇只有 1500 字的小文章被我放到博客上后遭到了群体性的指责。主要意见是：“新闻的最高职业道德就是显现真相。你不去抨击挟尸要价，却去攻击摄影作者！”“真相只有一个，哪怕再怎么样，新闻是以事实为出发点，如果没有这点，新闻就没有它的价值了！！！ ”

后来形势才逐渐变化，支持我的言论增多：

“换作那尸体是你儿子你还爱看不？如果你几岁的小儿子看到了，拉着你的手说：‘爸爸 or 妈妈，我怕！”你还会看得很爽吗？’”“揭露社会现实一定要用血腥暴力吗？还记得 2005 年北京某个小学被泥石流掩埋的事情吗？那张获奖的照片，没有任何人，没有尸体，而只是教室外的一堵墙，墙上被孩子们画满了各种可爱的画，可是泥石流已经将其掩埋。要表达的不是已经表达了？要震撼的不是已经震撼过了？难道你重口味的要看尸体才爽？”

2003 年中国新闻工作者职业道德调查报告（陈绚、郑保卫主持）指出：

近 3/4 同意记者拉广告：16.8％同意，56.5％态度暧昧；

4/5 强同意为栏目拉赞助：26％同意，54.1％态度暧昧；

2/3 承认主动淡化不利于广告客户的新闻：12.1％同意，54.2％态度暧昧；

5/6 强认为可以接受被采访方用餐 ：21.5％同意，62.8％态度暧昧；

近 2/3 认为可以接受被采访方免费旅游：10.7%同意，55.1％态度暧昧；

近 1/2 认为可以接受被采访方现金馈赠 ：6.3%同意，40.5％态度暧昧；

1/2 强记者为企业公关 ：9.9%同意，42.8%态度暧昧。

虽然多数人倾向于可以做违规的事情，但态度暧昧的居多数。这说明，多数传媒人的良心没有泯灭，而是藏在内心，这是未来中国新闻传播业职业道德得以树立起来的基础。

2007－2008 年，我和王辰瑶主持的关于新闻职业意识的深度访谈（后来形成《艰难的新闻自律》一书，2010 年出版）也表明，中国传媒人仍然具有基本的社会良心，只是这种美好和善良被各种不良的外部环境压抑了，尚待唤醒。

以下是 2004 年以来发生的事情和观念变化，说明中国新闻人正在逐渐被唤醒新闻职业道德的意识。

2004 年 6 月，11 名中国工人在阿富汗被恐怖分子打死。上海《新闻晚报》记者李宁源写了一篇文章《一名新记者的困惑》，叙说他采访遇难民工家属时遇到的事情。该民工的家里人为不让 88 岁的老太太因获悉儿子的噩耗而发生意外，拒绝记者采访。记者退出后，村主任陪着当地领导和一群当地记者浩浩荡荡来到该家，硬是冲进家门，领导在老太太哭天喊地的悲痛中完成了“亲切慰问”，随行记者抓拍到了具有震撼力的悲痛镜头。李为此发出疑问：职业与道德面前，我们记者应当如何选择？

该报副主编胡廷楣告诉这位新记者：“那正是你心中的良知还没有泯灭，请你保护这样的感觉，那是一个真正好记者的必须。” ①

2004 年 12 月印度洋海啸以后，中国记者蜂拥到上海浦东机场采访中国接收的外国难民。两位《申江服务导报》记者就此描述说：

“在浦东机场采访时，一对只在游泳衣外裹了条毯子的老外夫妇格外引人注目。经历了记者的第一轮‘围攻’后，他们推着手推车上两个年幼的孩子，孤零零地站到了机场商场边。他们几乎所有的行李都被冲走了，身上一分钱也没有。他们的身边聚集了很多记者，闪光灯下，他们闭上了眼睛。距离这一家子不到 10 米处，静静停着一部轮椅，一位在海啸中左脚受伤的女孩子低垂着头坐在轮椅上，尽管她已被惊惶、疲惫折磨得几近虚脱，然而在众多话筒、照相机、摄像机的包围中，这位虚弱的女孩不得不面对无数的问题……”

“入行前，父亲对我说过：‘永远记住，在成为一个记者前，你首先是一个人’。”“这一刻，我一再地想起他的话。我非常钦佩同行的敬业精神，为得到真实及时的新闻而恪尽职守。但是此刻，我选择做另一件事。我和一起来的同事走上前去，将我们的衣服脱下，给他们披上，然后去商场给他们买了食品和水。我们没有做采访。” ②

2005 年的“厦门事件”表现出中国公众，而不仅仅是新闻界本身开始关注传媒自律问题。这年 5 月 10 日，福建省厦门市的《东南快报》发表了记者拍摄的一组 5 张照片，内容是一位骑车人因为看不见雨水淹没的路上的大坑而跌倒的连续瞬间照片。这件事情引发了公众对该记者职业道德的质疑。根据新浪网调查，最初大约一半的意见支持记者，认为他抢拍下了具有新闻价值的精彩镜头；另一半意见认为该记者明知雨水下暗藏大坑，却在那里等候了近一小时而拍下这组照片，缺乏职业道德。我当时参加了新浪的网上直播讨论，反对记者这样做。随着讨论的深入，后一种意见后来占了上风。

解决中国新闻传播业的职业道德问题，没有立竿见影的灵丹妙药。

我们现在能够做的，就是继续坚持和完善大学的新闻职业道德教育，但更重要的是从小学开始进行普及基本社会道德（包括新闻道德）的教育。这是一个长久的过程，非常不易，恢复一个民族的道德意识，是一个长期的过程，不是搞一项什么“工程”可以解决的。

目前要做的是：明确告知新闻从业者们：你们的什么做法、想法是错的，什么做法、想法是对的。是非不清楚，是现在中国新闻从业人员最大的问题。

中国新闻学界能做的，也就是这些：反复告知，怎样做是对的，怎样做是错的。

① 李宁源：《一名新记者的困惑》，载《新闻记者》，2004（11）。
② 徐灿、李燕：《我们放弃了近在咫尺的采访》，载《申江服务导报》，2005-01-05。

目前通行的中华全国新闻工作者协会的《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》（2009 年第三次修订）是用党建话语写的，没有可操作性。我承担了一项关于新闻职业规范的课题，2012 年出版了一本操作性较强的《中国新闻职业规范蓝本》，共 572 条，划分为总的原则、职业角色、利益冲突、新闻业务四大块，涉及 28 种情形。下面是目录[①]：

原 则

一、总则

二、法律原则

三、专业原则

四、社会责任

职业角色

五、新闻与司法

六、隐性采访

七、新闻与公共关系：传媒假事件

八、传媒逼视

利益冲突

九、虚假新闻

十、有偿新闻

十一、有偿不闻与新闻敲诈

十二、新闻与广告：新闻植入式营销

十三、新闻舆论监督

十四、传媒的不正当竞争

十五、付费采访与新闻线人

十六、新闻传播与国家、民族、宗教

十七、新闻与弱势群体、未成年人、性别

十八、新闻与公众人物

十九、新闻侵权

新闻业务

二十、新闻的叙述与语言

二十一、新闻与著作权

[①] 陈立丹、周俊、陈俊妮、刘宁洁：《中国新闻职业规范蓝本》，人民日报出版社，2012（11）。

二十二、新闻与性、暴力

二十三、灾难新闻

二十四、犯罪新闻

二十五、自杀新闻

二十六、图片新闻

二十七、娱乐新闻

二十八、时事地图

2000 年，鉴于香港 1998 年发生“陈健康事件”[①]，香港和内地学界在香港浸会大学召开了传媒操守研讨会。有的与会记者说：“你们说这些没用，我们回去后，老板叫我做什么就得做什么。”时任浸会大学传理学院院长的朱立教授总结时说：“我们的学生工作以后，老板要求他做违规的事情，他不得不做，但他价值判断上能够认识到这是错误的，这就是我们新闻教育的成功!”

[①] 1998 年，香港男人陈健康到深圳嫖娼时，她的妻子抱着孩子跳楼自杀身亡。《苹果日报》记者给陈健康 5000 元港币，叫他去深圳再现嫖娼的过程，跟随采访。此举遭到香港人（包括传媒界人士）的强烈批评，指责该报和记者没有职业道德，最终该报老板就此事在报上发表了致歉声明。

封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

大数据与“被遗忘权”

Big Data and the “Right to be Forgotten”

吴　飞[①]

中文摘要：对个人自主性的保障，已经成为当今社会的主流思想，因为如此方能真正保障个人自身所认为的美好生活。隐私权正是在这样在理念下逐渐发展并受到社会广泛认同的。个人不受他人的干扰，可以决定谁拥有权利获知某些私人信息，这是每个人自主权得到尊重的基本理念。但数字化记忆的可访问性、持久性、全面性给人类带来了严重挑战，人类日常生活面临数字化的全面介入，导致了我们隐私不保时代的真正来临。“被遗忘权”的提出虽然在一定程度上为化解这样的数字异化提供了一种解决之道，但仍然存在较大的漏洞。

关键词：大数据，隐私权，被遗忘权，数字化

Abstract： It has been the mainstream to secure personal autonomy, since the well-being could be ensured as such. Based upon this idea, the concept of privacy developed and is well recognized now in the society. Not disturbed by the others, and able to decide who has the right to access certain personal information-these are the basic ideals of being respected. However, the digitalization of memory and its accessibility, durability and all-sidedness, posed severe challenges to human beings. Our daily life is intruded by the digitalization; hence the era of no privacy has come. We propose the “right to be forgotten”, as a way out to the alienation of digitalization, but there are still big leaks.

Keywords：big data, privacy, right to be forgotten, digitalization

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媒体上越来越多地充斥着各种闲谈与丑闻，偷窥、暗访已经成为媒体最习以为常的吸引眼球的手段。不少人认为这类信息具有冒犯性，应该被禁止。法学家塞缪尔·D·沃伦和路易斯·D·布兰代斯在 1890 年建议制定相关方面的法律，保护个人隐私权。如今隐私权的保护已经深入人心，许多人认为，过分地刺探公众人物的生活和其他人的生活并非善举，何况许多信息与公共利益和公众兴趣无关。例如，在中部田纳西州立大学（Middle Tennessee State University）1990 年实施的一项调查中，绝大多数答复者说：他们相信，当记者探察公众人物的过往生活，或发表备受公众关注的性生活内容时，新闻媒介不应该获得完全的保护。俄裔美国哲学家、文学家艾茵·兰德（1905-1982）曾写道："文明，就是向拥有隐私权的社会不断迈进的进程。野蛮社会的一切都是公共的，靠部落的法则来治理。文明是将一个人从一群人当中解放出来的过程"。[①]

一、我们的未来掌握在谁手中？

新媒体的迅速发展，一方面解放了普通大众的传播权力，但另一方面又带来了许多新的问题。个人隐私权的保护就面临着严重的挑战。记得 2002 年一届本科生毕业，在学生们毕业的晚宴上，作为班主任的我，被热情而多少有些伤感的毕业生们的情绪感染了，喝了很多酒，很快便醉了。几天后，一位学生告诉我说，网上有一组我各样醉态的照片。那时，我多少有些吃惊，因为我并不知道是谁拍了这样的照片，又是谁在什么时候放到网上去的。不过，因为当时我想那些照片是学生毕业晚宴的一部分，且这些照片只是在同学圈子中传播，虽有些不快，但没有过多责备学生，毕竟那些学生并无恶意，何况我并未在意那些照片是否会有损我个人的形象。与我经历相似的是《体育画报》泳装模特耶西卡（Yesica Toscanini）。有一天她醉酒后，与朋友拍摄了一张衣着不得体的照片。后来，这张照片被上传到了网上。她为此起诉了 Yahoo，要求它移除照片，她胜诉了。[②]

安德鲁·费尔德玛（Andrew Feldmar）生活在温哥华，他是一位六十多岁的心理咨询师。2006 年的某一天，费尔德玛的一位朋友从西雅图国际机场赶过来，他打算穿过美国与加拿大的边境去接他。但是这一次，边境卫兵用互联网的搜索引擎查询了一下费尔德玛。搜索结果显示出了一篇费尔德玛在 2001 年为一本交叉学科杂志所写的文章。在文中，他提到自己在 20 世纪 60 年代曾服用过致幻剂 LSD。因此，费尔德玛被扣留了 4 个小时，期间被采了指纹，之后还签署了一份声明，内容是他在大约 40 年前曾服用过致幻剂，并且不被准许再进入美国境内。安德鲁·费尔德玛是一位没有犯罪记录、拥有学识的专业人员，他知道当年服用致幻剂确实违反了法律，但是他坚称自 1974 年后就一直没再服用过，那是他生命中一段早已远去的时光，一个他认为已被社会遗忘了很久、与现在的他完全不相干的过错。但是，数字技术已经让社会丧失了遗忘的能力，取而代之的则是完善的记忆。虽然年近七十的安德鲁·费尔德玛未曾在互联网上主动披露关于自己的信息，但他怎么能够想到，自己曾经发表过的一篇文章，居然成为限制他行动的证据。对他而言，"成为数字化记忆的受害者完全是一个可怕的突然袭击。"[③]

费尔德玛的经历是从牛津大学教授维克托·迈尔·舍恩伯格出版的新书——《删除：大数据取舍之道》收集到的一个案例。在这本书中，舍恩伯格提出了与大数据概念"背道而驰"的想法：在数字时代，或许人类发生的最根本的改变，就是记忆和遗忘的平衡已经反转了，

[①] 转引自涂子沛：《大数据》，广西师范大学出版社，2012 年版，第 157 页。
[②] Robert Krulwich, Is The 'Right To Be Forgotten' The 'Biggest Threat To Free Speech On The Internet'? Krulwich Wonders, February 24, 2012.
[③] （英）维克托·迈尔-舍恩伯格：《删除——大数据取舍之道》，袁杰译，浙江人民出版社，2013 年版，中文版序言第 8-9 页。

将信息提交给数字存储器已经成为默认状态，而遗忘则成了例外。他认为，大量数字化的私人信息不仅可能在今天被滥用，在几年甚至几十年之后仍然可能被滥用。因此他指出，从某种意义上说，一个人是否生活在民主社会，与数字化记忆是否被滥用并无必然关系。如果私人信息被抓取后，以数字形式在未来被存储了很久很久，那么即使生活在民主社会，它仍然像一颗定时炸弹——因为，未来任何非民主政府，都可以利用这极具价值的信息权力宝藏。不过，毕竟互联网技术为人类提供的正能量，可能远远超过其可能存在的风险，更何况我们或多或少已经成为计算机的工具，所以断网、远离计算机已经不是应对数字化所带来风险的现实之举。怎么办呢？维克托·迈尔·舍恩伯格教授的解决之道是“充分运用互联网使其发挥全部潜能；并且，通过给互联网设置遗忘功能，以确保互联网被那些大权在握的人当作工具滥用的可能性越来越小，而让互联网充当创新、沟通和赋予权利的工具”。[①]

当我们注册一些商业购物网站、邮箱、游戏和各种各样的社交网络与手机应用时，我们可能并没有注意到，我们已经同时提供了各类私人信息，诸如出生日期、电话号码、银行帐户、家庭住址、地理位置甚至社会保险号码等等。而越来越智能的云计算，正紧锣密鼓地收集和整理着我们在消费、玩游戏、看网页，以及在社交网络上活动时留下的各种蛛丝马迹。一方面，我们获得了前所未有的方便快捷；另一方面，我们正有意无意地大规模泄露自己的私人信息。人肉搜索与精准营销，虽然是完全不同的事务，但它们运用了几乎完全相似的数据收集与分析技术。有人感叹说，随着科技日益进步，对数据分析的掌握水平已经能够操控个人资料，并对消费以至日常生活产生超乎想象的影响。全国人大代表叶青 2011 年 3 月 12 日座客正义网直播访谈节目时也曾谈到：个人信息一旦发布到网络上，可能其终身所有东西都会永久留在上面，覆水难收。个人信息的外露，可能会遭到某一方或者某一人的“攻击”。其中，有些“攻击”可能是无中生有的，有些“攻击”则会对其真实的负面信息进行炒作。叶青举例说：“比如我要升职的时候，大家就会把我过去所有的东西都摆出来。一件很小的事情，可能就会对我产生很大的影响。一些在过去登记的信息，虽然是不真实的，但人在一生中会发生很多的变化，一些不真实的信息可能是在青年时期留下的。因此，我不希望我过去留下的信息跟现在关联起来，那些过去的信息可不可以被遗忘掉？”

1967 年 1 月，《纽约时报》发表了著名记者、隐私权专家帕卡德（Vance Packard）的文章《不能告诉计算机》。文中写道：“当政府把我们每一个人的信息和日常生活的细节都放置于某个中央级的数据银行，我们便会受控于坐在电脑机器前面的那个人和他的按钮。这令人不安，这是一种危险。”[②]前美国中央情报局（CIA）技术人员斯诺登（Edward Joseph Snowden）所曝光的机密文件就证实了这一事实：我们一直将个人隐私送到“云端”，政府情报人员却通过技术手段窥探。对此，香港《星岛日报》2013 年 6 月 16 日曾刊文指出：斯诺登对传媒披露美国政府监控各地公民的信息，其实只是证实了外界长久以来的怀疑。与此同时，美国以至网络公司如何使用客户数据，可能比政府的监控行为还要严重和值得关注。斯诺登披露机密的争议行为，可能只是信息时代下个人权利被侵扰的冰山一角。文章分析说，除了国防和保安需要，这些网络公司将管有的大量信息经过整理后，可以对个人的生活模式和喜好了如指掌，从而形成非常重要的商业情报。而使用这些数据的企业，正可以投其所好，令受众置身消费引诱而不自觉。

美国著名计算机专家迪博德（John Diebold）曾分析说：“当你在银行存钱、提款的时候，你留下的信息绝不仅仅是一笔银行交易；其实你还告诉了银行，某一时刻你所处的地理位置。这些信息，很可能会成为你其他行为的解释，从而透露你的隐私。例如，这个提款记录，如

[①] （英）维克托 迈尔-舍恩伯格：《删除——大数据取舍之道》，袁杰译，浙江人民出版社，2013 年版，中文版序言第 6-7 页。

[②] Don’t tell it to the computer, Vance Packard, New York Time Magazine, January, 1967.

果和你当天的通讯、消费、旅行等其它数据记录整合起来，你当天的行踪和作为，就不会有太多的秘密可言。迪博德进一步总结说，在信息时代，计算机内的每一个数据、每一片字节，都是构成一个人隐私的血肉。信息加总和数据整合，对隐私的穿透力不仅仅是“1+1=2”的，很多时候，是大于 2 的。[①]美国外交关系委员会（Council on Foreign Relations）兼职高级研究员理查德·福肯瑞斯曾指出：Gmail 就具备联络跟踪功能，这个功能与谷歌管理数字照片的免费产品 Picasa 整合。Picasa 具备标签功能，可以告诉谷歌照片在哪里及何时拍摄，此外还具备一个先进的面部识别功能，谷歌可以通过认出一张照片中的某个人，识别用户数字照片库中这个人的所有照片。仅仅将这 3 种服务与谷歌的核心搜索功能整合，就能让谷歌在互联网上几乎任何一张数字照片中找到此人，从而获知用户出现在哪里，什么时候、和谁在一起，以及做过什么。如果把 YouTube，或者安卓手机，以及谷歌开发或收购的其它任何数据库加入进来，其结果会让人大吃一惊。[②]对此，中国互联网资深评论员谢文先生认为：大数据技术的发展已经证明，不计成本、不计后果地在网络上获取一个人的隐私完全可能实现。人们单纯地依赖那些消极防御的方式去保护自己的个人隐私，实际上是不堪一击的。他指出，将隐私权博弈维持在一个相对稳定健康的状态，大致有三种可能的方式。一是需要动态确认网络世界对个人隐私利用的合理合法范畴，使其与现实社会基本对应合拍；二是利用个人隐私者，需要“己所不欲勿施于人”的价值观和职业道德来进行自我约束，不把自身难以接受的隐私利用方式施加于他人；三是社会主流人群需要逐渐接受和适应技术进步带来的新型社会形态和行为方式，在接受社会服务和放弃部分隐私之间，两害相衡取其轻。[③]

劳伦斯·弗里德曼（Lawrence M. Friedman）在《选择的共和国》中写道：“现代技术注定了这种形式的隐私必将消失。只要愿意，政府就可以在任何地方一字不落地听到一个针头掉地所发出的声音。计算机时代的人们认为一切都是可以记录的，或至少是已经屈从于这种无奈的事实局面了。因此，隐私与其说是保持秘密的权利，不如说是按照一个人喜欢的方式进行生活的权利，即从事‘私人的’行为而不受干涉”。[④]《基督科学箴言报》曾报道了卡内基梅隆大学数据隐私专家的观点：“即使没有姓名、没有社会安全号，只要通过性别、生日和邮编 3 个数据项，数据挖掘的技术就能够成功地识别全美 87%的人口。”[⑤]正因为如此，密歇根州的一些警察就能够利用警务数据库“猎艳”。他们在街上邂逅漂亮的女性之后，就跟踪她们、记下她们的车牌号码；回到办公室后，再通过查询数据库，获得该女性的住址等个人信息，然后再人为制造进一步接触的机会。此外，还有警察利用数据库查询政治对手和上司的信息，并对相关人员实施威胁。据悉，在 2001 年前后 5 年间，美国涉嫌滥用警务数据库的警察共有 90 名之多。特拉华州还有政府官员，将公民的个人信息泄露、出卖给赌博公司，帮助他们追债、开发新的顾客。[⑥]这些层出不穷的侵犯个人隐私的事件，让人们越来越对自己个人信息的数字化充满忧虑。如美国皮尤研究中心 2012 年 2 月发布的一份研究社交网站隐私管理的报告就发现：约半数社交网络用户担忧隐私。不仅仅停留在担忧，越来越多的社交网络使用者开始采取行动保护隐私——报告中 44%的用户已经开始删除他人在自己档案信息中留下的评论，37%的用户开始把标记有自己姓名的照片删除。

① 转引自涂子沛：《大数据》，广西师范大学出版社，2012 年版，第 162 页。
② 理查德 福肯瑞斯：谷歌不应侵犯网民的“被遗忘权”，http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001043258/ce。
③ 谢文：《互联网世界的隐私权博弈》，载财新《新世纪》，2013 年第 12 期。
④（美）劳伦斯·弗里德曼：《选择的共和国——法律、权威与文化.》，高鸿钧等译，清华大学出版社，2005 年版，第 212-213 页。
⑤ US plans massive data sweep, The Christian Science Monitor, February 9, 2006.
⑥ 涂子沛：《大数据》，广西师范大学出版社，2012 年版，第 176 页。

二、我能删贴吗？

全球复杂网络研究权威艾伯特—拉斯洛·巴拉巴西曾指出，关于我们个人的信息记录到处都是：

- 手机运营商掌握着我们的实时通信信息和行踪；
- 我们的花销和旅行习惯对银行来说已不是秘密；
- 我们的社会关系和个人爱好都被电子邮件供应商归了档；
- 监视器会经常录下我们和身边人的一举一动。[①]

这样看来，在数字化时代，我们确实没有多少属于我们自己专有的私密空间了。维克托·迈尔·舍恩伯格教授在他的著作《删除——大数据取舍之道》讲了一则故事。故事的主人公是斯塔西·施耐德（Stacy Snyder），她的梦想是成为一名教师。2006年夏天，这位25岁的单身母亲已经完成了她的学业，并且对她未来的事业充满了期待；但是很快，她的梦想破碎了。她心仪的学校明确地告诉她，她被取消了当一名教师的资格，理由是：她的行为与一名教师不相称。她究竟做了什么，让人觉得她不配当“人类灵魂的工程师”呢？原来，多年前，她曾将自己一张载着一顶海盗帽、举着塑料杯饮酒的照片放在了她My Space的个人主页上，并且取名为“喝醉的海盗”。她拍这张照片的本意是给朋友看的，只是图个好玩儿而已。但学校认为，该照片不符合教师的形象，容易误导学生受到不良的影响。于是，斯塔西向学校承诺将这张图片从网上删除，可为时已晚一一她的个人主页早已被搜索引擎编录，且照片已经被网络爬虫程序存档了。也就是说，互联网记住了斯塔西想要忘记的东西。因此，维克托·迈尔·舍恩伯格教授分析说：数字化记忆具有三个特征——可访问性、持久性、全面性，这便意味着在信息权力与时间的交汇处，永久的记忆创造了空间和时间圆形监狱的幽灵。完整的数字化记忆摧毁了历史，损害了我们的判断力和及时行动的能力，让我们无助地徘徊在两个同样让人不安的选择之间：是选择永久的过去，还是被忽视的现在。[②]

2013年4月，英国《卫报》发表了关于“我能删帖吗”的争论文章[③]，描述了欧洲围绕“被遗忘权”掀起的网络数据保护新运动。据说，有越来越多的网络用户要求博客服务商和网站删除内容，比如有损害的或过时的个人信息，以及让人难堪的照片。隐私权游说团体Big Brother Watch在2013年2月发布的一项调查称，68%的英国民众对自己在网络上的隐私安全感到担忧，其中又有22%的调查者表示“非常担忧”。《卫报》的读者调查表明，个人数据和隐私信息在互联网上可能通过多种方式被泄露：

- 难以注销社交媒体网站账户，难以确保网站上的所有数据被删除；
- 使用 Google 搜索自己的个人信息时，一些过时的、有失偏颇的或者不正确的搜索结果排在靠前位置；
- 缺乏控制其他用户发布含有自己信息图片的方法；
- 担忧网络跟踪软件会监控用户网络使用情况，并得到个人网络活动习惯的全貌。

[①]（美）艾伯特-拉斯洛 巴拉巴西：《爆发：大数据时代预见未来的新思维》，马慧译，中国人民大学出版社，2012 年版，第 253 页。
[②]（英）维克托 迈尔-舍恩伯格：《删除——大数据取舍之道》，袁杰译，浙江人民出版社，2013 年版，第 117 页。
[③]《卫报：我能删帖吗？》，中文译版见 http://international.caixin.com/2013-04-10/100511897.html，原文见 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/apr/04/right-forgotten-internet-campaign.

在2011年3月份的一篇博文中，谷歌公司的隐私权首席法律顾问Peter Fleischer分析说：欧洲所讨论的被遗忘权涵盖了三个不同的层面：第一个层面：“如果我在线发帖，我有权再次删帖吗？”。这项权利似乎没有太多争议，因为大多数社交网站已经允许网民这么做了；如微信、微博、博客，我们都可以自由删除自己发布的任何信息。第二个层面涉及的是数据删除权。比如我自己发布了一张搞怪的照片，但后来感觉不好便将它删除了，可这张照片已经被他人转贴了，我能否要求对方或者相关的网络平台删除这张照片呢？根据欧洲提出的被遗忘权，答案自然是肯定的。根据法律规定，当某人要求清除其个人数据时，互联网服务提供商“必须清除并且立即执行”。除非该数据的继续保留因为涉及到“表达自由”而显得是“必要的”。不过，该规定为数据清除创造了一个豁免义务，当“个人数据的处理仅用于新闻目的，或者仅出于文学艺术表达之需。”最后，Fleischer提出的请求删除的第三个层面是：“如果某人发布了关于我的帖子，我有权删除吗？”当然，这是表达自由最为关切的问题。美国最高法院判定，各州不得通过法律，限制媒体传播真实但令人尴尬的信息——比如强奸案受害者的姓名——只要该信息是合法取得。[①]

三、“被遗忘权”能保护什么？

互联网记录了一切却不会抹去任何内容。人们无法逃脱过去，这个曾经令罪犯头疼的问题，如今将困扰所有的公民。1998 年，美国联邦贸易委员会对 Geo Cities 提起诉讼，这是一家拥有 2 万多用户的网站，它为用户提供自己的网页、电子邮箱以及他们感兴趣的内容。联邦贸易委员会和该公司宣布了它们之间的和解协议。根据该协议，网站向用户许诺，如果没有得到用户的允许，它将不会对外散布用户在注册时提供的信息，其中包括年龄、受教育情况、职业、收入、个人兴趣等。联邦贸易委员会的主诉理由是，Geo Cities 误导消费者，未能告诉其注册用户，该公司将如何使用他们的个人信息。1999 年 5 月，联邦贸易委员会又迫使一家投资公司同意改变其所属网站的信息处理方式。该网站要求年轻人回答一系列经济问题，如每月津贴是多少、父母是否正在积蓄他们的大学教育费用等。这家公司曾许诺，所有来自用户的资料将保持匿名状态，但事实上未能做到这一点；相反，该公司还使用这些信息来辨认特定的个人。

1995 年，欧盟成员国通过了《欧洲数据保护规程》（*European Data Protection Directive*）这部隐私权法规，1998 年起正式执行。该《规程》要求所有成员国制定法律，对电子商业公司收集的所有个人信息的隐私权实施保护。不提供这类保护的公司不得在欧盟成员国内经营业务，而欧盟成员国几乎包括了所有欧洲国家。2012 年 1 月 25 日，欧盟委员会发布了《有关“1995 年个人数据保护指令”的立法建议》（简称《数据保护框架法规》草案），对 1995 年《数据保护指令》着手进行全面修订。与 1995 年的《数据保护指令》相比，该方案的一个主要的特点是增设了“被遗忘权”，旨在针对互联网上这种个人信息被无限滥用而且不可消除的现象而提。欧盟将“被遗忘权”定义为“当个人信息不再为正当目的所需，个人使其……被删除的权利。”[②]。学者将“被遗忘权”定义为“如果一个人不再想让他的个人信息被信息控制者加工或者存储，并且如果没有保持这些信息的合法基础，这些数据应该从他们的系统中被删除。”[③]因此，“被遗忘权”也被称为“删除的权利（The Right to Erasure）”，这一权利对于网络用户控制谁能获取他们的个人信息至关重要。根据这个规定，个人数据被广义地界

[①] Peter Fleischer, *The Right to Be Forgotten, or How to Edit Your History*, Privacy . . . ? (Jan. 29, 2012), http://peterfleischer.blogspot.com/2012/01/right-to-be-forgotten-or-how-to-edit.html.
[②] Eur. Comm’n, A Comprehensive Approach on Personal Data Protection in the European Union, at 8 , COM (2010) 609 final(Nov. 4 , 2010).
[③] Sanna Kulevska, The Future of Your Past: A Right to be Forgotten Online? June 24, 2013, Available at: http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherID=769.

定为“任何与一个信息主体有关的信息”。[①]信息主体提出要求后，网站操作者被要求“不加延迟地实施删除”，除非对数据的保存为践行欧盟成员国的法律规定的“言论自由”所必需。欧盟负责基本权利和公民权利的司法专员维维亚娜·雷丁（Viviane Reding）2012 年 1 月底宣称，欧盟委员会提议将创建一项全新的隐私权——“被遗忘权”。[②]

2012 年 1 月 22 日，当司法专员雷丁宣布这项全新的被遗忘权时，她注意到该项权利给青少年带来的特定风险，因为他们可能会披露一些日后会后悔的信息。于是，她阐明了“被遗忘权”的核心条款。如果个人不再希望自己的个人数据被数据控制商加工或储存，而且数据控制商没有继续占有该数据的合法理由，那么，此数据就应该从系统中清除。

简言之，“被遗忘权”就是允许当事人删除自己或他人放置在互联网上的、关于自己的、令人尴尬的照片或者数据信息。这一权利延伸至所有人的个人信息，而不仅仅是犯罪者的犯罪前科。这一权利被定义为“个人有权利使它们的个人信息……被删除，当已经没有保存它们的正当理由时。”[③]根据欧盟提案，在以下四种条件下，权利主体有权要求信息控制者删除与其有关的所有信息或停止此类信息的进一步传播：（1）此类信息已没有被收集或处理的必要；（2）权利主体通过声明或行动表示不再允许其信息为实现一个或多个具体目的被收集；或被收集的信息存储期已经过期，且法律上已没有处理该信息的必要性；（3）权利主体根据自身情况在任何时候都可以反对其个人信息的收集和处理，除非对于该信息的处理对维护信息主体的基本权利至关重要，或是为了维持公共利益的正常运作所必需的，或属于信息控制者既定的官方权利范围之内，或信息收集者对于该个人信息的处理有着超越保护个人信息自由的无可抗拒的立场；（4）对于权利主体个人信息的处理违反个人信息保护的改革方案（欧盟个人信息保护的改革方案）。[④]

“‘被遗忘权’已经被认为是一项法定权利，而且是一种值得受到法定保护的价值或利益。这一权利被归类为一种隐私主张，即使它被应用于至少在某种程度上公开的信息。它代表着‘信息的自我决定’和以控制为基础的隐私定义，并且试图将个人信息从公共领域转移到私人领域。”[⑤]这一权利暗示着个人对自己的个人信息的控制权利。“个人决定这些信息将会怎样，并且即使‘离开其掌控’，也保持着对它的控制。”[⑥]

维维安·雷丁说，这看似是无害的数据，但如果无法删除，也许它会在未来影响你的职业发展。她希望能够通过法律强制这些公司尊重用户的“可能被遗忘权”，允许用户随时要求更改或注销个人信息，同时企业需向隐私监管部门表明他们所收集的用户信息及用途。这项过去数年来在欧洲被激烈讨论的权利，最终被编入到新提议的数据保护管理法的一部分。尽管雷丁认为，这是基于现有的数据隐私权而适度衍生出的一项新权利，但它代表了未来十年互联网上言论自由的最大障碍。维维亚娜·雷丁发言说，网站应该能够让使用者更好地控制自己的数据，“我想解释得更明确些，就是人们应该享有他们想要在网站上处理其数据的意愿收回权利，而不仅仅是可能性。”

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① Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, *art. 4(2), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Proposed Data Protection Regulation]*, available. *at* http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com_2012_11_en.pdf.

② Viviane Reding, Vice President, Eur. Comm'n, The EU Data Protection Reform 2012: Making Europe the Standard Setter for Modern Data Protection Rules in the Digital Age 5 (Jan. 22, 2012), *available at* http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/26&format=PDF.

③ E.U. Personal Data Protection, at 8.

④ 转引自邵国松：《“被遗忘权”：个人信息保护的新问题及对策》，载《南京社会科学》，2013（2）。

⑤ Meg Leta Ambrose& Jef Ausloos.The Right to Be Forgotten Across the Pond.Journal of Information Policy3 (2013):1-23.

⑥ Jef Ausloos. The 'Right to be Forgotten'–Worth remembering? Computer Law & Security Review, 2012, 28(2): 143-152.

法国的数据保护监管者“国家信息和自由委员会”（CNIL）已加入其它欧洲机构的行列，支持欧洲的数据保护新运动。该委员会正处理着日益增加的从法国网站删除个人数据的诉求，大部分经过谈判都已经成功地被删除。CNIL 总裁 Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin 说：“我们受理了越来越多的有关‘被遗忘权’的投诉。2012 年总共有 6000 宗投诉，其中有超过 1000 宗或多或少地与‘被遗忘权’相关。在法国，这已经是个很大的问题了，此类投诉在一年间上升了 42%。”

四、“被遗忘权”面临的挑战

（一）当“被遗忘权”遭遇言论自由

在美国，里德学院在 2006 年开除了一名学生，原因是这名学生在他的博客上发表了诋毁学校的言论;加利福尼亚州科斯塔梅萨市一所中学的 20 名学生因为在 My Space 网上发表了反犹太人的言论被暂停学业；科罗拉多大学的运动员因为在 Face book 网粗鲁地评价他们的教练而被停赛；佛蒙特专科学校一名已经找到工作的毕业生因为在 Face book 网上透露了自己参加聚会和酗酒的经历而被雇主取消录用。[①]

如果孩子们担心他们的直率之言可能会损害他们未来的职业，那么，他们还会在学校报纸的网络版上坦率直言吗？如果我们担心我们想抗议的公司，在可预见的未来可能会拒绝跟我们做生意，我们还会抗议这些公司的贪婪或者对环境的破坏吗？在民主国家里，个人既是公民又是客户。他们从事经济交易，同时又热衷于公共议题。有时，他们可能会发现他们自己所反对的，正是他们的交易伙伴所支持的。[②]

2010 年末，哈维·库尔茨（Harvey Purtz）向施里尼·华森（Rajesh Srinivasan）提起了一个小额赔偿诉讼，理由是华森已经使他和妻子遭受到故意的精神伤害，因为对方拒绝从《加利福尼亚日报》（*Daily Californian*）的在线档案中移除关于其儿子的一篇文章。这篇四年多前的文章详细报道了克里斯·库尔茨（Chris Purtz）醉酒后在旧金山的脱衣舞俱乐部与员工冲突的事实。那次事件之后，克里斯·库尔茨就在 UC Berkeley 球队暂停比赛，并最终由于个人原因于 2007 年 2 月离开球队，2010 年去世。

克里斯·库尔茨死后一个月，其父哈维·库尔茨联系了《加利福尼亚日报》且要求从在线档案中删除关于他儿子死亡的那篇文章，华森以文章没有达到公司规定的撤销资格而拒绝从数据库中删除。哈维·库尔茨为此提起了 7500 美元的赔偿请求。但法院没有支持华森的主张，法官认为虽然他很同情库尔茨遭受的丧子之痛，但是，这并不能成为反对华森的请求基础。

透过这一案例，美国人似乎向世人表明，被遗忘权不等于有权抹杀整个历史。对于最新提议的被遗忘权，媒体的报道同样是要消除人们的顾虑，即表明它对言论自由的影响。对于美国人来说，“被遗忘权”除了与宪法《第一修正案》冲突外，也与美国传统的司法实践相冲突。一直以来，美国法律都主张已经公开的信息不能再回到私密状态。“被遗忘权”是否真的是一种“隐私”权？因为隐私涉及的是那些没有公开的信息。相反的，“被遗忘权”是通过不再允许第三个人获取这样的信息，将一定时期内的公共信息转向私人信息。[③]显然，在隐私与言论自由适度平衡的理念上，欧美之间必将存在严重分歧。欧洲推出的法律规定所

[①] 参见（美）安德鲁·基恩：《网民的狂欢：关于互联网弊端的反思》，丁德良译，南海出版公司，2010 年版，第 176 页。
[②]（英）维克托·迈尔-舍恩伯格：《删除——大数据取舍之道》，袁杰译，浙江人民出版社，2013 年版，第 140 页。
[③] Rolf H. Weber. The right to be forgotten: more than a Pandora's box? Journal of intellectual property, information technology and e-commerce law, 2011, 2: 120-130.

强调的则是：他人发布的真实信息，与本人发布图片后由他人复制的信息，其删除请求是一致的，两者均包含于个人数据的界定之中，即“任何与我相关的信息”，无论其来源，我均可以提出删除要求。至于举证责任，则由第三方承担，第三方必须证明该信息是出于新闻工作、文学艺术实践的目的。这就可能将 Google 公司变成欧盟的信息首席审查员，而不是一个中立的平台。因为这是 Google 公司并不情愿扮演的一个角色，相反，当一个欧洲用户输入某人姓名，而此人恰好反对令他不快的博客或状态更新，那么其搜索结果可能是空白页。在欧洲，被遗忘权可在法国的法律中找到其知识渊源。乔治华盛顿大学法学教授、《新共和》杂志《法律事务》栏目编辑杰弗里·森（Jeffrey Rosen）指出，法国的法律认可遗忘权（“right of oblivion”）——这项权利允许那些已经服刑和经过改造的判决犯有权反对出版关于自己判刑和监禁的有关事实。与之不同，在美国，出版某人的犯罪史则受到宪法第一修正案的保护。两个德国人曾因为谋杀一位著名演员而锒铛入狱，他们试图从该演员的维基百科词条中抹除自己的犯罪史，而他们的努力遭到了维基百科的抵制。[①]有学者明确指出：“欧洲人相信政府，不相信市场；而美国人的态度恰巧与此相反。”[②]“因此，通过政府行为保护公共形象的欧式传统若被移植到美国，将会遭遇《第一修正案》的强烈阻碍。”[③]

阿根廷歌手弗吉尼亚·达昆哈（Virginia Da Cunha）的案件表明，相关诉讼正威胁言论自由。这位阿根廷流行歌星年轻时曾拍摄了一些不雅照片，她为此起诉了 Google 和 Yahoo 公司，要求将这些照片删除，起诉的理由是两家公司违反了阿根廷版的“被遗忘权”。Google 在回复中表示，从技术上说，Google 无法服从法律上强制删除图片的宽泛要求。Yahoo 则声称，服从法律判决的唯一路径是封锁 Yahoo 搜索引擎上指向弗吉尼亚·达昆哈的所有网站。然而，一位阿根廷法官则支持弗吉尼亚 1 达昆哈，判决 Google 和 Yahoo 支付罚款，并责令两家公司清除所有包含她姓名的含有性爱内容的图片。这一判决在上诉后被推翻，理由是，仅当 Google 和 Yahoo 公司知道相关信息是诽谤内容，且因为工作疏忽未能删除时，方可承担责任。不过在阿根廷，有至少 130 多起类似的法律案件至今悬而未决，大多数是由演员和模特们提出的要求删除图片和用户生产内容的诉讼。就算起诉者的诉求不能得到满足，大量的诉讼案例，都足以引发互联网公司严格的自我审查。

杰弗里·罗森指出，这些规定其实并不局限于人们“已经泄漏自己”的个人数据。相反，这些法律规定创造出了删除个人数据的一项全新权利，从广义上可界定为“与数据主题相关的任何信息”。“被遗忘权”如被严格执行，将影响到 Face book 和 Google 公司多达 2%的全球收入，而且很可能影响到互联网的开放性。[④]

不过，在网站 Atlantic.com 上，有一篇标题为《新闻记者为何不该担心欧洲的“被遗忘权”》的帖子，作者约翰·亨德尔写道：雷丁对数据进行了狭义上的界定，“对于可能暴露自己的个人数据”，人们有权要求清除。亨德尔认为，这项条款至关重要。法律修订组认为，互联网用户有权控制他们发布在网络上的数据，但绝非是媒体和其它方面引用的数据。[⑤]

事实上，欧盟提出了一系列的改革方案，比如提出信息控制者在如下情况下可拒绝承担删除个人信息的责任：（1）对个人信息的处理纯粹为了言论自由，比如新闻报道或文学艺术

[①] Jeffrey Rosen,The Right to Be Forgotten,64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 88，February 13, 2012.
[②] Franz Werro.The right to inform v. the right to be forgotten: A transatlantic clash. The Right tobe Forgotten: A Transatlantic Clash (May 8, 2009). LIABILITY IN THE THIRD MILLENNIUM, Aurelia Colombi Ciacchi, Christine Godt, Peter Rott, Leslie Jane Smith, eds., Baden-Baden, FRG, 2009.
[③] Robert Kirk Walker.The Right to Be Forgotten. Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 64:101. 2012:257-286.
[④] Nick Clayton,E.U. Security Agency Warns on ‘Right to be Forgotten’, The wall Street Journal, November 21, 2012.
[⑤] John Hendel, *Why Journalists Shouldn’t Fear Europe’s ‘Right to Be Forgotten,’* Atlantic (Jan. 25, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/01/why-journalists-shouldnt-fear-europes-right-to-be-forgotten/251955/.

的表达；（2）对个人信息的处理在保证信息主体之基本权利的同时涉及以下与健康安全有关的情况：严格保密的情况下个人信息为医学专家或其他人员为了研究药物、医学诊断、医疗服务的供给和管理所用；个人信息在公共健康领域符合公众利益，比如防止严重的传染性疾病、维护医疗产品、医疗器械的品质和安全等；个人信息符合其它公共利益，比如有利于确立医疗保险系统的医疗津贴或是有利于提高医疗保险服务的质量和经济效率；（3）对于个人信息的处理为历史性、数据性、科学性研究所必须；（4）对于个人信息的处理，信息掌控者不具有发言权，欧盟等其它法律另有规定。[①]

（二）当“被遗忘权”遭遇国家安全

2001 年 9 月 24 日，布什政府向国会提交了《爱国者法案》[②]，该法案要求限制公众获取政府信息的广度，并提高政府控制、检查公民个人信息的程度。这些个人信息，很多都属于隐私的范围。例如，根据这个法案，警察和情报机关不需要法院的核准，就有权窃听公民的电话，检查公民的电子邮件和医疗、财务甚至在图书馆的借阅记录等等一切信息记录。美国公民自由联盟（ACLU）批评这是向麦卡锡主义的回归，是以“反恐”的名义粗暴侵犯公民的隐私和自由。《爱国者法案》长达 342 页，赋予执法和情报机构广泛权力，以防止、调查和打击恐怖主义。没有经过听证会，没有任何会议讨论和斟酌，就交予表决。法案以压倒性优势通过，众议院 357 票赞成 66 票反对，参议院仅 1 票反对。众议长哈斯特德(John Hastert)解释说，为打击恐怖主义，确保国家的安全，全体美国人都应该考虑牺牲一部分个人自由。次年 11 月，国会正式通过了《2002 国土安全法》(Homeland Security Act of 2002)，批准联邦政府在国土安全办公室的基础上成立一个新的内阁部门：国土安全部(DHS)。不过，美国人对这样的侵犯个人隐私的法案，还是心存疑虑的，毕竟美国社会对于个人权利还是十分看重的。据报道，美国联邦法官 2006 年 9 月 26 日做出裁决，美国《爱国者法案》两项条款违宪，因为它们允许当局在没有确切理由的前提下就发布搜查令。美国俄勒冈州联邦地区法院法官安·艾肯裁决认为，《爱国者法案》有关条款允许政府机构毫无根据就对美国公民进行监视和搜查，这样的做法违背了美国宪法第四修正案的精神。

虽然媒体揭露了自 2004 年始，时任美国总统小布什等政府核心层通过一些司法程序手段，成功绕开了有关公民隐私的法律困境，在美国设立了四大监控计划，棱镜计划只是其一。[③]但对于斯诺登“究竟是捍卫了公民的隐私权利，还是损害了美国的反恐制度”这样的问题，美国人的态度仍然存在较大差异。2013 年 6 月 12 日至 16 日，由美国皮尤研究中心(Pew Research Center)和《今日美国》联合完成的调查显示：44%的公众认为披露此类国家安全局的监听信息损害了国家利益，49%的公众认为这是为国家利益服务的。对于斯诺登的赞同与反对，民意基本不相上下。而在这两股不同的声音背后，折射出的是一个让美国人民真正需要面对的尴尬议题，那就是在长期坚守的公民自由与日趋严重的国家安全问题之间，到底应该选择谁？哈佛大学肯尼迪政治学院研究生马瑞欧(Sergio Marrero)认为：“美国人一直以自由为信仰，但它的前提是不能与任何威胁生命的事情相冲突。如果是为了维护国家的自由和

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① Proposed Data Protection Regulation，at art．17(3)。转引自邵国松：《“被遗忘权”：个人信息保护的新问题及对策？》，载《南京社会科学》，2013（2）。

② 美国爱国者法案（USA PATRIOT Act），是 2001 年 10 月 26 日由美国总统乔治·布什签署颁布的国会法案（Act of Congress）。其正式名称为“Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001”，中文意义为“使用适当之手段来阻止或避免恐怖主义以团结并强化美国的法律”，取英文原名的首字缩写成为“USA PATRIOT Act”，而“patrit”也是英语中“爱国者”之意。

③ 据《华盛顿邮报》2013 年 6 月 16 日爆料称，斯诺登所曝光的“棱镜”项目，缘起于一个此前从未公开过的“星风”（STELLARWIND）监视计划。“星风”监视计划分拆成了由美国国家安全局（NSA）执行的 4 个监视项目，除“棱镜”外，还包括“主干道”（MAINWAY）、“码头”（MARINA）和“核子”（NUCLEON），这些都只是项目的代号，具体名称及含义仍属美国国家机密。

主权，这样的监听是可以接受的，但它必须发生在很多人的生命安全都处在危险之中的时候。”[①]

对此，美国新闻记者西蒙·加芬克尔批评说：“监控就是监控，不管是通过人还是通过计算机来监控，多少都要侵犯个人的隐私和自由。数据库一旦建立，就应该严格保护，否则很容易被滥用”。[②]

（三）模糊与过宽？

欧洲提出的“被遗忘权”的相关条款尚未进一步细化，这看起来是有意为之，因为雷丁表明，她希望这一规定模糊一些，以便适用于未来的新科技。“这一规定代表着未来的三十年——它要清楚但不是足够的准确，如此一来，监管时可以机动适应市场与公众舆论的改变。”但任何法律文本，一旦不精确——无论是模糊或过宽，都会带来操作实施上的困难。比如说，对于“被遗忘权”所涉及到的个人数据的滥用或者个人隐私权的侵犯，法律应该要追究的是数据的收集者么？对于Google、Face book、阿里巴巴这样的公司，或者像学校、医院、银行这样的社会组织，以及诸如国家安全部门、司法机构等等的国家权力机构，它们都拥有大量的公民个人数据，一旦涉及到隐私信息的泄漏，它们应该承担怎样的责任？

“被遗忘权”必须承认，大数据的威力（以及隐私风险）主要来自于元数据，即有关数据在哪里、何时以及是由谁创建的信息。在反恐工作中，元数据经常让我们获得关键的第一个线索，以便进行更深入的调查。在商业领域，元数据让巨大的数据库可添加索引、可检索、可连接、有用而且有价值。与很多互联网企业一样，谷歌的隐私政策强调为客户内容提供保护，但将元数据视为其可以永久保留和控制的业务记录。对此，查德·福肯瑞斯指出，有意义的“被遗忘权”应当规定，企业不仅要清除电邮内容或照片，而且还要清除与这位用户相关的所有元数据。[③]

不过另有学者指出，在大数据时代，因为数据的价值很大一部分体现在二级用途上，而收集数据时并未作这种考虑，所以“告知与许可”就不能再起到好的作用了。在大数据时代，我们需要设立一个不一样的隐私保护模式，这个模式应该更强调数据使用者为其行为承担责任，而不是将重心放在收集数据之初取得的个人同意上。这样一来，使用数据的公司就需要基于其将对个人所造成的影响，对涉及个人数据再利用的行为进行正规评测。[④]

应该说，互联网公司在尊重用户隐私上还是下了些功夫的，但每个理性的人都明白，任何东西一旦放上网络，很容易会被复制并且广泛传播。中国有一句古话，说出口的话就等于泼出去的水，伤害一旦产生，就很难修复了。陈冠希裸照事件（Edison Chen photo scandal）之后大起 XX 门事件，都表明删除原文件根本无法阻止人们从别处找到复制品。中国为此产生了大量的删贴公司，虽然有一时之效，但纸终究是包不住火的。

五、总结

在大数据时代，谁拥有数据，谁就拥有权力，谁也就可能为这世界的主宰者。数据挖掘技术的发展，让任何数据都有被暴露的风险。因此，对个人隐私信息的保护在这个时代尤显紧迫。“被遗忘权”正是基于这样的思考而产生的。它虽尚不完善，但至少提醒人们，互联

[①] 杨静竹：《近半受调查美国民众认为斯诺登为国家利益服务》，载《第一财经日报》，2013-06-19。
[②] Simson Garfinkel and Michael D. Smith, Data Surveillance: Guest Editors' Introduction , IEEE Security and Privacy Volume 4, Number 6. November/December 2006.
[③] 理查德·福肯瑞斯：《谷歌不应侵犯网民的“被遗忘权”》，http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001043258/ce。
[④]（英）维克托·迈尔-舍恩伯格、肯尼思·库克耶：《大数据时代》，盛杨燕、周涛译，浙江人民出版社，2013 年版，第 220 页。

网时代是一个难以遗忘的时代：我们每个人有意或无意间透露的个人信息，都将永远存在于云端，这与纸墨时代存在着根本差异。胡适的日记和他与情人间的书信，只有他们有意留下来的，我们才有机会看到；我们甚至不知道美国总统杰斐逊的真正长相。但在互联网时代，孩子们从出生到成人，几乎一点一滴的变化都被记录了下来。我们在街头的任何行为，都可能被各种“天网”采集到。所以，在这个时代，我们几乎没有真正的隐私可言，这是人类为自己打造的数据“圆形监狱”。更可怕的是，数据挖掘技术可以将关于某人的每一条信息都整合起来。这种强大的人肉探索功能，更让你无处藏身，让那些令人们伤痛悲哀的信息和有关人们爱恨情仇的信息，也一直存在于云端。除非你远离数据，切断与外界的联系，否则你终归无法逃避。所以，“被遗忘权”是有价值的。至少，它可以让那些未成年人、那些曾经犯过错误的人、那些被伤害过的人，有一个后悔、重新有尊严地做人和遗忘的机会。

对个人自主性的保障，已经成为当今社会的主流思想，因为唯有如此方能真正保障个人自身所认为的美好生活。隐私权正是在这样的理念下逐渐发展并受到社会广泛认同的。个人不受他人的干扰，可以决定谁拥有权利获知某些私人信息，这是每个人自主权得到尊重的基本理念。不过，过于扩大“被遗忘权”的边界也是不适当的。因为对于被认为是理性的成年人来说，这样的权利保护，似乎反而鼓励了他们对自己发布到网上的信息缺少责任。笔者非常同意下面的观点：“一旦这些事实进入公共领域，它们就将保存在那里……原告不能像蜗牛那样把自己缩在壳里。”这一观点，源于美国的一起诉讼。1975 年，约瑟夫•卡林格（Joseph Kallinger）和他的儿子因谋杀、抢劫、强奸等罪行被警方逮捕。1983 年，纽约城市大学的刑法教授出版了一本书，主要讲述卡林格的人生和罪行。卡林格的一位受害者提起诉讼。他说，在公共印刷媒介上重演往日悲剧给他造成了伤害和困扰，这种行为极具冒犯性。法院同意原告的这种评价，但法院同时判决，因为作者在书中披露的是公共事实，而非隐私性事实，所以原告败诉。“即使它们是隐私性事实，它们也符合公众的合法关注。”[①]

维克托号召大家发起一场“互联网遗忘”运动，并给出了六大应对数字化记忆与信息安全的对策：数字化节制、保护信息隐私权、建设数字隐私权基础设施、调整人类的现有认知、打造良性的信息生态、完全语境化。此外，维克托还建议给信息设定一个存储期限，他写道：“存储期限并不是强制性的遗忘，不是让我们被迫去选择，而是通过存储期限让我们能对信息的寿命做出应对。”[②]其实，有时技术确实可以部分化解道德与法律的难题。据媒体报道：美国人常用的图片分享社交手机应用Snapchat和Instagram、Digisocial，都有一个相似的功能：当用户收到信息后，图片会在十秒甚至更短的时间内被删除。这种信息“阅后即焚”的功能，让发送者的压力减小了很多；因为人们有时会发布一些故意恶搞的图片或者偷拍的视频，不过是图极少数的人一乐而已，并不想对当事人造成伤害。这一技术的发明者斯皮格尔和鲍比•墨菲介绍说，Snapchat的灵感来源于他们使用社交网络时的一些体验：本是好友之间的私人照片，但是在社交网络中稍有不慎就会被广泛传播，甚至被搜索引擎永久收录，无法删除。另据《南方周末》2013年4月14日报道，德国的研究团队开发了一项叫做“X-pire”的软件，专门为生成的图片添加失效日期。2012年Wickr发布，该应用旨在向所有人提供不留下任何痕迹的交流方式——包括可以自我删除的文本信息、视频、音频文件和PDF。这些技术，或许可部门的解除“被遗忘权”之困吧！

[①] *Romaine v. Kallinger*, 537 A. 2d 284 (1988).
[②]（英）维克托•迈尔-舍恩伯格：《删除——大数据取舍之道》，袁杰译，浙江人民出版社，2013 年版，第 202 页。

封面主题：中国与国际伦理前沿的对话

当前中国新闻职业道德状况的调研与思考

Current Situation of Journalistic Ethics in Mainland China: Survey and Discussion

张洪超[①]

中文摘要：中国记协和中国政法大学在中国大陆组织了一次新闻行业自律情况问卷调查，本文介绍了被调查者基本情况，被调查者对《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》的了解和态度，认为常见的违反新闻伦理的行为分别是哪些，以及对接受各种利益的态度，和对影响新闻工作者职业道德水平的综合因素的评价。

关键词：新闻职业道德, 记者, 新闻行业

Abstract: Chinese Journalists' Association has surveyed among mainland Chinese journalists on journalistic ethics in 2012. This paper introduces the demographics of the survey participants, their knowledge and attitudes towards *Profession Moral Standards of Chinese Journalists*, their attitudes to accepting various interest offers, what do they consider as the most common behaviors that break the professional morals, and the overall evaluation to the factors that influence the professional moral standards of Chinese journalism.

Key Words: journalist, professional moral standards, news profession

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中国社会对媒体记者的从业行为和职业道德非常关注，有关心评论，也有批评指责。特别是针对最近的马来西亚航空航班失联事件，一些人批评中国媒体在报道中出现了违反新闻伦理的情况，并推荐西方记者的处理办法。面对此类问题，关键是研究导致问题的原因，特别是深层次原因，找出妥善解决的办法。这就需要我们对新闻伦理问题进行深入的而不是一般性、肤浅地研究，对当前中国的新闻职业道德状况有一个清晰、准确地了解。

一、当前我国新闻伦理认识和实践的基本状况

2012 年，中国记协和中国政法大学在中国大陆组织了一次新闻行业自律情况问卷调查，按照各类媒体分布情况选取 108 家媒体，这是近 30 年来我国最大规模的与新闻职业道德有关的问卷调查。整个问卷包括 60 个问题，这里简要介绍几个主要问题：

第一个问题，被调查者基本情况。在这次调查中，女性新闻从业人员占 54.08%，略多于男性的 45.92%。在年龄上，34 岁以下的从业人员占 68.03%。按从事新闻工作年限看，工作 9 年以下的占 65.87%。这就是说，年龄在 34 岁以下、从事新闻工作 9 年以下的新闻从业人员已经成为主体。

这些新闻从业人员有新闻理想追求，对新闻业的满意度和忠诚度较高。他们选择新闻业的原因主要是“追求理想”占 58.24%、“兴趣好奇”占 47.86%、想“体验多样生活”占 46.57%，考虑社会地位、收入高的极少。从对新闻业的满意度看，选择“很好”、“较好”、“一般”的达到 89.45%，71.85%的从业人员没有离开新闻业的想法。

第二个问题，被调查者的教育背景。从教育程度看，被调查者有大学本科、硕士、博士学历的分别占 63.05%、32.43%、1.06%，合计 96.54%。被调查者从事新闻业前的身份是学生的占 69.74%，其他行业的从业人占 30.26%。就是说，从高校毕业进入媒体的应届毕业生依然是新闻从业人员的主要来源。

从被调查者的专业背景看，新闻传播学占 47.68%，文史法类、理工类等占 52.32%，没有接受过新闻院校教育的从业人员占多数，这改变了过去新闻从业人员中新闻传播学背景占多数的印象。对这项调查结果，我们通过其他调查同样可以得到印证。这就意味着，现在大部分从业人员在走向记者岗位前，没有接受过系统的新闻教育。

新闻伦理教育在新闻院校主要分为新闻伦理课程和传播法规课程，而被调查者中学过这两门课程的比例并不高，28.91%修过这两门课程，修过新闻伦理课的占 15.54%，修过传播法规的 4.46%。从学科背景看，即便是新闻专业毕业生，同时修过这两门课的只有 51.51%；文史法类专业毕业生同时修过的在本专业占 7.31%；理工类背景及其它专业毕业生，全修过的在本专业占 7.12%。

第三个问题，被调查者对《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》的了解和评价。《准则》是中国记协 2009 年修订并公布实施的，公布 3 年以后，被调查者中“知道修订了，但不清楚具体内容”的占 40.41%，“不知道，没关注”的人数占 32.85%，而“了解具体条款”的只有 26.71%，比例很低。

被调查者所在的媒体中 54.94%组织过专门学习，没有组织学习但是把《准则》印发给员工的 16.97%，鼓励员工自学的 11.99%。在了解《准则》内容的被调查者中，83.34%认为“很好和较好”，评价很高。

第四个问题，对违反新闻伦理行为的看法。按照出现频率高低排序，被调查者认为常见的违反新闻伦理的行为分别是：煽情新闻、报道不全面、虚假广告、语言不规范、有偿新

闻、过度介入报道、隐性采访、匿名消息源、业内恶性竞争、虚假新闻。与这种观点不同，我们认为虚假新闻是新闻界表现最突出、最持久、危害最大的问题。

第五个问题，被调查者对接受各种利益的态度。在“接受被采访单位的现金馈赠”方面，明确反对的比例最高，占 73.3%，持无所谓态度的占 24.28%，也有 2.41%的人认为可以接受。

在“接受新闻来源单位安排的免费旅游”方面，明确反对的占 62.82%，无所谓的占 34.37%，认为可以接受的占 2.82%。

在“主动淡化不利于重要广告客户的新闻”方面，明确反对的 69.27%，20.70%的人认为无所谓，表示赞成的 10.03%。

对“在企业兼职”方面，73.19%的人明确反对。反对“在政府部门兼职”的达到 66.75%。57.36%的调查者明确反对记者“参与为企业制作商业广告”这种行为。这些数据说明大部分被调查者对各种利益冲突有清醒认识。

被调查者认为最频繁出现的 3 种现象是“接受被采访单位或个人的招待用餐”、“接受新闻来源单位赠送的礼品”、“为自己的单位联系广告业务”。关于接受被采访单位的现金馈赠的现象，认为“完全没有”、“偶尔发生”、“一般”的分别为 20.94%、32.26%、26.39%，20.51%的被调查者认为“比较频繁”或“非常频繁”。

第六个问题，影响新闻工作者职业道德水平的综合因素。从影响主体来看，被调查者认为对新闻行业的整体职业道德水平影响最大的五个主体分别是：媒体自身、新闻管理部门、媒体从业者、社会监督、行业协会，最主要的是媒体自身。这说明媒体如果有严格的伦理要求，新闻从业者就趋向于去执行。

从工作环境来看，被调查者认为导致一些从业者缺乏职业道德的原因主要是“业内、社会大环境或潜规则的影响”，其他原因依次是“从业人员收入低、工作压力大”、“媒体过分追求收视率和发行量”、“从业人员素质不高”。

如何保障新闻伦理的实现？被调查者认为最重要的是“个人的良知”，其次是“新闻管理部门出台的规范性文件”、“与信息传播相关的法律规定”、“单位文件规定”、“行业自律规范”。以前新闻界有人提出过高薪养廉，认为高收入可以保障新闻伦理的实现。但是通过调查发现，新闻从业者的工资收入与是否“接受现金馈赠”等基本没有关系，没有任何数据能够看出收入高与职业道德水平高有必然联系。有必然联系的是有没有接受过新闻职业道德课、传播法规课教育，系统学习过两门课程的学生对新闻伦理有更准确的认识。

二、影响新闻伦理认识和实践的深层次问题

影响新闻伦理的问题很多，其中深层次问题往往导致各种表面问题出现，所以我们要更多关注深层次问题，这里用“历史”、“现实”、“未来”三个关键词进行说明。

先说“历史”。这两年关于老人摔倒在地，却没有人上前扶一把的报道很多，大家都很痛心。有人说，这些现象与前些年南京法院彭宇案的判决有关。从历史来看，1982 年，第四军医大学一名大三学生张华为救助落入化粪池的老农民牺牲生命。当时有的媒体报道是赞扬的，有的认为“不值得”，大学生不该救助老农民的论调出现了。再往历史看，国学大师钱穆提出：“西方社会有阶级，无流品。中国社会有流品，无阶级”。从元朝开始，到明朝初期确定了一种价值观念，不同行业和职业之间有好坏高下的差别，这个观念一直影响着中国

人。现在媒体解决这些问题，一定要考虑问题背后的历史渊源，不能简单指责个别人、个别现象。

再说“现实”。对中国社会的现实状况，每个人都有看法。社会学有一个理论叫做“社会失范论”，当一个社会处于发展快、动荡大的时期，原有的社会规范对社会成员的约束力就会下降，但新的规范没有完全建立，这个时候容易出现乱像。越是这样，人们越焦虑，越渴望幸福。什么影响人们的幸福感？媒体影响最大。哈佛大学原来最受欢迎的公选课是经济学，现在是幸福心理学，主讲教授综合大量心理学研究提出，媒体是影响人们幸福感的首要因素，因为媒体大量报道各种负面新闻，对积极美好的事物报道较少，由此把人们变成了消极主义者。的确，新闻界不少人认为反常新闻更有价值，认为通过舆论监督可以解决各种现实问题、推动社会发展。其实，甘肃《读者》杂志每月发行量近千万册，微信里心灵鸡汤式的励志文章大受欢迎，说明积极传播正能量的信息是人们需要的。

再说“未来”。对传统媒体来说，关系未来的最大变量是互联网。我们讲媒体融合，最重要的是在理论上、思路上与互联网思维对接。比如记者的定位，很多人喜欢说是“无冕之王”。这个词语最早出现在 19 世纪英国，当时泰晤士报被称为英国上流社会的舆论权威，主笔辞职后常被内阁吸收为阁员，地位很高。人们称这些主笔是无冕之王。其实这一称谓并不符合中国国情，特别是近些年，随着互联网技术的广泛应用，每个人都可以发布传播新闻，有的网友做的还很专业，“无冕之王”这个词就更说不通了。再比如大学开设新闻采访课，老师讲要注意向权威的政府主管部门核实。以前政府的工作思路是发现一件事情，查清楚以后再向媒体通报。现在网络时代，政府思路是边调查边通报、同步推进，这是很大进步，但由此也可能出现“通报——发现失误——跟进纠正”的现象，这次马航航班失联事件中的马来西亚政府就是典型例子。在这种情况下，媒体如何防止做简单的传声筒，及时纠正失误、最大限度保证新闻真实，已经成为需要研究的新课题。

对新闻事业发展来说，“历史”、“现实”、“未来”中有大量问题需要梳理归纳，进而形成理论来指导事业发展，这项工作需要新闻媒体、新闻院校和研究机构共同来做。这项工作目前有两个问题需要解决，**一是**理论研究与新闻实践联系不够。比如 2004 年印发的《关于新闻采编人员从业管理的规定》，首次规定“新闻报道在新闻媒体刊发时要实行实名制”。当时有专家认为这会伤害从事舆论监督的记者，不利于媒体公信力打造。其实，起草者关注的是一些记者用笔名或化名抄袭的现象。如果当时能联系沟通多一些，专家进行点评的针对性就能更强。**二是**研究成果影响新闻实践的渠道不畅通。这几年我国多次发生自然灾害，很多专家写文章呼吁媒体采访不要刺激灾后群众，不要刊登血腥画面。这些文章大多刊登在学术刊物，看到的人有限。以后能不能发布在影响力更大的平台，更能引起新闻媒体乃至社会各界的关注和回应，都值得考虑。

附录：

新闻行业自律的体制与机制研究的问卷调查
内容节选

1．您的性别是（单选题）
男：45.92%。　　女：54.08%。
2．您的年龄是（单选题）
20-24：7.62%。　　25-29：33.43%。
30-34：26.98%。　　35-39：14.72%。
40-44：9.03%。　　45-49：4.63%。
50 岁以上：3.58%。
3．您正在攻读或已经获得的最高学历是（单选题）
大专及大专以下：3.46%。　大学本科：　63.05%。
硕士研究生：32.43%。　　博士研究生：1.06%。
4．您的专业是（单选题）
新闻学或传播学（包括广播电视学等）：47.68%。
文史法类（不含新闻学和传播学）：32.9%。
理工类：8.39%。　　其它：11.03%。
5．您从事新闻业前的身份是（单选题）
学生：69.74%。　　从业人：30.26%。
6．您选择新闻业的原因是（多选题）
追求理想：58.24%。　　兴趣好奇：47.86%。
收入高：3.11%。　　社会地位高：10.62%。
体验多样生活：46.57%。　结交朋友好办事：5.22%。
其它：7.39%。
7．您对所从事的新闻业的满意度为（单选题）
很好：10.85%。　　较好：38.89%。
一般：39.71%。　　较差：6.16%。
很差：3.17%。　　说不清：1.23%。
8．您有无离开新闻业的打算（单选题）
有：28.15%。　　没有：71.85%。
9．您从事新闻工作的时间（单选题）
1 年以下：8.8%。　　1-2 年：13.67%。
3-5 年：21.76%。　　6-9 年：21.64%。
10-15 年：21.17%。　　16-19 年：5.75%。
20 年以上：123，7.21%。
10．2009 年 11 月 9 日，中华全国新闻工作者协会第三次修订了《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》，您是否了解？（单选题）
了解具体条款：26.71%。
仅知道修订了，但不清楚新版的内容：40.41%。
不知道，没关注：32.85%。
11．您所在的媒体，是否组织学习过新版《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》？（单选题）

组织了专门的学习活动：54.94%。
没有组织专门的学习活动，但是把新版的《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》印发给员工：16.97%。
只告知员工有新修订版《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》，鼓励员工自学：11.99%。
单位对此没有任何活动和要求：4.11%。
不清楚单位有无活动和要求：11.99%。
12．您对《中国新闻工作者职业道德准则》内容的评价（单选题）
很好：35.09%。　　较好：48.25%。
一般：11.4%。　　需小改进：0.88%。
需大改进：1.97%。　　说不清：2.41%。
13．您如果是新闻院校毕业的学生，在校期间是否修过新闻职业道德（伦理）与传播法规课程？（单选题）
都没修过：7.21%。
修过职业道德（伦理）课，没修过传播法规课：15.54%。
没修过职业道德（伦理）课，修过传播法规课：4.46%。
都修过：28.91%。
非新闻院校毕业生：43.87%。
14．您认为，新闻道德（伦理）课程的教学对新闻行业自律产生的作用（单选题）
作用非常明显，很大程度上促进了新闻行业自律水平的提高：12.14%。
作用较大，在较大程度上促进了新闻行业自律水平的提高：27.21%。
作用一般，在一定程度上促进了新闻行业自律水平的提高：41.52%。
几乎没有作用，对新闻行业自律水平没有什么影响：　14.78%。
其它：4.34%。

全球传播论坛

构建有竞争力的地方认同：在全球声誉竞争中增强软实力
——介绍 Anholt-GfK 国家品牌指数调查[①]

Build Competitive Place Identity:
Strengthen Soft Power in a Global Reputation Race with Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index

赵小岩[②] 马克·基达[③]

冯若谷[④] 盛夏[⑤]译 郭镇之[⑥]校译

[①] 本文是在 2013 年 12 月 4 日全球网络会议演讲的基础上整理的文稿。Anholt-GfK 国家品牌指数是由 GfK 集团和独立的政府顾问 Simon Anholt 先生合作提供的国家声誉评测服务。

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对于国家品牌指数（Nation Brands Index，NBI）测量，有些人可能还比较陌生。因此，在分享 2013 年调查报告的一些重要发现之前，我们想首先简单介绍一下这个研究和咨询平台的内容。其次，我们将带领大家纵览国家声誉调查的宏观全景和发展趋势，以此证明，整合形象是特别重要的。然后，我们将介绍一些特别的案例，讨论后发国家如何利用资源提升国家声誉、策划大型活动能在何种程度上影响国家声誉、成熟的国家品牌如何加强与受众的联系，以及创新对品牌好感的带动作用——与其它驱动因素相比，现在创新起到的作用越来越显著。最后，我们将回到那些连接受众的必备要素和对某些关键的认识上来。

越来越多的国家已经从以猜测作为策划的基础，逐步发展到以证据作为策划基础的阶段；而证据恰恰是 Anholt-GfK 国家品牌指数所聚焦的内容。国家品牌指数是我们为帮助客户衡量国家认知而提供的一套**全面、平衡和连贯**的系统，以便客户有章可循，形成在证据基础上的规划。要做到**全面**，需要关注产生国家形象的所有领域——输出（科学/技术、创新、产品和善意）、国内和国际治理、文化（包含历史遗产和当代成果，如体育、人物、旅游胜地及经验），最后，还有人才、商业和投资机会。我们的研究基于著名的国家品牌六边形理论，这是由我们的合作伙伴 Simon Anholt 先生在十多年前提出的。大部分国家依靠这六种活动渠道联系外部世界。在国家声誉测量问卷中，我们针对六边形的每一个三角区域都提出了三到五个问题，相应地建立了六种度量标准，最后产生了一个全面衡量各个领域的总体工具，我们称之为 NBI（国家品牌指数）系统。对于每一个领域，我们还有描述式的词汇联想，有助于剖析国家声誉的整体轮廓。总之，通过对单个国家和群体进行的调查，依靠维度指标测量的坚实基础，我们最终以视觉化的六边形（见图 1）显示了国家在世界舞台上声誉发展变化轨迹。

图 1：国家品牌六边形

那么，我们调查谁呢？这项研究每年调查 20000 多个有全球联系的公民——在 20 个被调查国家中分别对 1000 网民进行访问。这 20 个国家（见图 2）是主要的发达国家和发展中国家，代表不同的信仰、文化和价值观。具体来说，是西欧与北美的七个国家，即美国、加拿大、英国、德国、法国、意大利和瑞典；中欧的三个国家，为俄罗斯、波兰和土耳其；亚太地区有五个国家，即日本、中国、印度、韩国和澳大利亚；拉丁美洲有三个国家，是阿根廷、巴西和墨西哥；中东与非洲有两个国家，为埃及与南非。它们广泛地发出声音，对全球成员形成最大的影响力。令人高兴的是，来自新兴市场的声音在数量上占据优势——这 20 个国家里有 11 个为后发国家。这样选择调查对象的理由在于：正如许多全球经济指标显示的那样，新兴市场国家的总和已经超过了全球总数的一半。

图 2 进行调查的国家（20 个）

下面是我们对其进行形象测量的 50 个国家（见图 3）。我们的调查基本上一直采取比较的方式，因为我们认为：国家声誉是在竞争状态下得到的认同。从 2008 年开始，我们的测量对象一直包含一个固定的核心国家系统——这样我们可以建立**连贯**的趋势；同时，根据每位客户的需求，增加一些非核心国家。例如，2013 年，博茨瓦纳开始使用 NBI 这个政策和传播规划工具，因此进入了调查范围。我们对核心国家系统成员的选择结合了多种因素，包括政治和经济系统的多样性、人口规模的多样性、文化特征以及特别重要的——区域的代表性及其**平衡**，以使我们的研究真正体现全球性。



图 3 被测量形象的国家（50 个）

现在我们来看看 2013 年国家品牌调查最主要的发现——全球 NBI 的总形势。总体来看，NBI 得分在前 20 位（国家品牌指数平均值为 62.94 分）的国家，除了巴西之外，都是西方国家，这些国家都有成熟的市场经济和历时长久的民主体制。在这个居于 NBI 体系顶端的精英俱乐部中，巴西是唯一一个新兴市场国家，排名第 20 位。今年强势国家品牌的实力和持续性与以往几年相同：从 2008 到 2013 年的 6 年中，领先的 NBI 品牌大多被一些相同的国家所占有——稍后我们还将讨论其中的变化。但即便如此，这个精英队伍距离顶尖也还差距较远——它们的平均分还不到 63 分，而假想的完美国家品牌的 NBI 分数应是 100 分，这个队伍的平均分甚至还不到理想分数的三分之二。

排名第 21 位到第 50 位的国家，平均分（50.89 分）仅比满分的一半稍多，落后前 20 名国家 10 多分。显然，排名位于 20 多位的国家分数更高，因为它们紧跟在前 20 之后。这些国家代表了一个很有意思的群体：从第 21 位开始，首先是希腊，这是唯一一个没有排在前 20 位的西方国家；这组国家还包括知识经济小国新加坡，还有来自几乎所有大洲的新兴市场国家，如阿根廷、墨西哥、俄罗斯、中国、韩国，另外还包括三个中欧和东欧市场经济国家，如波兰、捷克和匈牙利。

接着我们来看一个宏观的问题——是什么原因让排在顶端的国家保持其领先优势呢？一个原因是对于排在前 10 位的大多数国家来说，它们国家品牌的六个领域之间能保持着很好的平衡。我们可以看一下分别排在第二位和第三位的德国和英国，它们的最高领域分数和最低领域分数排名之间差距很小。但就这个规律来说，澳大利亚和美国可能是例外，它们的最高分数和最低分数排名分别差 9 位和 14 位。（见图 4）



图 4 不同国家的最高和最低 NBI 领域指数排名位置

下面我们来观察这个表格的第二部分——金砖国家，情况便很不相同。巴西是发展中国家里排名最高的，它的各项领域指标都体现了相当不错的声誉，其最高指标排名和最低指标排名之间的差距只有 15 位。然而，印度、俄罗斯和中国还未能建立平衡的形象。它们在某些方面有很强的表现，举例来讲，俄罗斯在文化上排名第 9 位；但在最低排位的治理方面却只处于第 35 位，这两个领域之间整整差了 26 位。这种不均衡的现象也体现于中国和印度，及一般较强的发展中国家——它们是强大的新兴市场主体，尽管拥有丰富的文化遗产和其它一些正面优势，却只排在中游位置。从总体上看，它们在治理方面的表现还有待提高。

此处存在一些深刻的宏观形势。我们选择 6 个国家品牌指标的六边形（见图 5）进行对比，进而发现这些国家确实处在不同的品牌年龄段。右侧是两个在平衡性上表现不错的国家品牌，根据它们的排名情况，可以看到两个国家品牌六边形的各个区域都得到了较好的填充——这两个品牌分别来自两个西欧大国，它们都发展出了成熟的代议制民主体制和成熟的市场经济体制。深入研究细节属性后，我们会发现世界这样看待这些国家：人民可以获得公正的待遇和平等的机会，政治体系可靠，劳动力训练有素，在全球事务中能够担负责任，有令人向往的文化成就和旅游胜地，能够发明和生产优质产品。这也是领先国家的成功法则。中间是两个中小型发展中国家，其创新的民主政治体制刚刚建立，近几十年才稳定下来。在经济方面，它们做得很好，其中一个国家的人均国民生产总值（GDP）和购买力平价（PPP）已经可以和右上方的国家相比。但是，较小的国土面积、欠佳的地理位置以及其它一些原因，使得它们并没有得到特别的关注。因此，虽然它们有着平衡的表现，但这些表现显然还有待增强。左边这部分是两个市场刚刚起步的国家，它们在国际舞台上的声誉和表现尚显稚嫩—

—它们都是人口较少的国家，都不贫穷，但却有着不同的政治体制，并且它们在一个方面存在共性，即都来自世界上最不为人所知的地区。换句话说，在向世界表现它们的资源和优势、展示与当代世界的独特联系方面，这两个国家的表现还不成熟。



图 5 居于不同品牌年龄段的 6 个国家

现在来讨论宏观全景和未来趋势的变化。我们已经讨论了 NBI 得分领先国家表现的如一性。这种如一性与其说是普遍情况，不如说是例外。特别是，很多新兴市场由于缺乏如一性，会居于比较脆弱的地位——因为声誉的各种组成元素之间的确是相互联系的。例如世界上最大的出口国中国（见图 6）。



图 6 声誉元素的相互联系：中国的某些属性

中国在科技方面对世界的贡献有很高的声誉——排名第 4 位，中国的创新能力受到认可，但在“在购买其产品时感觉良好”方面，中国在 50 个国家中仅排在第 44 位。我们的一些动因分析显示，一个国家的治理形象与人们对购买该国产品是否有正面感受高度相关。中国其它方面的弱点还包括环境和人权——中国常常因为污染和工作条件恶劣而遭到指责。在全球层面考察元素之间相互联系的特征，可以从加拿大人对中国声誉各个方面的不同评价反映出来。有意思的是，在阿根廷，对中国环境和人权纪录方面的认知排名要好一些——在 50 个国家中排在 30 多位。目前，阿根廷人对于中国产品也有相当好的评价。这给予我们的重要启发是：改善驱动领域是非常重要的，然后你所期望的积极变化才会成为现实。

我们从 2008 年开始实施 Anholt-GfK 国家品牌指数。从世界范围内的 NBI 指数来看，一个确定的趋势是（品牌）强国和（品牌）弱国之间的差距正在缩小。我们的测量系统显示了在 2008—2013 年这段时间内前 20 位国家和后 30 位国家分数的变化，发现后 30 位国家在六年中指数的增长是相当显著的，接近一个百分点（+0.81）；而前 20 位国家的 NBI 平均值在这段时间内则遭遇了轻微下滑（-0.14）。当然，这还不足以消除差距，但其中蕴含的意义是清楚无误的：差距正在缩小。

我们以团粒分级方法研究一些国家之间 NBI 分值差距缩小的原因。例如，三个品牌强国——法国、意大利和西班牙——在 2008 年至 2013 年间经历了可察觉的 NBI 分值下滑，因为这些欧洲南部国家持续面临着高失业率和其它系统的低迷状况。

相反，分别位于东、中欧，拉丁美洲和东亚的波兰、智利和韩国则表现出持续强劲的经济发展势头。韩国的产品创新和流行文化已经抓住了全球的目光。后面我们还会对韩国进行更深入的分析。

金砖国家中的俄罗斯和印度这六年间的 NBI 分值波动较大，但总体上仍然呈现出上升的趋势。而不幸的是，因为一场从 2011 年开始爆发的动乱，埃及的 NBI 分值呈现出猛烈下降的趋势。

两年前，一项代际分析结果展现在我们眼前。当时，我们对居于 NBI 体系顶端的精英国家俱乐部发出了和今天同样的警示。这是一个关于世代更迭问题的调查——年轻一代与年长一代如何因怀有不同的世界观而对世界产生不同的看法。我们的研究涵盖了三代人：第一代人（45 岁以上）成长于冷战和殖民地国家的独立时代；第二代人（30 至 44 岁）在东西方两极秩序崩塌、民主化传播和全球化蔓延的时代背景下长大；第三代人（18 至 29 岁）与东西方对立的格局相距最远，而对无国界的数字网络和恐怖主义最为熟悉。

我们绘制了 NBI 分值的代际分布趋势线（见图 7），最大的发现之一是：NBI 分值最高的 10 个国家的代际得分逐代下降，而 NBI 分值最低的 10 个国家的代际得分则逐代上升。这表明：对于正在打造国际名誉和全球影响力的国家而言，现在是一个重要的开端；与此同时，对于老牌的享有国际声誉的国家而言，这种代际变化意味着巨大的挑战。



图 7 国家品牌强国和国家品牌弱国 NBI 分值的代际分布趋势图

接下来，我们将做一些更深入的探讨，并且分享一些例子。首先，后发国家如何面对全球化的挑战？我们之前提到，各个国家处于不同的品牌年龄段。现在，调查范围涵盖的 20 个国家的样本设计体现出了强大的优势：我们可以逐一查看每个国家的调查结果。比如，A 国当前刚刚开始踏上全球化舞台。我们建议 A 国仔细研究作为样本来源国的一个邻国的调查结果。一般说来，邻国的受众显然比全球受众更熟悉 A 国，他们的观点是对 A 国优势和劣势的知情评估。根据邻国评估中对 A 国“治理”和“人民”两个维度所显示的肯定性评

价，A 国政府被视为诚实的和有能力的，为维护世界和平与安全做出了贡献，且注重环保；A 国人民被视为友好的，他们享有平等的社会地位和令人惊叹的自然美景。这些坚实的优势在 A 国与邻国之间形成了牵引力。因此，我们进一步对客户指出：A 国可以并且应当在其全球传播中凸显这些真实而可靠的优势，由此开始，让良好的品牌形象逐一进入各个国家。

这里还有一个在全球品牌建设中处于中间层次的国家的例子。我们想要举这个例子，是因为对于我们测量的大部分国家来说，国家品牌六边形中都出现了大面积的空白区域。这表明在全球公民眼中，这些国家的声誉远落后于那些领先国家。尤其对于在国家品牌年龄段中处于中间层次和低层次的国家来说，从全球水平上考量自己国家品牌的六边形，可能会稍感失落。例如就案例中的中等收入国家 B 国而言，它的确尚未在一些国家的市场中树立起自己的声誉和形象。然而，从被调查的单个市场来看，它在不同市场中具有多样的表现，并且在某些市场中取得了一些成绩。如在某国调查得到的 B 国国家品牌六边形说明：B 国已经向这个大型的发展中经济体市场迈出了坚实的脚步，并且两国间具有紧密的文化联系。另外两个较为积极的六边形表明：B 国在美国和本地区的另一个发达经济体也建立了雄厚的根基。B 国的机会来自于它对自身优势有很深入的理解，例如在那些已经进入的市场中，究竟是哪些因素在起作用，以及为什么起作用？同样，机会也来自于对下面问题的回答：相同因素在欠发达的声誉市场中是否会产生相同的作用？如何利用成功的故事来拓展市场？B 国在更多市场中推广其国家品牌的关键，是将声誉建立在已有的可信故事基础上，从而逐一弥补 B 国在这些欠发达市场中的不足之处。

下面，与大家分享一些我们对全球性重大事件的观察，进而分析它们对国家声誉的潜在影响。如前所述，国家声誉的改变是一个缓慢的过程，但它的确在改变。声誉发生变化的一个原因是——国家本身发生了明显的改变；而促使国家声誉改变的更重要的原因，则是真实的变化带来了受众感觉的变化。这里要说明的是，有时感受是落后于现实的，而事件的营销传播能够利用曝光这些事件促进感受的与时俱进。我们观察到的现象是，发生的变化确实越来越多，但是期望借此全盘改变国家形象却是不切实际的。2012 年和 2013 年我们的一些 NBI 研究数据，大体能够作为 2012 年伦敦奥运会前后英国国家形象的反映。研究显示：一些领域的数据确实变动了，这些变动主要发生在可以预料到的领域，如：奥运会前后，英国“体育卓越”和“民众热情好客”两项指标的 NBI 排名分别上升了 1 位和 3 位。不过，另外一个长期调查的领域——“英国美丽的自然风光”的排名结果也有所上升。有趣的是，“社会公平”的排名也提高了：当镜头转向伦敦之外的国家景区的时候，当记者谈及奥运会如何改变了伦敦的贫困地区的时候，英国以强烈的特写形式将这个国家的自然风光和社会平等展现在整个世界眼前，随之而来的是世界对这个国家自然风光和社会平等信任感的增强。然而，在另外一些英国具有传统优势的领域，数据则没有随之上升，如：“现代文化”、“文化遗产”、“游览的渴望”等。总的来说，英国 2012 年和 2013 年的 NBI 排名均处于第三的位置，个别指标排名的上浮并不足以提升英国的总体声誉，使之超越 NBI 排行榜上前两位的国家。

我们可以在南非 2010 年世界杯上看到类似的情况。我们的调查工作正巧在赛事刚过一半的时候开始。调查显示：世界被南非的热情欢迎迷住了，在“人民热情好客”一项，南非的 NBI 排名较之 2009 年上升了 5 位。这个国家丰富多彩的文化也展现在全球舞台上，“文化遗产”一项的排名上升了 3 位。此外，南非在“自然风光”和“现代文化”上的排名也有所上升。所有这些都是全球传媒报道中体现的重要背景元素。有趣的是关于南非的另一组数据。我们知道，记者的镜头、智能手机和社交媒体也会捕捉普通人的生活场景和具有不同社会、经济特征的地区画面，这些场景和画面也是背景故事的组成部分。南非过去在“平等”和“减轻贫困”这两个重要指标上排名靠后，而在世界杯开始之后，它在这两个指标上的排名依然没有起色。而且总体来说，除了在一些领域排名有所提升之外，世界对南非的整体看

法在很大程度上是世界杯前一年的延续。这样的结果印证了我们的看法：国家声誉的改变是一个缓慢和渐进的过程，并且它只产生于现实行为的变化；即便是最成功的营销传播，也只能设法缩短相对于现实的感受滞后，而这些改变仅在之前鲜有报道和受众缺乏经验的领域发生作用；全球性的重大事件实际上增加了那些根深蒂固的问题曝光的机会，因此，反映现实反而可能进一步增强负面感受。

就像我们之前看到的，即便精英国家也不是完美的，仍然有许多工作需要做。我们在这里展示了一个西欧精英国家的支持者和非支持者的观点。在一个采用七级量表的调查中，77%的支持者在“品牌美誉度”一项给这个精英国家打出了最高和次高的分数。而在非支持者中，只有 14%的人做出了同样的选择。这是一个巨大的差距，而正因为这种现象发生在一个名列前茅的精英国家，因此便更加引人注目——它强调了所有国家都必须面对的任务。

这项任务之所以重要，是因为声誉是两个重要的管理维度共同塑造的结果。首先是利用支持者。动员那些对你的国家有正面印象和经验的人，使其在个人行为（如消费和旅游）与公众行为（如人际交往和贸易）中帮助你的国家，以扩展国家品牌的传播范围。其次是与非支持者建立密切的关系，并且将他们转化为支持者。这项工作更具有挑战性：因为市场里充满了竞争者，而民众的心早有归属。想要实现与支持者和非支持者的结合，需要我们对其需求、欲望、希望和梦想有所洞察。成功的声誉管理超越了“理解自己”的层次，进而追求对受众的理解。我们需要理解受众的需求，从而相应地运用我们的声誉优势，以有意义、有关联的方式与其结合。

那么，我们对刚才提及的精英国家的支持者和非支持者有哪些了解呢？以 X 国为例，我们列出了支持者和非支持者对这个国家的形象进行审视时，他们头脑中那些影响其判断的个人价值观因素，这些价值观在处于全球联系的公民看来十分重要。此外，我们从人口统计学的角度勾画出了“支持者”和“非支持者”两个群体特征的区别。这一项类似的研究为我们提供了人口统计学层面和个人态度层面的全面详实的数据——既有以国家为分析单位的总体性数据，也有国家内部的微观数据。

从人口统计学角度来讲，X 国非支持者的年龄相对年轻、经济地位相对较低、居住在小城市和农村地区的比重相对较高、与 X 国直接接触的经验相对较少。他们刚刚开始了解这个国家。从个人态度方面看他们的价值观，无论是支持者还是非支持者，都将思考和行动的自由性与独立性、关心和帮助他人认作重要的价值。这种同质性，显示了为他们设计一致的总体性传播主题的可能性。但是，也需要注意两个群体在价值排列优先性上的一些细微差别。比如，支持者赋予财富和地位更高的重要性。导致这种现象的原因可能是：这个国家对“奋斗者”具有很强的吸引力，而这些人对 X 国的世界级产品、繁荣和旅游目的地了如指掌。另一方面，更年轻和与数字生活联系更紧密的非支持者群体，则稍微倾向于将家庭和朋友、简单的生活、易于获得的乐趣和刺激等富有都市活力的领域放在更重要的位置上。而在这些领域，X 国却排名靠后，说明它需要向非支持者证明这个国家存在哪些相关条件，以及正在做出哪些努力，以满足他们的这些需求。

让我们回到一个重要的问题上来：什么造就了声誉和好感？对此没有一种放之四海而皆准的答案。我们知道，声誉是集合了各种因素的复合体，但是有些因素在塑造国家品牌时显示出更显著的重要性，所起的作用要比其它因素更大。我们进行了一项动因分析，显示每种声誉属性在塑造国家综合性好感度中的作用。分析发现：没有魔弹可以一击便中，是众多的因素共同塑造了国家的声誉。尽管如此，我们还是发现了一些自然形成的具有影响力的元素群（见图 8）。首先，排在前列的第一组中的三个因素都与出口指标有关，亦即：“原产国/喜欢购买该国产品”、“科学技术创新”和“有创意的、前沿想法和新思考”，这是当前各国

与世界进行连结的最主要方法之一，消费者不需要踏出国门就可以接触到它国的商品。第二组是围绕国家治理主题的因素——“有能力和诚实的政府”、“尊重公民权利/公平对待民众”。政府的行为是公开的，展示在全球平台上，而公众一直对其进行监督。第三组中包括三个与人和地方相关的因素：“高质量的生活”、“长期生活和工作吸引度”和“热情友好的民众”。也就是说：你愿意呆在这里吗？



图 8 驱动声誉提升的三种因素

我们对这些有趣的信息进行了一个分析。首先，科技创新抓住了人们的想象力，促进了相互的意识和联系，并且这不是精英国家独有的领域。其次，什么因素没有出现呢？特别是在第二和第三组中？我们发现，投资的机会和闪光事件没有被包含在内；而这个国家是否诚信、公平，对待普通民众的方式是否公正，则被认为是必要的。政治和政策才与民众生活利益攸关。再次，联系之前提到的各种因素之间的互联性，我们发现，国家治理的声誉能够支持对产品的好感。

下面，我们来分享一下韩国的案例。我们对韩国已经进行了六年的追踪，其间韩国的 NBI 排名提升了 6 位——从 2008 年的第 33 位上升到了 2013 年的第 27 位。促使受众对韩国国家形象的认知发生变化的，是我们前面提到的因素——抓住想象力、科学和技术、创造力，还有体育的进步。试想一下过去这几年里“三星”、“现代”，还有“江南 style”遍布全球的足迹吧。韩国在国家治理方面的得分仅排名中游，这未能使上述因素获得更高的好感度；但也不像中国那样，拖了其它因素的后腿。但是，韩国在国家声誉建设方面还有重要的事情要做：在“热情友好的民众”和“访问愿望”两项驱动性因素方面，韩国接近底端，两者的排名分列第 39 位和第 41 位。

在总结部分，我们先跟大家分享一个从去年的调查中得出的重要结论，它强调了与受众保持关联的重要性。我们向来自全球各地的 20000 多个受访者提出了一个问题：对一个国家而言，你最欣赏的是哪些方面？换句话说，对我们那些想要俘获全球受众之心的客户国家来说，你们的受众看重的是国家的哪些特质？对来自 20 个调查国家的数据进行分析之后，我们总结出了受访者最为欣赏的五大特征：1）“这是一个民主的、开放的国家，能够平等地对待公民”；2）“这是一个不仅拥有高质量的生活，并且在工作和生活之间达到平衡的国家”；3）“这是一个关注环保、尊重自然，拥有洁净的空气和水源的国家”；具有同样重要性的是 4）“这个国家安全有序，民众行为良好”和 5）“这个国家的民众对客人热情友善”（见图 9）。

这五大特征很好地回应了之前提到的造就国家声誉的动因，以及那些在国际声誉上领先的国家所具备的主要特征。虽然对于几个文化取向鲜明的国家来说，其它一些独特的因素更加重要，如，平等之于瑞典，繁荣之于埃及和土耳其，以及高度熟练的劳动力之于日本。但是总体而言，这五大特征对于全球公民具有普遍意义。



图 9 受众最欣赏的五大国家特质

下面简要介绍一下我们的 GfK 团队提供的地方品牌服务。首先和基础性的是国家品牌指数（NBI）与城市品牌指数（CBI）测评服务，这是我们和独立的政府顾问 Simon Anholt 先生合作提供的。这些全球性服务被各大洲的许多政府部门及其传播机构视为关键的绩效指标。NBI 和 CBI 通过市场调查帮助我们的客户逐个追踪自己在不同市场的重要性，并将结果告知内部的利益相关者和外部的支持者，然后在政策和传播规划中运用这些得到的知识。我们还通过定性和定量研究，探索品牌基因（DNA），确定什么是真实、可靠的，以及什么可能加强品牌与受众的联系或者转变非支持者的态度。我们也针对重大的运动和事件进行前后测量。我们还准备在想要建立团粒组合竞争工具的个别地区进行更深入的挖掘，如全美城市品牌指数项目，和潜力非洲国家的品牌指数项目。我们的出发点是：希望客户利用我们建立多年的地方品牌研究的洞见，选择最符合需求的形象塑造工具。

最后，概括一下我们今天讨论的关键知识。首先，虽然国家声誉一般是稳定的，其改变通常是缓慢的，但是改变确实在发生，并且国家品牌强国和其它国家之间的差距正在缩小。对于已经树立起成熟品牌的国家来说，如何连结相对年轻和数字一代的受众至关重要——理解这些受众，满足他们的需求，有助于将对传统国家品牌优势感觉淡漠的一代转变为这些品牌的支持者。其次，对于追赶先进的发展中国家而言，需要谨记哪些动因造就了整体的好感，使一个国家得到世界的欣赏。尽管创新和科技是声誉提升的引擎，但是发展中国家仍然需要弥补最深的缺陷，包括廉政和洁净环境的缺失。再次，我们看到，重大事件可以扳动国家声誉的一些指标，但只是有选择地发生在一些先前罕有报道的领域；而且需要注意，在精心策划的重大事件中，根深蒂固的问题甚至可能暴露出来，面临更密切的监督。因此，对于维护国家品牌的人来说，在事件传播方案中，坚持透明和以解决问题为导向的传播是十分重要的。最后，对于那些刚刚踏上世界舞台进行国家品牌角逐的“新手”来说，利用自己熟悉的市场成功故事是重要的第一步，如此便能在世界舞台上放大这些成功，进而带动新的市场。

学术活动信息

第四届全球媒介伦理圆桌会议

第四届全球媒介伦理圆桌会议（The Fourth Roundtable on Global Media Ethics）于 4 月 19-21 日在清华大学召开。教育部新闻传播学学科指导委员会主任委员、中国传媒大学副校长胡正荣与清华大学新闻与传播学院院长、国家新闻出版总署前署长柳斌杰教授在开幕式上致辞。

“全球媒介伦理圆桌会议”迄今已经在南非、迪拜、印度举办过 3 届。第四届会议的主题是专业性（Professionalism）。国际著名学者克里斯琴斯(Clifford G. Christians)、威尔金斯（Lee Wilkins）、沃瑟曼（Herman Wasserman）、拉奥（Shakuntala Rao）、沃德（Stephen J.A.Ward），中国港台学者陈韬文、苏蘅，大陆学者陈昌凤、陈立丹、郭镇之、单波、吴飞、阴卫芝、张洪超、展江等发表了论文，黄瑚、孙有中、史安斌、张咏华、胡泳等主持或者担任评议，数十位中国青年教师出席了会议。

会议同期还举办了“中国媒介伦理学术论坛”，7 位学者发表了论文，全国 30 位媒介伦理与法领域的高校教师参加了论坛。Clifford G. Christians 教授寄语中国学者：共同为新媒体技术时代媒介伦理的理论与案例研究作出贡献。

“解码玉兔”国际传播研讨会在我院召开

4 月 21 日，“解码玉兔”国际传播研讨会在清华大学宏盟楼多功能厅召开，各界专家共同研讨“月球车玉兔”微博国际传播的新经验、新做法和新启示。本次研讨会由清华大学新闻与传播学院联合新华社对外部主办，清华大学爱泼斯坦对外传播研究中心承办。我院常务副院长尹鸿教授、新华社对外部主任严文斌出席了此次研讨会并致辞。

清华大学新闻与传播学院副院长、爱泼斯坦对外传播研究中心执行主任史安斌教授做了题为《走向对话、互动与融合：从“月球车玉兔”集成报道看全媒体新闻话语体系的构建和危机传播模态的创新》的主旨发言。“月球车玉兔”微博的主创团队在此次研讨会上讲述了策划和创意过程。新华社对外部新媒体室主任顾钱江、果壳网主编徐来、新华社对外部记者姬少亭、果壳网市场经理宗唯伊分别从不同角度做了发言。新华社对外部副主任、科幻作家韩松和中国探月工程总体部部长刘彤杰对策划进行了点评。

参与研讨的专家还包括中国新闻史学会会长、北京大学新闻与传播学院教授程曼丽、新华社新闻研究所国际传播研究中心主任唐润华、中国人民大学新闻学院教授钟新等。

本次研讨会由清华大学爱泼斯坦对外传播研究中心常务副主任周庆安主持。《中国日报》、《新京报》、《中国记者》、《对外传播》等媒体的记者出席了此次研讨会。

我院院长柳斌杰做客时事大讲堂讲述中国媒体新格局

5 月 13 日晚，全国人大教科文卫委员会主任委员、清华大学新闻与传播学院院长柳斌杰教授座客清华大学时事大讲堂，发表了题为“在改革创新中重构新闻传播新格局”的演讲。校党委书记陈旭出席了讲座。

讲座最后，学生代表向柳斌杰赠送了时事大讲堂的嘉宾认证牌。

新闻与传播学院党委书记金兼斌、校团委书记赵博等相关负责人出席了本次活动。此次讲座由时事大讲堂与新闻与传播学院《马克思主义新闻观研究》课程合办。

本场活动是时事大讲堂的第 151 期讲座。时事大讲堂是由校团委宣传部主办的形势政策讲座平台。自 2004 年成立以来，秉承“时效性”、“高端性”、“权威性”的宗旨，帮助在校学生了解时事政策、社会热点和理论前沿，为清华学生搭建了“处身校园，紧跟时代；胸怀祖国，放眼世界”的平台。

“全媒体时代的危机传播与新闻发布”国际学术论坛在清华举行

5 月 17 日，由清华大学新闻与传播学院、清华－伊斯雷尔•爱泼斯坦对外传播研究中心主办，中国新闻史学会外国新闻传播史研究委员会协办的“全媒体时代的危机传播与新闻发布”国际学术论坛在清华大学新闻与传播学院多功能厅举行。清华大学新闻与传播学院副院长史安斌教授、美国佛罗里达中部大学尼克森传播学院教授蒂莫西•库姆斯、香港中文大学新闻与传播学院教授黄懿慧、台湾辅仁大学传播学院院长吴宜蓁教授出席了研讨会并做主题发言，来自国内外的 60 余位专家学者及研究生参加了本次论坛。

开幕式上，清华大学副校长谢维和、清华大学新闻与传播学院党委书记金兼斌、中国新闻史学会会长陈昌凤分别致辞。论坛由清华－伊斯雷尔•爱泼斯坦对外传播研究中心常务副主任周庆安及清华大学新闻与传播学院全球财经新闻硕士项目主任杭敏主持。

史安斌教授做了题为《绘制危机传播与政府新闻发布的路线图：东西方对话的视角》的主旨演讲。蒂莫西•库姆斯教授做了题为《从内到外的观照：全媒体时代企业危机传播的挑战》的主旨演讲。黄懿慧教授和吴宜蓁教授分别就《风险社会中的危机沟通：研究的挑战与契机》、《理论 vs 实务：危机传播研究的几点迷思》做了主题演讲。

下午，参会的外新史会员单位代表就《危机传播与媒体执政的中国经验——危机传播视角下的“昆明火车站暴恐事件”分析》、《风险交流视域下的回应性政府与媒体关系》等做了专题发言，并与参会专家学者展开了热烈讨论。

新闻与传播学院前沿讲座

5 月 16 日晚，台湾辅仁大学传播学院院长吴宜蓁教授与香港中文大学新闻与传播学院黄懿慧教授到访清华大学新闻与传播学院，发表了精彩演讲，并与清华师生进行了深入交流和讨论。清华大学新闻与传播学院副院长、清华-伊斯雷尔•爱泼斯坦对外传播研究中心执行主任史安斌教授主持了讲座。

吴宜蓁教授的讲座主题是“探讨危机传播的理论取径”，她立足于经典理论，结合新近案例，通过“危机预防到危机沟通”和“从微观取向到巨观取向”两个主线介绍了她在危机

传播领域的研究成果和研究体会。吴宜蓁教授认为：在当下全媒体的语境中，危机预防比危机的处理更重要。她表示，未来的危机传播研究应该是一个包含预防和沟通，微观和巨观的全面研究模式。

黄懿慧教授做了以“自西方而返：公共关系研究的挑战与前瞻”的主题讲座。黄懿慧教授首先回顾了她自己的学术旅程，并基于详细的文献整理和分析描述了她对公共关系的定义和分类。此外，黄懿慧教授还结合具体文献和案例，对自己在华人公共关系管理领域的研究历程做了全面的介绍。

2014 财经新闻论坛在清华举行

6 月 13 日，2014 清华财经新闻论坛在清华大学新闻与传播学院举行。本次论坛主要探讨“财经报道中的数据新闻”，议题为“数据的力量：驾驭财经新闻报道中的信息革命（The Power of Data: harness the information revolution to improve business journalism）”。论坛邀请了来自英国牛津大学、美国乔治华盛顿大学、亚利桑那州立大学、华盛顿邮报、彭博新闻社、中国日报和中央电视台等单位的 60 多位学界业界专家，共同探讨了数据新闻的发展、数据新闻在财经报道中的应用以及数据新闻时代的财经新闻教育三大主题。

论坛由清华大学新闻与传播学院全球财经新闻硕士项目主任杭敏副教授主持。英国牛津大学 Robert Picard 教授做了题为《数据新闻与财经新闻报道》的主旨演讲。Picard 教授阐释了数据新闻的正能量、对财经新闻报道的优势、新闻机构尝试数据新闻的有效应对经验等。

美国乔治华盛顿大学 Michael Shanahan 教授做了题为《新闻：改变，痛苦以及数字叙述者的未来》的主旨演讲，认为：未来媒体发展的趋势是数据新闻、可视化新闻及付费新闻。彭博新闻社大中华地区总经理 John Liu 先生做了题为《彭博新闻社的数据新闻》的主题演讲，刘先生以彭博新闻社为例，讲述目前从业者如何用数据报道当下新闻，并预测了未来的经济发展走势。美国亚利桑那大学财经新闻项目主任 Andrew Leckey 教授做了题为《财经新闻数据：青年力量与技术力量》的主题演讲，分析今后数据挖掘与数据财经新闻走势，对青年记者抱有很大期望。

在随后的对话与讨论环节，央视经济新闻部主任肖振生博士与主题发言人一起回答了参会者提出的问题，并进行了深入的互动交流。

论坛下午，《财经国家周刊》总编吴亮先生、清华财经新闻项目联合主任 Rick Dunham 教授、《华盛顿邮报》多媒体主编 Pam Tobey 女士、彭博新闻社数据新闻记者 Henry Sanderson 先生、中国日报社财经新闻记者蓝澜女士、北京工商大学新闻学院副院长王擎教授和中央财经大学谭云明教授分别就《美国国际记者协会 30 年》、《数据媒体的兴起》、《案例研究：华盛顿邮报如何展示可视化数据》、《中国的财经新闻数据挖掘》等做了专题发言，与参会学者探讨了如何将数据、信息图标和财经新闻相结合以融汇数据的力量，驾驭财经新闻报道中的信息革命等核心问题。

清华大学于 2007 年开设了“全球财经新闻硕士项目”，是目前大陆唯一的双语财经新闻项目。该项目至今已培养来自四十多个国家与地区的学生，向国内外新闻单位输送了大量的财经新闻人才。自 2007 年以来，清华大学还定期举办财经新闻论坛，打造财经新闻教育的合作平台，探讨财经媒体的发展。

外国新闻传播史研究委员会 2014 年会暨学术研讨会在河南大学举行

外国新闻传播史研究委员会 2014 年年会暨学术研讨会 6 月 14 日在河南大学举行，研讨会主题是：“思考与呈现：中外新闻传播比较研究”。此次研讨会系外新史会与河南大学新闻与传播学院及其传媒研究所、编辑出版研究中心联合主办。

参加此次会议的有来自清华大学、中国人民大学、中国传媒大学、社科院新闻与传播研究所、新华社新闻研究所、北京外国语大学、上海外国语大学、华中科技大学、山东大学、深圳大学、河南大学、郑州大学、安徽大学等全国二十多所院所的学者近四十人。清华大学新闻与传播学院郭镇之教授，中国人民大学新闻学院陈立丹教授，中国传媒大学传播研究院陈卫星教授，河南大学黄河学者、清华大学新闻与传播学院李彬教授，清华大学新闻与传播学院副院长陈昌凤教授等作了主题演讲，学者们就中外新闻传播业交往互动的历程、新媒体时代与全球化背景下中外新闻传播业求同存异的路径进行了深入研讨。

下午的分组讨论中，与会学者围绕中外新闻传播的理念与实践，新媒体时代的环境新闻、新闻作品著作权、舆论监督、政府舆论管理等广泛的议题发表了研究成果，并进行了深入的交流。

会议期间，郭镇之会长还主持召开了外国新闻传播史研究委员会第二届理事会第四次会议，就外新史会明年的工作计划和换届等议题进行了讨论。外新史学会副会长、北京外国语大学副校长孙有中教授，常务理事辜晓进、张威、唐海江、张举玺（新增），以及外新史会理事及理事单位代表 19 人参加了工作研讨。

外新史学会是国家一级学会中国新闻史学会下设的二级学会，于 2008 年创设，连续两届秘书处均设于清华大学新闻与传播学院。学会连年主办了年会及学术研讨会，还配合多个单位协办了多次学术活动。